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Introduction 
We all depend on the extensive biodiversity found on this planet. The 
range of vegetation and varieties of plant life are of critical importance as 
they form the basis of the food chains that have nourished us throughout 
history. In addition to food products, a wide variety of products is directly 
or indirectly derived from plants, including (bio)fuels, building materials, 
soaps, cosmetics, pesticides and medicines. In respect of the last in this 
list, over 70% of humanity depends on plants as the primary source of 
medication, and, as well as this usage for traditional medicines, plants are 
also extensively utilized within the pharmaceutical industry, forming the 
basis of such widely used drugs as aspirin and taxol (Griffo & Rosenthal, 
1997). Ten years ago, the global market value of products derived from 
plants and micro-organisms was already estimated at between 500 and 800 
billion US dollars, a figure roughly equivalent to that for the annual global 
sales of petrochemicals, or the worldwide computer market (ten Kate & 
Laird, 1999, p. 1). 
 
New developments and demands such as novel uses of plants in the bio-
based economy, the adaptation of plants to new conditions (e.g. as 
presented by climate change), the emergence of new diseases, and the 
need for ever greater yields to feed a growing world population, lead to 
continuous searches for ‘new’ diversity that can be included in production 
systems. Where such searches are mainly focused at finding new traits 
within the existing plant species, biotechnologies vastly increase the scope 
of genetic diversity that may be used and speed with which it may be 
harnessed. Biotechnology is defined by the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity as “any technological application that uses biological systems, 
living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or 
processes for specific use” (UNEP, 1992, Article 2) – a very broad 
definition encompassing everything from traditional beer brewing to 
cloning of higher animals. The term ‘plant biotechnology’ is used in a 
more narrow sense, i.e. the use of molecular biology tools that focus on 
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the knowledge and use of plant “genetic material”, the material containing 
“functional units of heredity” (UNEP, 1992, Article 2). 
 
Plant biotechnology now has several sub-divisions and a wide and rapidly 
expanding set of associated applications. It is, for example, increasingly 
possible to map and study the entire genetic constitution of an organism 
(structural genomics), the genes and their function (functional genomics), 
the structure of the RNA (transcriptomics) and proteins (proteomics) and 
the whole network of metabolic pathways leading to actual functional 
products that the plant produces (metabolomics). With such knowledge it 
is possible to identify which genes code for particular traits of interest. In 
the case, for example, of gene(s) found to increase resistance to a 
particular disease to which crops are susceptible, the relevant material may 
be transferred to the crop through traditional plant breeding, or through 
marker assisted breeding, or through various forms of genetic modification 
(transgenesis), which involves the insertion of a gene into one species 
from another.1 
 
With biotechnology creating new knowledge about and possible uses for 
plants and their genetic material, the plant genetic resources that can be 
found around the world have become more valuable as possible source 
material for new inventions and products. It is not just the plant genetic 
resources that are the locus of value in this respect, however, for to search 
randomly for interesting traits in plants would be an extremely costly and 
time-consuming task. Biotechnology companies and public researchers are 
also interested, therefore, in existing knowledge that can serve as possible 
leads to valuable characteristics in already identified varieties. Particularly 
interesting in this regard is the so-called traditional knowledge of the 
natural environment that indigenous communities have acquired over the 
centuries through their foraging, farming and development of new sources 
of sustenance, herbal remedies, plant-based fuels, etc. The term 
“traditional knowledge” is commonly used to refer to this broad mix of 
                                                 
1
 The technology of transgenesis has aroused much social and political debate, which will 
not be considered here. For an ethical reflection on the topic, see e.g. (Thompson, 2007). 
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knowledge, traditions, innovations and practices passed orally by the 
members of a community from generation to generation and managed by 
the community’s own laws of custom.2 
 
Laws of a different kind have entered the contemporary arena, however. 
The new products and scientific inventions derived from plant genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge are increasingly protected 
by Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). IPRs such as patents and 
copyrights provide the creator of a particular invention or text with an 
exclusive but time-limited right to use and commercially exploit it.3 
Because of the high costs of biotechnology research and development, 
IPRs play an important role and are generally considered the primary 
means to recuperate investments in this field. Thus, during the last two 
decades, patent activity in relation to biological and genetic material has 
acquired an increasingly prominent position within the international patent 
system (Oldham & Cutter, 2006). 
 
The issue arises, then, of how these IPRs on new inventions and products 
relate to the plant genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge from 
which they are derived, and who is to share in their benefits. Most often, 
the new inventions are produced in industrialized countries with the 
financial and technical capacities for extensive biotechnology research, 
which may not be the countries where these resources originate from. This 
becks the question whether (and how) compensation must be paid to the 
countries and communities that provide the knowledge and/or genetic 
resources. Such questions have become the subject of an increasing public 
and political debate around the world. This research project focuses on this 
discussion, and especially on questions concerning the sharing of the 
benefits of plant genetic resources and associated knowledge and how this 
relates to the increasing focus on IPRs in modern research and 
development. 
                                                 
2
 More detailed information and descriptions of traditional knowledge and can be found 
in, e.g. (Twarog & Kapoor, 2004). 
3
 For more information see, e.g. http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ [Accessed 7 July 
2009]. 
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Benefit-sharing 
Two major international agreements were negotiated over the past couple 
of decades setting out principles for the benefit-sharing of plant genetic 
resources, and remain the primary regulatory instruments in the field. The 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) proclaims access to 
genetic resources to be subject to “sharing in a fair and equitable way the 
results of research and development and the benefits arising from the 
commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting 
Party providing such resources” (UNEP, 1992, Article 15.7). Besides 
monetary benefits, this includes access to and transfer of technology 
(Article 16), the exchange of information (Article 17), and technical and 
scientific cooperation (Article 18), with a special emphasis on 
biotechnology (Article 19) and the sharing of benefits derived from 
traditional knowledge (Article 8j). So far, 191 countries have signed and 
become parties to the CBD, committing themselves thereby to conserving 
genetic resources, promoting their sustainable use, and arranging for fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing.4 
 
The CBD was followed in 2001 by the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) of the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the CBD Bonn Guidelines in 2002. 
The ITPGR establishes a Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing that, while in harmony with the CBD, focuses especially on plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture deemed to be important for 
global food security. The Bonn Guidelines, meanwhile, provide extra, 
voluntary guidelines regarding the Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) 
provisions in the CBD, aiming to “assist Parties, Governments and other 
stakeholders in developing overall access and benefit-sharing strategies, 
and in identifying the steps involved in the process of obtaining access to 
genetic resources and benefit-sharing” (UNEP, 2002, p. IV). 
 
                                                 
4
 See http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/ [Accessed 7 July 2009]. 
One Plants, Genes and Justice 
16 
 
Despite these guidelines, the ABS provisions of the CBD have not been 
successfully implemented: “ten years later, (…) fewer than 10% of CBD 
Parties had adopted ABS legislation, and virtually none of those claimed 
that their ABS arrangements were functioning effectively” (Tvedt & 
Young, 2007, p. 1). And with respect to the ITPGR, disputes over the 
practical implementation of the Multilateral System and its benefit-sharing 
component in particular continue today.5 It is perhaps no surprise then that 
the current negotiations on an International Regime on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing, as called for by the parties to the CBD in 2002 and 
supposed to be completed no later than 2010, are progressing very 
slowly.6 
 
An increasing number of studies have been made over recent years aiming 
to analyze the causes behind the current failures and difficulties.7 Many of 
these focus on the legal, economic or other technical aspects that 
complicate any successful implementation of the ABS provisions. Others 
have examined the broader socio-political aspects involved in specific 
ABS agreements or with respect to particular stakeholders. Building upon 
this existing body of literature, this research project aims also to add an 
extra perspective, one oriented towards a consideration of ethics. 
 
Very few studies of ABS have applied an ethical perspective to the 
subject, and most of these have only dealt superficially with notions of 
justice and philosophical morality. This seems rather strange given the 
usage of terms like “fair and equitable sharing” and the obvious centrality 
of ethics and ethical concerns in tackling the basic questions of benefit-
sharing (who gets what, how is it distributed, and who decides). Some of 
these issues have been taken up in discussions about human genetic 
resources, especially in relation to the Statement on Benefit-Sharing of the 
Human Genome Organization (HUGO Ethics Committee, 2000) in 2000. 
                                                 
5
 The latest meeting of the ITPGR Governing Bodies (prior to the preparation of this 
work) dealt primarily with this issue. See e.g. (Finkel, 2009). 
6
 See https://www.cbd.int/abs/ir/ [Accessed 7 July 2009]. 
7
 About a hundred articles and reports, for example, are listed on the CBD website (at 
https://www.cbd.int/abs/ir/0014.shtml?field=area&value=ABS [Accessed 7 July 2009]). 
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Ethical discussions in this regard have revolved around topics like prior 
informed consent, standards of privacy and issues of communication in 
research projects, and the ownership and commodification of human body 
parts.8 Obviously, these issues are particularly relevant in the field of 
medical research, policy formation and decision-making, and only a few 
will be equally important with respect to plant genetic resources.9 
 
Another relevant comparison may be drawn with the field of pollution 
control and climate change. In this area, the Kyoto Protocol and 
subsequent international negotiations on the global burden-sharing of 
emissions reduction and resulting development of a quota system have 
been subject to in-depth philosophical scrutiny, to the extent that a whole 
new discipline seems to have been created.10 The contrast here with the 
place of ethics in the world of ABS is manifest. Neither the official 
documents nor most studies commenting on the notion of “fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing” as applied to plant genetic resources and 
repeatedly proclaimed in the aforementioned treaties seek to inquire into 
the ethical issues, let alone actually provide real explanation or offer 
definitions. We can only conclude that the philosophical discussion on 
plant genetic resource benefit-sharing thus far has been very weak. 
Research questions 
This thesis aims to address the lack of social and scientific debate on the 
ethical dimensions of benefit-sharing in the field of plant genetic 
resources, related knowledge and IPRs. This will be done, by investigating 
and exemplifying the normative positions and argumentations within the 
current debates on benefit-sharing, and by reflecting on the meaning of 
and possibilities for fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Rather than 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. (Sheremeta & Knoppers, 2007; Williams & Schroeder, 2004). 
9
 E.g. the discussion on prior informed consent (see e.g. the Bonn Guidelines, Articles 24 
- 40). 
10
 See e.g. (Beckman & Page, 2008). 
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zooming straight into the myriad of specific, detailed difficulties related to 
the ethics of benefit-sharing, therefore, this study aims to begin from the 
start by asking what benefit-sharing is actually about and what it is 
supposed to accomplish. 
 
In order to give direction and guide the research, the following questions 
are focused on: 
1) When did the concept of benefit-sharing originate and for what 
purpose was it developed? 
2) What are the major difficulties (practical, as well as ethical) that 
complicate the current negotiations on and implementation of 
benefit-sharing policies? 
3) What normative positions and objectives are incorporated in the 
a. international legislation on benefit-sharing? 
b. benefit-sharing policies of international, national and local 
organizations? 
c. stakeholders’ perceptions of benefit-sharing? 
4) What is the relation between benefit-sharing and intellectual 
property rights: do they support or impede each other? 
5) What is fair and equitable benefit-sharing and how might it best be 
realized? 
 
Of the wide range of applications and research sectors encompassed by 
plant genetic resource benefit-sharing, those in the areas of agriculture and 
medicine are probably most important. It is the former that are considered 
in the chapters to follow where more specific applications of certain plant 
genetic resources and their users and providers are highlighted, with 
emphasis placed on the so-called plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture or on the public agricultural research sector. Two main reasons 
for this are 1) that benefit-sharing issues with respect to medicinal plants 
and the pharmaceutical industry have already received relatively much 
attention in the literature, and 2) that there are particularly pressing 
problems with respect to ABS and the agricultural sector in the face of 
global food security, an area in which the public research sector plays a 
major role. 
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Ethical perspective 
Our ethical reflection is strongly informed by a pragmatist ethics.11 One 
central characteristic of this approach is that it does not start from an 
overarching moral principle or particular theory of social justice. Instead, 
it claims the freedom to apply existing moral principles and theories 
wherever they can contribute to the practical inquiry and ethical 
assessment of real-life questions and problems: 
While consequentialists take collective happiness to be the moral 
touchstone, and deontologists the obliging character of moral 
norms, pragmatism revolves around the possibilities for living and 
working together. Pragmatism’s primary concern is to facilitate 
the solving of problems and the settlement of conflicts emerging 
from our joint activities and practices in order to improve 
cooperation and enable peaceful cohabitation. (Keulartz et al, 
2002, p. 252)  
A pragmatic, flexible and problem-oriented approach is badly needed to 
cope with the complex and dynamic character of the issue at hand. The 
socio-political debates, legal rulings, and scientific developments are in a 
state of continuous flux, constantly evolving and involving a broad, still 
increasing range of different stakeholders. One of the benefits of a 
pragmatic ethics in this respect is that it is as much interested in the 
process of (ethical) inquiry as in its products. Implicit in this shared 
emphasis is the need for decisions to be made on the basis of a careful 
consideration of all relevant ethical positions, claims and arguments, with 
all parties involved able to take a proper part in proceedings and have their 
say. This is not to assert that this is always possible, but it refers to the 
ideal situation of a “fair and open discourse” (Thompson, 2002, p. 215), 
which a pragmatic ethics always strives for. Furthermore, because ethical 
positions and standpoints are not always easily conceived of and 
expressed, a pragmatist ethics takes much effort in explicating normative 
                                                 
11
 The philosophical foundations and methodologies of this approach are thoroughly 
discussed in (Keulartz et al, 2002). 
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positions, assumptions and differences. Overall, a pragmatist ethics aims 
to facilitate public debate and decision-making towards possible solutions 
and/or compromises, appreciating that one single solution, the right 
answer, is often non-existent in the complex, multi-faceted and 
interconnected societies of today. 
 
This is not to imply that a pragmatist ethics does no more than merely 
evaluate existing situations: indeed it also endeavors to devise alternative 
pathways for the future. Another important characteristic of a pragmatic 
ethics in this respect is described in terms of a “shift in emphasis from the 
context of justification to the context of discovery” (Keulartz et al, 2004, p. 
18, [referring to Caspary, 2000]). Rather than focusing chiefly on the 
justification of certain moral judgments, that is, pragmatism also 
emphasizes “the importance of novel constructs and hypotheses with 
which emergent problems can be tackled” (idem, p. 18). On the basis of 
creative and heuristic thinking, new perspectives, alternative (moral) 
vocabularies, and possible lines of actions are formulated in order to find 
or create openings in the problems and conflicts of the day. 
Methodology 
The research questions listed above reflect the foundations of a pragmatist 
ethics, aimed as they are primarily at gaining insight into and clarifying 
the different (ethical) viewpoints, objectives and difficulties with respect 
to benefit-sharing. In order to acquire a sufficiently comprehensive and 
realistic overview of these issues the research has been based on a 
combination of inquiry techniques, involving desktop research, 
stakeholder interviews, site-visits, and international meetings and 
conferences. These include: 
- An extensive study of the scientific literature, policy documents, 
minutes and news reports, 
- Over 75 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders on location in 
Kenya, Peru and the Netherlands, 
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- Attendance at meetings of the CBD and its Ad Hoc Open-Ended 
Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, and a visit to the 
FAO, 
- Participation in international workshops on ABS in Germany and 
India, 
- Organization of an international conference in the Netherlands 
aiming to prompt public debate on public-sector intellectual 
property and benefit-sharing. 
The three countries chosen as the sites for interviews and visits – Kenya, 
Peru and the Netherlands – were selected with the intention of gaining 
input from a diverse and diffuse group of stakeholders. Varying hugely in 
their socio-political and cultural make-up and each with its own views and 
interests in respect of benefit-sharing and plant genetic resources, these 
countries are also members of three different geo-political cooperation 
organizations (the African Union, the Andean Community, and the 
European Union). Within the three countries, representatives from various 
scientific, governmental, industrial and civil society organizations were 
interviewed, both with respect to their opinions about and experiences of 
benefit-sharing (in the conference room or on the ground), and in regard to 
their understanding of the objectives and problems of benefit-sharing in 
general. 
 
At an international level, meetings of the CBD and the FAO headquarters 
were attended in order to gain a better appreciation – through observation, 
corridor-talk, and semi-structured interviews – of the international 
negotiations on ABS. This was complemented by the participation in two 
international workshops on ABS in Bremen (Germany) and New Delhi 
(India).12 Together with the extensive literature research, these sources are 
believed to provide a broad and heterogeneous basis adequate for the 
purposes here of extracting general findings and conclusions. 
 
                                                 
12
 See http://www.feu.uni-bremen.de/downloads/Workshop/programme.pdf and 
http://www.ris.org.in/icgr_prg.htm [Accessed 7 July 2009]. 
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In addition to research into the current state of affairs regarding benefit-
sharing, the research project aims to search for and formulate possible 
solutions for the identified impasse and explore options that might 
promote fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Apart from some specific 
alternative pathways reflected upon in the following chapters, the aim is 
also to contribute to the promotion of public debate in this respect, 
especially with interaction between stakeholders. For this purpose, we 
organized an international conference at Wageningen University and 
Research Centre (Wageningen UR) in the Netherlands. Entitled 
“Reconsidering Intellectual Property Policies in Public Research: Sharing 
the benefits of biotechnology with developing countries”, this conference 
invited stakeholders from the public and private sector, research funding 
agencies, and civil society to discuss possible tensions between the 
increasing application of IPRs in biotechnology research on the one hand, 
and access to knowledge and technologies for development purposes on 
the other. The main objective of the conference was to investigate how 
public research institutes in the developed world can prevent their IP 
policies from hampering innovation in poor countries and promote the 
sharing of their knowledge and technologies for the common good. This 
topic was chosen for its relevance in the Dutch context and many other 
developed countries.13 
Structure 
This thesis consists mainly of a compilation of articles that have either 
been published or accepted for publication in peer-reviewed journals. With 
the exception of Chapter 6, which consists of two papers published on the 
website of the Centre for Society and Genomics, this introduction and the 
concluding chapter. 
                                                 
13
 An earlier attempt to initiate debate on ABS policies and issues of biopiracy in the 
Netherlands was less than a complete success because few organizations have any 
experience or familiarity with these subjects. 
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Chapter 2 contains a historical overview of the origin and development of 
the concept of benefit-sharing in international law, and analyses the 
philosophical premises it incorporates. It proposes, furthermore, a 
distinction between downstream and upstream models of benefit-sharing 
and favors the latter in order to ensure that benefit-sharing can contribute 
to world food security and global justice. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the different motivations and objectives that can be 
extracted from the current debates on benefit-sharing. Together with an 
analysis of the various ABS mechanisms that are in place or currently 
proposed, this results in the identification of six distinct approaches to 
benefit-sharing. The tensions and incompatibilities among these different 
approaches largely explain the difficult implementation and slow-moving 
negotiations on benefit-sharing today, as mentioned. The chapter 
concludes with a reflection on the major differences and a discussion of 
consequences and possible ways forward. 
Chapter 4 builds upon these different approaches to analyze what is 
understood by the notion of fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Here, 
different principles of justice are reflected upon in relation to the various 
approaches to benefit-sharing. Several conclusions are reached and 
suggestions made in the light of these as to how a fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing mechanism might best be realized. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on case studies, the position of two public research 
institutes, the International Potato Centre in Peru and Wageningen UR in 
the Netherlands, in order to analyze how they deal with the array of 
regulations, interests and perspectives that accompany the resources they 
work with. The chapter studies the institutions’ own policies in this regard 
and reflects upon the optimum balance between the sharing and the 
protection of genetic resources, knowledge and technologies for 
organizations whose mission it is to serve the public interest. 
Chapters 6 and 7 revisit the international conference on benefit-sharing 
and public-sector IP policies that we organized in Wageningen in 2008. 
Describing the central topic, Chapter 6 includes the conference start 
document and final report, while Chapter 7 is a viewpoint article that 
reflects upon the conference in light of the growing importance of 
economic value creation in public science. Special attention here is given 
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to the organizational process and the difficulties of bringing different 
stakeholders with clearly conflicting interests together in order to discuss 
complex problems and search for possible solutions. 
Chapter 8 brings together the major findings of the preceding articles and 
reviews the research questions posed in this introduction. 
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Vicissitudes of benefit-sharing 
of crop genetic resources: 
Downstream and upstream14 
                                                 
14
 This chapter is written by Bram De Jonge & Michiel Korthals and previously appeared 
as a scientific article in the Journal Developing World Bioethics, 2006, 6: 144-157. 
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Abstract 
In this article we will first give a historic overview of the concept of 
benefit-sharing and its appearance in official agreements, particularly with 
respect to crop genetic resources. It will become clear that, at present, 
benefit-sharing is primarily considered as an instrument of compensation 
or exchange, and thus refers to commutative justice. However, we believe 
that such a narrow interpretation of benefit-sharing disregards, and even 
undermines, much of its (historical) content and potency, especially where 
crop genetic resources are concerned. We argue that benefit-sharing 
should not be based merely on commutative justice but rather on a broader 
model that is also grounded in the concept of distributive justice. This has 
repercussions for the application of benefit-sharing, which we try to 
clarify by distinguishing between downstream and upstream benefit-
sharing. Upstream benefit-sharing is not so much inspired by 
compensation for actions done, or the distribution downstream of benefits 
developed, but by the idea of shared decision-making on the research and 
development of resources fundamental to human welfare. Going upstream 
in the research process of crop genetic resources, and determining research 
agendas and improving crops according to the needs of the poor, benefit-
sharing may well be a tool to contribute to world food security and global 
justice. We concretize our ideas on upstream benefit-sharing by 
introducing a set of criteria that determine the success of consultations on 
agricultural research agenda setting. 
Introduction 
One of the most pressing ethical issues in our world is the unequal 
distribution of such basic goods as health care and food supply. 
Repeatedly, world leaders have condemned this grave injustice and 
virtually every country has committed itself more than once to fight 
poverty and hunger. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the 
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most recent example of this. Their objective is to reduce hunger and 
extreme poverty by half by 2015 and to make substantial gains in health, 
education, social equity, environmental sustainability and international 
solidarity (UN, 2000). The eradication of hunger is thereby central, as the 
recent State of Food Insecurity in the World 2005 report states that 
“hunger and malnutrition are major causes of the deprivation and suffering 
targeted by all of the other MDGs” (FAO, 2005b). However, there is a 
long way to go. The most recent estimates of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) indicate that 852 million 
people lack sufficient food for an active and healthy life. An additional 
two billion people will have to be fed over the next 30 years, 90% of 
whom will live in developing countries. Not only chronic hunger but also 
the so-called ‘hidden hunger’ of micronutrient deficiencies causes many 
problems within developing countries. Billions suffer from this insidious 
form of malnutrition caused by the poor quality of, and lack of diversity 
in, their daily diets (FAO, 2004; FAO, 2005a). Given the current pace of 
international action, many doubt whether the MDGs will be reached in 
time, if at all. It is repeatedly stated that scientific research, by improving 
present crops, can contribute much to turn this tragic situation around. 
However, there are signs that modern molecular sciences, like 
biotechnology, do on the contrary contribute to a ‘molecular divide’ 
between rich and poor.15 
 
This article is not about reaching the MDGs, the eradication of hunger, or 
the unequal distribution of basic goods. However, it is linked to these 
topics through its focus on plant genetic resources (for food and 
agriculture)16 and the concept of benefit-sharing. Plant genetic resources 
                                                 
15
 Compare with Louise Fresco, adjunct director general FAO: “What we are witnessing 
is a molecular divide between developed and developing countries, between rich and 
poor farmers, between research priorities and needs, between technology development 
and technology transfer - in short, between the promise of biotechnology and its real 
impact” (Fresco, 2003a). 
16
 We will focus primarily on the agricultural sector and thus on plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture, or crop genetic resources for short. However, as crop genetic 
resources are part of the general category of plant genetic resources the latter will also be 
discussed. 
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are obviously related to food security as they are the building blocks of 
what people eat. Their use, management, exchange and development by 
scientific research are therefore of major importance to humanity and 
subject to several international agreements. The notion of benefit-sharing 
is adopted in these agreements, and is currently being negotiated within 
several fora.17 It is however far from clear whether, and how, benefit-
sharing is related to issues of hunger, or to the unequal distribution of 
basic goods. In this article we will analyze the use and application of the 
concept of benefit-sharing, particularly with respect to crop genetic 
resources. It will become clear that, at present, benefit-sharing is primarily 
considered as an instrument of compensation or exchange and thus refers 
to the Aristotelian notion of commutative justice. However, this model of 
benefit-sharing does not suit crop genetic resources. On the contrary, it has 
harmful effects on the agricultural sector as it obstructs the international 
transfer of genetic resources on which the agricultural sector historically 
depends. The likely outcome of this is that (especially) the poorest 
countries will suffer. Therefore, we propose an alternative model of 
benefit-sharing based on a broader model that is also grounded in the 
concept of distributive justice. 
 
In the prevailing discussion on benefit-sharing the link between benefit-
sharing and distributive justice has been rejected rather than supported. 
For example, with respect to the field of human genetics, Kadri Simm 
remarks that benefit-sharing is fuelled by feelings of injustice that refer to 
a larger background of current world inequalities, “be it inherited from 
colonization experience or the international establishment of market-
oriented liberal capitalism that favours certain prominent players and 
regulations in the ordering of our world.” (Simm, 2005, p. 37). However, 
she does not support this link between the concept of benefit-sharing and 
issues of global justice as she argues, “To my mind the problem is that a 
benefit-sharing framework is not able to respond adequately to those 
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 For example, The Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity is at present negotiating an International 
Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing. 
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concerns that surface from this larger background of injustice issues.” 
(idem, p. 37). 
 
We question this opinion on the unsuitability of a benefit-sharing 
framework for solving global justice problems because we also question 
the narrow interpretation of benefit-sharing (i.e. as commutative justice) 
on which it is based. We will discuss several factors that support our 
proposal for a broader model of benefit-sharing that also takes into 
account the concept of distributive justice. This shift has repercussions for 
the application of benefit-sharing, which we try to clarify by 
distinguishing between downstream and upstream benefit-sharing. Most 
existing mechanisms of benefit-sharing are downstream focused, at the 
end of the research and development pipeline. Upstream benefit-sharing is 
not so much inspired by the downstream distribution of benefits developed 
but by the idea of shared decision-making regarding the technological 
utilization of resources fundamental to human welfare. We will elaborate 
on some of the central issues related to this idea of upstream benefit-
sharing and introduce three types of criteria (participation, transparency, 
and efficacy) as indicators of successful consultations. Of course, benefit-
sharing will not be the solution for world hunger and inequality. It may 
however be a tool, or mechanism, to stimulate the development and 
distribution of basic goods in such a way that it contributes to global 
justice and helps to narrow the gap between rich and poor. 
Benefit-sharing and the 
common heritage of mankind 
The notion of benefit-sharing first appeared on the international scene 
during the 1970s. At that time benefit-sharing was closely related to the 
concept of the common heritage of humankind. Both concepts appeared 
for example in the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (UN, 1979), and during the negotiations 
towards the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN, 
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1982).18 In the former it was declared that the “Moon and its natural 
resources are the common heritage of mankind” and subsequently 
established a provision on the “equitable sharing by all States Parties in 
the benefits derived from those resources” discovered on the moon (UN, 
1979, Article 11.1 & 11.7(d)). In the latter, it is stated that:  
the area of the sea-bed…as well as its resources, are the common 
heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which 
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole. (UN, 
1982, Preamble)19 
The common heritage idea is rather difficult to define. Bartha Knoppers 
described it as that which, “argues against private appropriation in favor of 
sharing, administration in the common interest, benefits and burdens 
equitably distributed, equitable access, peaceful use and preservation for 
future generations.” (Knoppers, 2003, p. 2). With respect to plant genetic 
resources, it appeared for the first time in the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) of the FAO. In its first Article, the 
document outlines that the “Undertaking is based on the universally 
accepted principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind 
and consequently should be available without restriction.” (FAO, 1983). 
Through its resolutions in 1989,20 it tried to achieve a balance between the 
interests of farmers as the historic, present, and future stewards and 
innovators of plant genetic resources on the one hand, and formal 
innovators as plant breeders and the biotechnology industry on the other. 
Therefore, it established the so-called ‘Farmers’ Rights’ in order to, “allow 
farmers (…) to participate fully in the benefits derived (…) from the 
improved use of plant genetic resources, through plant breeding and other 
                                                 
18
 In The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective) it 
is stated that “In 1970 the United Nations General Assembly declared the resources of the 
seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction to be ‘the common heritage of 
mankind’.” Available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.h
tm [Accessed at 13 March 2006]. 
19
 With explicit references to “Common Heritage” in article 136, and to “Benefit-sharing” 
in article 140. 
20
 Resolution 4/89 & Resolution 5/89. 
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scientific methods.” (FAO, 1983, Resolution 5/89, final article). The 
notion of benefit-sharing came more and more to the foreground. 
However, the context in which it eventually appeared changed radically in 
the 1990s. 
 
In 1992 the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted at the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The CBD has three main goals, namely: 
“the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of 
the utilization of genetic resources” (UNEP, 1992, Article 1). One of the 
most remarkable aspects of the CBD is that it turns away from the 
traditional understanding of genetic resources as the common heritage of 
humankind.21 Instead it states that, “the conservation of biological 
diversity is a common concern of humankind” and it declares that “States 
have sovereign rights over their own biological resources.” (Preamble). 
 
There are several reasons why the idea of sovereign ownership took 
precedence over the concept of common heritage within the CBD. One 
was that, in the years leading up to the introduction of the CBD, a new and 
promising industry was emerging. The first experiments with genetic 
engineering had taken place and the stock values of the new biotechnology 
companies were mounting. To stimulate this development the United 
States (US) had, as the first country, opened the door for patent protection 
of biotechnology products including living organisms. This had stirred 
expectations of the potential use and value of the world’s biodiversity, 
especially in poor but biodiversity-rich countries. At the same time, 
concern was rising over the protection and conservation of that 
biodiversity. The international environmental movement, which 
dominated the Earth Summit, considered sovereign rights over plant 
genetic resources a potentially strong tool for stimulating nature 
conservation in poor counties. The idea was that countries that own 
potentially valuable resources would take measures to safeguard and 
                                                 
21
 Resolution 3/91 of the IUPGR already states that “the concept of mankind’s heritage 
(…) is subject to the sovereignty of the states over their plant genetic resources”. The 
CBD takes the final step and abandons the notion of common heritage. 
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conserve those resources.22 The ‘grand bargain’ of the CBD thus became 
the benefit of access to genetic resources (and accompanying traditional 
knowledge) for the emerging bio-industries in the North, in exchange for a 
fair share in the benefits of these technological developments for the 
South. All are in favor, ideally, of the conservation and sustainable use of 
the world’s biological diversity. 
Open access versus enclosure 
Despite this major political success, there are some downsides to the CBD. 
One major point of criticism is that many countries consider their genetic 
resources as ‘goldmines’ that have to be protected against foreign parties. 
The CBD and successive Bonn Guidelines (UNEP, 2002) set up an 
‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ framework to regulate the flow of genetic 
resources between ‘provider’ and ‘user’ countries. What has happened is 
that most countries consider themselves providers and, thus, sellers of 
genetic resources, and are much less concerned with their own use and 
demand for these resources. As a consequence they have focused 
primarily on protection against abuse instead of facilitating access and 
developing creative benefit-sharing mechanisms. The international 
transfer of plant genetic resources has therefore declined dramatically 
since the ratification of the CBD.23 This has had major consequences for 
the agricultural sector, which depends on extensive flows of genetic 
material around the world. 
 
                                                 
22
 In the CBD, genetic resources are actually defined as “genetic material of actual or 
potential value” (UNEP, 1992, Article 2). 
23
 For example, “[The CGIAR] averaged 9782 acquisitions annually for the five calendar 
years before the CBD. In 1997 (…) the number of new accessions was only 563. The 
decline in the number of collection missions was even steeper” (Falcon & Fowler, 2002, 
p. 210). 
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To better suit the agricultural sector24 the FAO adopted the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) in 
2001 (FAO, 2001). As one of its central benchmarks it states that: 
In the exercise of their sovereign rights over their plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, states may mutually benefit 
from the creation of an effective multilateral system for facilitated 
access to a negotiated selection of these resources and for the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use. (FAO, 
2001, Preamble)  
As such, the ITPGR establishes a list of 64 major crops and forages that 
are freely accessible for breeders and researchers of member countries. 
Furthermore, the ITPGR includes an international fund for which payment 
is due when a commercial product is developed using resources from the 
Multilateral System.25 The fund will especially be aimed at supporting 
small farmers in developing countries. 
 
The ITPGR seems to refer back to the common heritage idea from before 
the 1990s. It is not only the creation of the Multilateral System that points 
towards this direction. The inclusion of the international gene banks of the 
Centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR)26 under the realm of the ITPGR (FAO, 2001, Article 11.5), and 
the ITPGR’s focus on Farmers’ Rights also contain a similar message 
(Article 9). The former by securing and regulating the management of the 
international gene banks as a public good. The latter by reaffirming the 
“enormous contribution that…farmers of all regions of the world…have 
made and will continue to make for…food and agriculture production 
throughout the world” (Article 9.1). However, these references to the 
common heritage idea are rather peculiar in combination with the 
                                                 
24
 For more information on the complex negotiation history of the ITPGR and its relation 
to the CBD and other relevant Treaties see, e.g. (Stannard et al, 2004). 
25
 Payment is voluntary if the commercialized product can be used without restriction by 
others for further research and breeding, it is compulsory if not. 
26
 The CGIAR centers hold a substantial percentage (over 500.000 items) of the 
germplasm in ex-situ storage. For more info see: http://www.cgiar.org. 
Two Plants, Genes and Justice 
34 
 
simultaneous confirmation of sovereign rights over plant genetic 
resources. The ITPGR appears to incorporate two opposite positions: one 
affirming sovereignty and appropriation; the other proclaiming open 
access and an ethos of sharing. This inconsistency has everything to do 
with the existing juridical and political context of intellectual property 
rights and world trade agreements. 
 
The major legal instrument that regulates intellectual property rights on a 
global scale is the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO, 1994).27 The 
Agreement’s statement with respect to plant genetic resources is rather 
complex. In Article 27.3 it is stated that “plants (…) other than micro-
organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants (…) other than non-biological and microbiological processes” may 
be excluded from patentability. However, the article proceeds, “Members 
shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof” (WTO, 1994). 
The TRIPS Agreement is of major influence to any benefit-sharing 
mechanism and there are a lot of debates on its relation to both the ITPGR 
and the CBD.28 
 
Just as plant genetic resources were once part of the global commons, now 
intellectual property rights are pushing these commons more and more 
into enclosure. This not only happens directly when new plant varieties or 
biotechnological products are patented, it also takes place indirectly. 
Countries that are genetically rich try to protect these resources from 
foreign parties. In the face of increasing intellectual property rights, they 
try hard to develop their own access-restricting regimes. This has not only 
caused the downside to the CBD described above, it has also triggered the 
                                                 
27
 The WTO agreements took effect on 1 January 1995 and count 149 member countries 
(on 11 Dec 2005). However, member states have differing deadlines to ensure that their 
laws conform with the TRIPS Agreement, ranging from one to 21 years depending on 
their development status and the patent area involved. 
28
 It is not in the scope of this article to go into depth with these debates. For more 
information see, e.g. (Van Overwalle, 2005). 
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protectionist features within the ITPGR. As a result, the Multilateral 
System of the ITPGR misses, for example, several staple crops. As one 
group chose to exclude a major crop in the hope of selling it bilaterally, 
other countries followed. In this way China excluded soybeans, Latin 
America withdrew groundnuts, and Africa excluded tropical forages 
(Falcon & Fowler, 2002). 
The changing concept of 
benefit-sharing 
The concept of benefit-sharing has not been static in the face of these 
developments. Originally, when benefit-sharing was linked to the common 
heritage idea, it was about common goods that are shared by all and to 
which everyone should have equitable access. Hence, benefit-sharing 
referred to a logic of distribution as the benefits and burdens of a common 
good should be equitably distributed. Now the idea of common heritage or 
common good is seen by many as more or less passé. Plant genetic 
resources are not purely in the public domain anymore. The original 
common good understanding has changed due to processes of 
privatization and environmental degradation. In the present light of 
appropriation and enclosure, benefit-sharing is often referred to as an 
instrument of compensation or exchange.29 This seems for example to be 
evident within the CBD. The ‘grand bargain’ on which it is based implies 
access to genetic resources in exchange for a fair share in the benefits of 
their utilization. But the concept of Farmers’ Rights, which is central to 
the IUPGR and the subsequent ITPGR, has also given rise to the idea of 
benefit-sharing as an instrument of compensation or exchange. As we 
have seen, Farmers’ Rights were primarily established as a counterforce to 
the increasing importance of breeder rights and intellectual property rights. 
Farmers’ Rights come down to the idea that the benefits derived from the 
latter type of rights are at least partly dependent on the contributions of 
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 Compare with, for example, (ten Kate & Laird, 1999). 
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farmers all around the world and should be shared accordingly, as a form 
of compensation. 
 
The changing concept of benefit-sharing can aptly be described through 
the Aristotelian distinction between distributive justice and commutative 
justice. In short, commutative justice is corrective in transactions between 
two individuals or groups of individuals. It focuses on the equal or 
equivalent value of exchanges. Distributive justice instead deals with the 
fair distribution of something (wealth, goods, opportunities, etc.) among 
several people or parties. So, benefit-sharing was originally focused on 
distributive justice, but is now often referred to as an instrument of 
compensation or exchange. Can we therefore say that benefit-sharing 
should be primarily or exclusively based on commutative justice? We do 
not think that this should be the case. On the contrary, we believe that such 
a narrow interpretation of benefit-sharing would disregard and even 
undermine much of its (historical) content and potency. The way in which 
the model of compensation or exchange undermines the concept of 
benefit-sharing becomes clear by analyzing some of the criticism of the 
CBD’s framework of Access and Benefit-Sharing. 
The framework of access and 
benefit-sharing 
We have seen that the CBD distinguishes between so-called user and 
provider countries of biological resources. The notion of benefit-sharing is 
hereby closely linked to the issue of access to these resources. This so-
called framework of Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) is especially 
adapted to a certain group of genetic resources. These are mainly 
resources that are rare and geographically isolated and of interest to 
specific industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry. There are several 
examples of more or less successful ABS agreements between local 
communities, that traditionally use a specific resource, and foreign parties, 
that are interested in analyzing and developing that resource (and 
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accompanying traditional knowledge) into a profitable product. Thus, this 
framework is explicitly based on a model of compensation or exchange. 
 
However, where plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are 
concerned, there are hardly any examples of existing ABS agreements. 
Instead, the whole idea of user and provider countries is highly criticized 
as it has obstructed international geneflows on which the agricultural 
sector historically depends (Falcon & Fowler, 2002). Brush is one of the 
authors who argue that the exchange model of benefit-sharing is, “largely 
metaphorical” and “inappropriate” where crop genetic resources are 
concerned (Brush, 2005). The idea that developing countries are the 
providers and developed countries the users of plant genetic resources is 
highly overestimated here. Nowadays, developing countries are more 
dependent on international flows of germplasm than developed countries 
(idem, p. 72). Besides, “No substantial market for [crop] genetic resources 
has ever existed” (Falcon & Fowler, 2002, p. 213), which makes it very 
difficult to estimate the value of specific contributions. 
 
So, the ABS framework and accompanying model of compensation does 
not seem to suit the agricultural sector. However, some critics also argue 
that the framework of ABS is awkward with respect to the broader field of 
plant genetic resources. One of them is Safrin, who remarks: 
The challenge presented to developing countries by the CBD is 
how to make a nonrivalrous, abundant resource and make it 
exclusive. How can nations prevent most, let alone all, genetic 
resources of potential value from leaving their borders? They 
cannot. (Safrin, 2004, p. 665) 
The difficulty is that plant genetic resources are most often abundant and 
non-exclusive goods that do not respect national borders. In addition, their 
value lies primarily in the genetic information they carry which is non-
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rivalrous. These are all characteristics of a public good.30 The ABS 
framework, which forces countries to arrange bilateral contracts regulating 
the transfer of plant genetic resources (as if they were a private good), 
incorporates some serious complications. For example, it can cause a ‘race 
to the bottom’ because a foreign party that is interested in access to certain 
resources will go shopping in different countries and negotiate the 
cheapest ABS agreement possible.31 
 
It seems that the ABS framework can do more harm than good, 
particularly to the agricultural sector. Unfortunately, we have seen that the 
ITPGR does not succeed in (re) establishing an encompassing, open-
access system for crop genetic resources. The likely outcome of this is that 
especially the poorest countries will suffer, as Falcon and Fowler remark: 
We have no doubt that developed countries and the private sector 
will be able to secure the genetic resources they need. We are less 
confident that African countries, for example, will have the 
capacity and resources to negotiate arrangements abroad to 
obtain tropical legumes or wild relatives of cassava from Latin 
American countries, or even genetic resources of local importance 
from a neighbouring country. (Falcon & Fowler, 2002, p. 212) 
The ABS framework obstructs the free flow of crop genetic resources that 
are essential for food supply and food security. Besides, the model of 
                                                 
30
 Public goods are often described in contrast to private goods. Private goods are 
classified as rivalrous and excludable. Goods are rivalrous in the way that the 
consumption by one prevents others from enjoying the same good. They are excludable 
when non-owners can be excluded from consumption. Pure public goods instead are non-
rivalrous and non-excludable. This means that the consumption by one does not affect the 
consumption of the same good by others. Furthermore, it is either technically impossible, 
or too costly, to exclude non-owners from consuming the good. There are also many 
goods that qualify as impure public goods. These goods are either non-rivalrous but 
excludable or non-excludable but rivalrous. The former are also named ‘club-goods’ as 
they are often non-rivalrous inside a group. The latter are called ‘common pool resources’ 
as they are accessible to all but subject to depletion or congestion (Kaul et al, 1999). 
31
 Once a country tries to claim that it is, as the CBD states, the ‘country of origin’, it has 
to prove so in the face of millennia of evolutionary history (Petit et al, 2001). 
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compensation or exchange on which it is based is not adequate for most 
plant genetic resources that are not rare or geographically isolated. This 
undermines the whole idea of benefit-sharing as it undermines the hoped-
for benefits in the first place. We would, therefore, argue strongly that 
benefit-sharing should not merely be based on a model of compensation or 
exchange and thus commutative justice, but rather on a broader model that 
is also grounded in the concept of distributive justice. 
The ideas underlying benefit-
sharing in the CBD and ITPGR 
In the presently dominant understanding of benefit-sharing as 
commutative justice, it is not surprising that Kadri Simm, amongst others, 
argues that benefit-sharing does not fit well with distributive justice issues. 
She remarks that, “The notion of global public goods or the human rights 
discourse has a better chance in distributing the needed resources” (Simm, 
2005, p. 38). But why should benefit-sharing be strictly separated from a 
global public goods or human rights discourse, or from the concept of 
distributive justice? By taking a closer look at the central objectives of 
both the CBD and the ITPGR it becomes clear that benefit-sharing is more 
than merely an instrument of compensation or exchange. 
 
By focusing on the CBD’s and the ITPGR’s preambles one can get a good 
idea of the central objectives of both agreements. At first, both preambles 
show that the global public goods discourse, to which benefit-sharing was 
originally linked, is still of great importance. Both the CBD and the 
ITPGR emphasize that plant genetic resources (for food and agriculture) 
are the common concern of humankind. They stress “the importance of 
biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining life sustaining 
systems of the biosphere” and for “food security”. The subsequent 
affirmation that states have sovereign rights over their plant genetic 
resources does not make them the private owners of these resources but 
rather the stewards that “are responsible for conserving their biological 
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diversity and for using their biological resources in a sustainable manner” 
(FAO, 2001; UNEP, 1992). 
 
Against this background, both agreements stress a broader context of 
benefit-sharing than one purely of commutative justice. The CBD’s 
preamble refers to commutative justice as it speaks of the “desirability of 
sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices.” However, it then states that: 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is of 
critical importance for meeting the food, health and other needs of 
the growing world population, for which purpose access to and 
sharing of both genetic resources and technologies are essential. 
(UNEP, 1992)  
This refers to an interpretation of benefit-sharing that focuses on meeting 
the essential needs of humankind independent of criteria of exchange or 
compensation.  
 
The ITPGR’s preamble refers to the concept of commutative justice as it 
relates benefit-sharing to the “past, present and future contributions of 
farmers in all regions of the world”. However, farmers’ contributions are 
especially acknowledged as being part of humankind’s endeavors to 
secure food supply. It is stated that: 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are the raw 
material indispensable for crop genetic improvement, whether by 
means of farmer’s selection, classical plant breeding or modern 
biotechnologies, and are essential in adapting to unpredictable 
environmental changes and future human needs. (FAO, 2001) 
The ultimate objective is to secure food supply. It appears that benefit-
sharing is mainly a tool for this objective as its application is linked to the 
Multilateral System and focuses on the redistribution of information, 
technologies, capacity-building and benefits from commercialization, 
especially in favor of developing countries and countries with economies 
in transition (Article 13). So, within the ITPGR, benefit-sharing is not 
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merely about compensation for contributions made, but rather about the 
distribution of the necessary means to secure sustainable agriculture and 
food security for this and future generations. 
Commutative justice, 
distributive justice and benefit-
sharing 
Both agreements put special emphasis on the food and health needs of 
present and future generations. According to us, this emphasis justifies and 
calls for a broader model of benefit-sharing that is also grounded in the 
concept of distributive justice. Distributive justice is a complex concept. 
As stated before, it concerns the fair distribution of certain benefits (or 
burdens) among several parties. But how to define those benefits, and how 
to determine just criteria for allocation, are highly debatable issues. As a 
result, many divergent theories of distributive justice exist. With respect to 
the subject of distribution, some focus on income, wealth or opportunities. 
Regarding the issue of allocation one can discern criteria of entitlement, 
merit, need or equality (Miller, 1976). However, in the context of crop 
genetic resources, we believe that it is quite obvious what distributive 
justice, as a general objective, is or should be about. The central issue at 
stake is world food supply (and indirectly world health), and the principal 
criterion for allocation should be according to need. This criterion is 
somewhat controversial as again it is difficult to define ‘needs’. Yet, in the 
face of hunger and micronutrient deficiencies, any insistence on technical 
definitions seems to be flawed if not inhuman. The satisfaction of the 
fundamental need for food is a matter of justice (idem, p. 146). 
 
To be clear, we are not arguing that benefit-sharing can, or should, be 
ruled strictly by the ‘needs norm’: as if every hungry person can be 
allocated a precise share of the benefits developed by, for example, a 
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biotechnology company. What we do want to say is that benefit-sharing 
should not merely be seen as an instrument of compensation or exchange, 
based on the concept of commutative justice. Instead, and in the face of 
the harsh reality that more than 800 million people are undernourished, 
benefit-sharing should also be grounded in the concept of distributive 
justice, as it can be a tool to improve food security. 
 
When we take a closer look at the concept of benefit-sharing in relation to 
distributive justice, we find that the two have been linked before in the 
context of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
referred to the notion of benefit-sharing in 1948 as it states that “Everyone 
has the right…to share in scientific advancement and its benefits” (UN, 
1948, Article 27). This right is reaffirmed in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN, 1966-1976, Article 15). In 
addition, the Covenant refers in its first Article by means of “the principle 
of mutual benefit” to some form of benefit-sharing with respect to “natural 
wealth and resources”. In these contexts, the notion of benefit-sharing is 
not based on any form of compensation but on the equitable distribution of 
everybody’s right to their own means of subsistence and to the benefits of 
scientific advancements. From here it is a small step to extrapolate the 
notion of benefit-sharing to other human rights endorsed by both 
agreements that call for an equitable distribution of such basic goods as 
health care and food supply. This does not mean that all human rights 
should automatically be linked to the notion of benefit-sharing. What it 
does mean is that benefit-sharing can also be interpreted as Castle and 
Gold remark as: “A mechanism through which to achieve either 
distributive justice or to satisfy international human rights law” (Castle & 
Gold, 2007). 
 
What we have seen is that the notion of benefit-sharing was originally 
linked to the common heritage idea, and implied the equitable distribution 
of benefits (and burdens). With respect to plant genetic resources, the 
CBD and the ITPGR recognize that these resources are a “common 
concern of humankind” and are indispensable for “food security” and for 
“meeting the food, health and other needs of the growing world 
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population” (FAO, 2001; UNEP, 1992). Benefit-sharing should, therefore, 
still be linked to the concept of distributive justice and can be a tool to 
improve food security. The model of commutative justice, to which 
benefit-sharing is often related, can best be seen as a specific aspect of 
benefit-sharing that fits certain plant genetic resources and certain 
objectives. For example, it is a tool to counterforce the illegal 
appropriation of rare plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge of 
local communities by patent applications of foreign industries and 
research centers. However, by reducing the whole notion of benefit-
sharing to an instrument of compensation or exchange, one would 
seriously undermine and disregard much of its (historical) content and 
potency. The next question is of course: How can the broader notion of 
benefit-sharing be put into practice and its potential be realized? 
Downstream and upstream 
benefit-sharing 
Most if not all existing benefit-sharing mechanisms are downstream 
focused, at the end of the research and development pipeline, as one party 
that supplies certain resources receives in exchange a share in the (hoped 
for) benefits of their further development and commercialization by 
another party.32 Only after these negotiations over matters of commutative 
justice do questions of distributive justice arise, with respect to the fair 
distribution of the negotiated benefits. But what happens when, from the 
start, benefit-sharing is also grounded in the concept of distributive 
justice? 
 
To answer this question properly, we first have to remind ourselves that 
the fair and just distribution of such basic goods as health care and food 
                                                 
32
 This includes milestone payments that can be paid well before any final products are 
developed as these payments are also downstream focused, anticipating the hoped for 
benefits developed later on. 
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supply is a pressing need, to say the least. The increasing gap between rich 
and poor with respect to food and health, both between nations and within 
nations, is one of the biggest concerns and a serious threat to global peace 
and welfare. The emerging molecular divide between rich and poor is not 
helping the present situation. With respect to crop genetic resources and 
the new biotechnologies, huge investments are made in the improvement 
of commercial crops and large-scale production applications for western 
markets. Unfortunately, these investments in crops and applications very 
often do not fit the needs of the poor, due to the large differences in 
agricultural and social factors between North and South. Benefit-sharing 
grounded in the concept of distributive justice should try to address this 
structural disparity. As such, it requires not only the downstream 
distribution of the results, royalties and technologies of successful research 
and innovations, but also that acceptable ethical decisions are made with 
respect to different interests and needs upstream in the research process. 
Upstream benefit-sharing would mean that the different stakeholders try to 
balance their interests with respect to the research priorities in the first 
place, taking into account the benefits that will be shared later on. 
 
So the issue is not only one of dividing the cake into fair pieces but also of 
going upstream towards the initial decision-making processes that 
determine how the cake should look. The usual downstream models of 
benefit-sharing focus on the conditions for access to specific resources in 
exchange for the fair sharing of benefits from their utilization, whatever 
that utilization may be. Upstream benefit-sharing involves a broader 
approach, which includes the research agenda and process, and focuses on 
the possible applications and innovations of the original resources in 
relation to the needs and interests of the stakeholders involved. This is an 
important difference. For example, if a biotechnology company is 
developing an improved crop variety that is resistant to certain pests that 
are a hazard in many western countries, then the chance is very small that 
this new crop variety will be of any use to developing countries that have a 
totally different environment and agricultural system. Even though plant 
genetic resources from around the world are used in plant breeding 
programs, the research itself is often focused on those parts of the world 
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where most money can be made. The existing benefit-sharing framework 
in the CBD and the ITPGR emphasizes the sharing of information and 
technologies of research carried out. But what can developing countries 
gain from this when these research outputs and the underlying research 
priorities are simply not tailored to their specific needs? 
 
Upstream benefit-sharing focuses on the research priorities throughout the 
development process. In this way, it is, for example, possible that within a 
particular plant breeding project several plant varieties are developed that 
suit different environmental circumstances and agricultural traditions. So 
on the whole, upstream benefit-sharing is not so much inspired by 
compensation of actions done, or by the downstream distribution of 
benefits and burdens of results developed, but by the idea of shared 
decision-making about the scientific and technological utilization of 
resources fundamental to human welfare. The ultimate target is the 
reduction of the gap between rich and poor with respect to the use of 
resources and the development and distribution of the accompanying 
science and technology, in particular in the field of food and health. 
 
‘Going upstream’ presupposes that the cherished idea of the fifties, of a 
linear, continuous accumulation of knowledge, where researchers and 
managers do not have to decide upon alternative research programs, is not 
valid. And indeed, recent philosophy of science and social studies of 
science generally agree about the room for maneuver that scientists and 
managers have in deciding upon alternative research agendas (Jasanoff, 
2005). Scientific and technological developments are steered by scientific 
and social interests, which raises the question whose interests are steering 
the scientific and technological developments that, in the end, produce the 
benefits? Or, to put it differently, what should be the research priorities 
that determine the benefits that, in the end, can be shared by whom? From 
the more abstract levels of research programs to the detailed and concrete 
research projects on the interactions between local variables, decisions 
always have to be made on the research priorities and the direction of the 
research process to be taken. 
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Determining research priorities upstream is a kind of co-evolution of 
science and society, or more precisely of scientific developments and 
normative decisions of what research is regarded as ethically and 
politically desirable, and feasible, for the poor. Therefore, an important 
question is how to involve the relevant stakeholders, particularly when one 
considers that one of the main groups of actors are poor farmers. With 
respect to “steering research in the right direction”, Louise Fresco argues 
that: 
In a globalised economy, the voices of small countries and poor 
producers and consumers often go unheard. I believe that 
scientists have moral responsibilities to speak for the weaker 
segments of society, because they sometimes best understand the 
likely results of not doing so. (Fresco, 2001, p. 6-7) 
We agree that scientists have a responsibility here, as do national and 
international policymakers. However, in order to speak for the weaker 
segments of society, scientists (and policymakers) should first speak with 
them to find out their food-related problems and research needs. This is 
one of the biggest challenges of upstream benefit-sharing. 
Deliberation in upstream 
benefit-sharing 
How to speak with farmers, often on the brink of starvation, on upstream 
research decisions, that is, how to find out what their needs are and to 
translate these into research priorities? How to set the agricultural 
technology agenda together with the poor? Normally, decisions on 
research priorities are made in the meetings of managers and scientists, 
sometimes with the input of politicians. However, to find out the needs of 
farmers who are confronted with problems of drought, decreasing yields 
of harvests, pests, etc., another type of solution is necessary. Moreover, 
farmers have, depending on their interests and social position, a plurality 
of research needs. Some want more research into how to improve local 
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crops, as in the case of cowpeas, which in African countries like Benin are 
rapidly being substituted by cash crops (like rice) that threaten the 
existence of local farmers. Others are in need of new types of biological 
pest management adapted to local circumstances. Top-level meetings on 
research priorities with government officials are not the solution in going 
upstream. Often these officials are interested in cash crops and turn into 
tyrants as they acquire what Pogge aptly describes “the international 
resource privilege” (Pogge, 2002, p. 113/142). Tyrants are accorded the 
right to sell natural resources like oil; multinational corporations often buy 
the rights to these resources, and the international community tends to 
treat these interactions as legitimate. The connection of deliberations with 
actors of civil society in upstream benefit-sharing goes against this 
privilege and makes it possible to include other actors, and to de-privilege 
governors. For an efficient and just method of going upstream, actors 
operating in civil society, like representatives of farmers, farmer 
organizations and movements, are to be consulted in upstream benefit-
sharing (Korthals, 2004, p. 145-9). 
 
However, not all types of debates and consultations on any subject and in 
any social context can do the job of setting research agendas. Time 
pressure, exclusion of important stakeholders, lack of expertise, 
fundamental and violent dissent, to name a few barriers, can hamper 
consultations and make them unproductive in improving agricultural 
research and experimentation.33 Indications of success of consultations on 
research agendas can be categorized according to three criteria: 
participation, transparency, and efficacy. These are respectively connected 
to three aspects of deliberations, namely, their input, throughput and 
output.34 With respect to the input of consultations, the most important 
issues are focused on participation: is everyone involved indeed 
participating? Is the agenda subject to discussion or has it been imposed 
from the outside? Do the participants have a framework for discussing the 
                                                 
33
 One remarkable barrier to the implementation of consultations in existing ABS 
agreements is the multiple consent requirements. See the discussion in (Safrin, 2004). 
34
 Here we use distinctions developed by Scharpf in his analysis of legitimacy: (Scharpf, 
1998). 
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ethical issues at hand or do they have to reconstruct a framework, and are 
they in the position to do this? Is the time span of the deliberation 
adequate or is the deliberation out of tune with societal developments? 
During the process (throughput) of the deliberation, it is important that 
relevant experts can be consulted and information acquired, and that 
discussions are transparent and free. Transparency is the main catchword 
for the process of deliberating on research priorities. With respect to the 
output, an important issue is how the results of the consultation are used: 
are they neglected and decisions made anyway, or are the results only used 
in a superficial way? Can the process of implementation be monitored and 
evaluated? Do the participants have any insight into what happens with the 
results of their deliberation? Are the results used in the way promised at 
the beginning of the consultation? These issues can be covered by the 
criterion of efficacy and efficiency. A barrier to efficacy is often 
unwillingness to implement the results of deliberations by authorities. 
 
These three types of criteria can be used as indications of how much 
chance the consultations on upstream benefit-sharing have of succeeding. 
If it is foreseeable that they cannot be met, in case of lack of participation, 
transparency and/or efficacy, institutionalizing consultations is a very hard 
job, to say the least.  
 
With respect to the groups involved in deliberating on upstream benefit-
sharing, one should distinguish between co-producers and stakeholders 
(Grin et al, 1997). Co-producers are the groups directly involved in the 
final benefit of the envisioned scientific and technological end product, 
e.g. farmers, breeders, retailers, process industry, etc. Stakeholders are the 
groups heavily interested in upstream benefit-sharing, and have strong 
views and strong stakes in steering the final use, e.g. governments, 
consumers, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although NGOs 
during the last decades have become heavily involved in policy and 
deliberation processes (Arts, 1998), their interests do not always coincide 
with local co-producers. 
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On a local level, co-evolution of science and technology can have close 
connections with communicative forms of extension because many forms 
of extension do try to improve local knowledge levels and applied 
technologies. An example of this is the farmer-field schools that Peter 
Kenmore started with the help of the FAO in relation to Integral Pest 
Management (IPM): “Their aims are to help farmers develop their 
analytical skills, critical thinking, and creativity, and help them learn to 
make better decisions” (Kenmore, 2002). From different sources, it can be 
shown that these schools can be seen as a way of developing the 
knowledge and skills of local farmers, and can have considerable impact 
on the improvement of their production. They score highly, both in 
accordance with measures of participation and of efficiency (Godtland, 
2004). On a local level, participation is often complied with to a greater 
extent but this is not a guarantee that participation on the higher levels (or 
the other criteria of successful consultations) is covered. Pretty gives a 
good overview of the large number of experiments and research projects 
in which scientists and technologists experiment with local farmer 
cooperation in improving crops and cropping systems, they are not only 
aiming at improving skills of farmers (Pretty, 2002; Pretty, 2003). 
 
On higher social levels, further removed from local areas, the 
consultations on upstream benefit-sharing can take different forms. One 
new issue is the reproducibility and communication of important findings 
of local researchers, for example, in how far a new potato variety or a new 
cropping system is generalizable beyond the local area. The three criteria, 
participation, efficiency and transparency are to be met in forms suitable 
to these higher levels. An example on the global level is the “Global 
Genomics Initiative” proposed by Acharya (et al, 2004). They summarize 
their proposal thus: “A global dialogue that would raise awareness, 
perhaps build consensus, and set the agenda for action is essential” 
(Dowdeswell, 2003, p. 4). However, only by encompassing the 
consultations on the national and local levels of research agenda setting, 
can upstream benefit-sharing on this high level reach its goal. When local 
farmer groups in a large area are concerned with improving varieties of 
cowpea or intercropping (the use of a combination of crops in improving 
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yields), and the higher levels decide upon improving Western crops or a 
monoculture, then there is something wrong with the participation. The 
further removed from the local application and the higher the social level, 
the more consultations run the risks of being inefficient, not fulfilling the 
aims that they are organized for, and not including the local actors that are 
most concerned. Therefore, the three criteria function as indicators of how 
far consultation processes on upstream benefit-sharing function or not. It 
is only through a careful process of deliberation on research priorities on 
the necessary levels and upstream in the research process, that science and 
technology development has a better chance to contribute to bridging the 
gap between poor and rich. This is what upstream benefit-sharing entails, 
and what its ultimate goal should be. 
Conclusion 
Originally, benefit-sharing was linked to the common heritage idea and 
referred to equitable distribution. In the present light of appropriation and 
enclosure of plant genetic resources, benefit-sharing is mainly an 
instrument of compensation or exchange. We have tried to show that this 
model of exchange and the framework of ABS on which it is based, 
seriously disregards, and even undermines, much of the content and 
potency of benefit-sharing, especially where crop genetic resources are 
concerned. In line with the ideas underlying benefit-sharing in the CBD 
and the ITPGR, we argue that benefit-sharing should not merely be based 
on a model of exchange and thus commutative justice, but rather on a 
broader model that is also grounded in the concept of distributive justice. 
The model of commutative justice can best be seen as a specific aspect of 
benefit-sharing that fits certain plant genetic resources and certain 
objectives. A broader notion of benefit-sharing that refers to distributive 
justice may well be a tool to contribute to the fair distribution of basic 
goods such as food supply and health care. To realize this potency, 
benefit-sharing has to move upstream in the research and development 
process and be subject to thorough structures of deliberation with 
stakeholders at local, national, and international levels. We introduced 
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three types of criteria: participation, transparency, and efficacy, as 
indicators of successful consultations. The ultimate target is the reduction 
of the gap between rich and poor with respect to the use of resources and 
the development of science and technology, in particular in the field of 
food and health. Of course, to reach this target much more is needed than 
the utilization of benefit-sharing alone. However, the wise and efficient 
application of benefit-sharing in its full gamut of compensation, 
distribution and deliberations, both downstream and upstream, is one step 
in the right direction. Fruitful initiatives of upstream benefit-sharing are 
already under way, and it would be a pity to disregard them. 
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A diversity of approaches to 
benefit-sharing35 
                                                 
35
 This chapter is written by Bram De Jonge & Niels Louwaars and is conditionally 
accepted – in a shortened version – as a scientific article for the Journal Global 
Environmental Politics. 
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Abstract 
Benefit-sharing is a complex and controversial policy concept. We claim 
that a major part of the controversy surrounding the sharing of benefits 
arising out of the use of genetic resources is based on the diversity of 
approaches to benefit-sharing. An overview is provided of six central 
motivations for benefit-sharing that can be extracted from the current 
debates with respect to plant genetic resources. The different mechanisms 
for benefit-sharing derived from these six motivations are analyzed, and 
their intended outcomes discussed. The paper aims at increasing insight in 
the different viewpoints and interests that people have in the debates about 
benefit-sharing and their interrelations. Furthermore, the overview makes 
apparent how these different approaches to benefit-sharing tend to 
undermine each other, insofar as they lead to conflicting effects or 
expectations. This article aims to expose and highlight some of these 
tensions and their underlying causes. Clarity and insight here is likely, we 
argue, to facilitate a more productive debate on benefit-sharing, and can 
inform and improve decision-making in respect of future applications of 
benefit-sharing, both at the national and international levels. 
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Introduction 
Benefit-sharing is complex and controversial. Put briefly, it is an 
international policy concept that originated in the 1970s with the aim of 
regulating the distribution of certain resources and the benefits derived 
from their use (De Jonge & Korthals, 2006). Benefit-sharing in relation to 
plant genetic resources was first included in international law by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992 (CBD) (UNEP, 1992). It 
figures as one of three objectives of the Convention, alongside the 
conservation and the sustainable use of biological diversity. The CBD 
introduced the concept of national sovereignty over genetic resources as a 
means to regulate access to these resources. Access can be made subject to 
mutually agreed terms, including aspects of prior informed consent and 
the sharing of benefits arising out of their use. The CBD has been ratified 
by almost all countries,36 which have established national competent 
authorities to implement the mechanisms.37 Few countries, however, have 
effectively implemented these rights in the period since in such a way that 
substantial benefits are actually shared (Visser et al, 2005).38 
 
Multiple aspects are complicating the successful implementation of 
Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) regulations. One aspect is that the use 
and transfer of plant genetic resources are dealt with in different policy 
sectors: environment, trade and agriculture. This has resulted in various 
international agreements with distinct objectives that are negotiated by 
different ministries in national governments (Petit et al, 2001). These are, 
amongst others, the aforementioned CBD, the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO, 1994), and the International Treaty on Plant 
                                                 
36
 http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
37
 http://www.cbd.int/abs [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
38
 See also http://www.cbd.int/abs/arrangements/ and 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/contracts/index.html [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
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Genetic resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) of the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) (FAO, 2001). Much debate and 
controversy results from the interplay of these different policy frameworks 
and the impact they have upon issues of access to genetic resources and 
benefit-sharing (Andersen, 2007; Dutfield, 2000; Sampath & Tarasofsky, 
2002). 
 
Another important aspect is that many different stakeholders influence the 
policymaking process. Because plant genetic resources are a component of 
biodiversity and form the basis of our food consumption and many other 
important products and industries (Rosendal, 2006b; World Resources 
Institute, 1992), the stakes for governments, business organizations and 
civil society groups are high (Laird, 2002; ten Kate & Laird, 1999). This 
results in a complex spectrum of diverging opinions and interests as to 
how ABS issues should be organized. Complicating factors in this respect 
are the huge cultural and socio-economic (power) differences between 
stakeholders involved (Greene, 2004; Vermeylen, 2007). The field of ABS 
is one in which representatives of a multinational corporation and an 
indigenous tribe may have to negotiate one agreement. 
 
Because of these different policy sectors, multiple stakeholders and 
various cultural and socio-economic contexts involved, it is not clear what 
is exactly understood by this concept of benefit-sharing. When we started 
our research and had our first interviews, we soon found out that different 
ideas exist about benefit-sharing, about its underlying principles, its goals 
and the preferred mechanisms to reach these goals. Furthermore, more 
than one motivation and objective were linked to this concept by any 
interviewee. For this reason, we decided to analyze and distinguish the 
different approaches to benefit-sharing that can be extracted from the 
current debates around this concept.  
 
So far, most studies on benefit-sharing have focused on practical problems 
or opportunities, and are aimed particularly at an evaluation of the few 
benefit-sharing policies that are currently in practice. This article serves a 
rather different end. We will present an overview of the main approaches 
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involved in order to contribute to a better informed and balanced debate in 
which policy-makers and other stakeholders are more aware of the various 
interests that are at stake. Interests that are not easily linked to separate 
stakeholder groups, as we will show, but which are referred to among the 
different stakeholders, often without them being clearly and explicitly 
differentiated. By doing so in this article, we hope to inform the current 
debate and shed more light on the major areas of contention involved. By 
comparing the different approaches in the second part of this article, the 
central stumbling blocks in the current ABS negotiations (both on the 
national and international level) will become apparent, showing why 
benefit-sharing is such a complex issue and why expectations are so rarely 
met. We will conclude with a brief reflection on possible ways forward, 
especially with respect to the ongoing negotiations towards an 
International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing within the 
framework of the CBD. 
Methodology 
The initial data for this overview have been derived from interviews with 
experts and stakeholders in Kenya, Peru, and The Netherlands, and some 
international organizations. This was augmented by further input via 
meetings and workshops, together with a survey of the literature, used 
primarily to ground the verbal reports and for referencing purposes. 
 
The three countries represent three major geo-political cooperation 
organizations – the African Union, the Andean Community and the 
European Union – with their respective views and interests in plant 
genetic resources. In order to obtain a wide variety of stakeholders and 
their organizations in the debate, 77 semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken with people from government and related institutions, the 
scientific community, industry, and civil society organizations. Additional 
input came through attendance at meetings of the CBD and its Ad Hoc 
Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, and a visit to 
the FAO. Plus two international workshops on Access and Benefit-Sharing 
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in Germany,39 India,40 and a national workshop with civil society 
organizations in the Netherlands. The study was conducted between 
March 2007 and July 2008. 
 
Table 1: Number of persons interviewed according to sector (x) and 
country (y) 
 Science Government Civil Society Industry 
Peru 9 4 8 - 
Kenya 6 14 9 2 
Netherlands 6 3 - 3 
International 
Organizations 6 4 - 3 
 
By linking the inputs from the verbal reports with the literature and policy 
documents, we identified six fundamentally different approaches to the 
issue of benefit-sharing in the field of plant genetic resources. These 
represent six distinct strains of argumentation or reasoning in which the 
concept of benefit-sharing is embedded, based on the following 
perceptions, or motivations:  
- The South-North imbalance in resource allocation and exploitation 
- The need to conserve biodiversity  
- Biopiracy and the imbalance in intellectual property rights  
- A shared interest in food security 
- An imbalance between IP protection and the public interest 
- Protecting the cultural identity of traditional communities 
In order to detail the arguments informing the different approaches, the six 
sections that follow describe the basic motivations, established and 
proposed mechanisms, and intended outcomes of each of the different 
interpretations of benefit-sharing. Each section will start with a quote from 
                                                 
39
 http://www.feu.uni-bremen.de/downloads/Workshop/programme.pdf [Accessed 13 
April 2008]. 
40
 http://www.ris.org.in/icgr_prg.htm [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
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one of the interviews that triggered our attention to this particular 
perspective on benefit-sharing.41 
 
The following analysis should be regarded as an initial effort to structure 
the various arguments and perspectives involved in the current debates on 
benefit-sharing. The different approaches are not fixed entities and they 
relate to each other in many different ways and on many different levels. 
We are aware of the strategic potential of any structuring and framing of 
concepts, by ourselves and the various stakeholders involved, but that is 
exactly the reason why we have put up this analysis in the first place. As 
long as the various interests and perspectives involved are not clearly 
distinguished, the socio-political debate may not be clearly understood and 
anticipated upon. The pragmatic and deliberative ethics approach 
(Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Dryzek, 1990; Gastil, 2005; Keulartz et al, 2002) 
that is applied in this paper aims to improve the “rationality of public 
debate and decision making” and promote the “fair representation of all 
relevant arguments” (Keulartz et al, 2004, p. 19). By illuminating the 
various perspectives and arguments that are at stake with respect to a 
particular problem, this approach aims to contribute to decision making 
that, in the ideal situation, is guided by the force of the better argument 
rather than forces of power, money and the like (Apel, 1988; Habermas, 
1991; Thompson, 2002). 
                                                 
41
 This is not to imply that the citied person is solely interested in that particular aspect of 
benefit-sharing. 
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Basic motivations, mechanisms 
and outcomes 
The South-North imbalance in resource allocation and 
exploitation 
“Experiences in my career led to this thinking that there is 
something not right in this relationship of biodiversity resources. 
Scientists come to our pristine areas, (…) and we help them get to 
the area, get to the information, and the benefit was like, why don’t 
you stay one week more of your time and at least come to my class 
and teach things (…) there was the feeling that the exchange was 
not totally straight, there was always one side benefiting more than 
the other.” Policymaker, Andean Community (Peru).42 
One major justification for benefit-sharing can be described, in general 
terms, as the transfer of plant genetic resources from the South to the 
North. Plant genetic resources have been distributed around the world for 
millennia, but some parts of the world are by nature richer in these 
resources than others. This is true for natural biodiversity, of which levels 
are higher in the diverse ecologies of tropical rain forests and mountain 
ranges – of developing countries – than in the much more uniform forests 
and grasslands of lower elevation temperate regions – of the wealthy 
countries (Faith, 1996). It is also true for agricultural biodiversity, notably 
in plant genetic resources, where the origins of almost all major crops 
have been located in a limited number of centres of diversity situated in 
economically poorer, developing regions of the world, especially in 
southern Asia, Latin America and northeast Africa (Vavilov, 1951). 
However, not all developing countries are rich in genetic resources; 
notably Africa (except the Horn) is poor in crop genetic diversity (Harlan, 
1971). 
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 Respondent chooses to stay anonymous. 
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During the colonial period of the second half of the last millennium, the 
global distribution of germplasm entered the modern period of 
transportation as the gene-poor empires from the north started to import 
and collect the plant genetic resources (newly discovered species) from 
their gene-rich colonies, especially from those of the south (Juma, 1989). 
On the economic importance of plant genetic material and the global 
division of benefits through collection practices, Kloppenburg concludes 
that “It is no exaggeration to say that the plant genetic resources received 
as free goods from the Third World have been worth untold billons of 
dollars to the advanced capitalist nations” (Kloppenburg, 2004, p. 169; 
italics original). He is therefore of the opinion that “It is highly ironic that 
the Third World resource that the developed nations have, arguably, 
extracted for the longest time, derived the greatest benefits from, and still 
depend upon the most is one for which no compensation is paid. Indeed, it 
is not merely ironic, it is contradictory” (idem, p. 153). 
 
The present-day practice of collecting germplasm is referred to as 
“bioprospecting” (Reid et al, 1993). Some consider the term 
bioprospecting inappropriate as it “assumes that prior to prospecting, the 
resources of desire were unknown, unused and without value” (Shiva, 
2005, p. 16). The central point of the critique here is that under the present 
framework of bioprospecting, the collected germplasm is considered the 
raw material for further breeding and biotechnology applications, efforts 
that give value to a hitherto relatively valueless matter. In fact, however, 
the collected germplasm has often been preserved, managed and improved 
by the collective labour of generations of farmers and indigenous 
communities. The resources are not simply raw materials extracted from 
nature (Phillips & Onwuekwe, 2007). 
Mechanism: National sovereignty over plant genetic resources 
The flow of plant genetic resources from the countries in the South to 
those in the North has become the basis for the best-known model of 
benefit-sharing. In the 1980s, global resistance against the free use of 
germplasm originating from developing countries arose. The new 
Three Plants, Genes and Justice 
62 
 
biotechnology industry was expanding rapidly and developed countries 
tried to facilitate this growth by expanding intellectual property rights to 
genetic material and living organisms. This stirred an appreciation – and 
expectations – in developing countries of the potential value of their plant 
genetic resources, which became an important input to the CBD 
(Macilwain, 1998). The CBD abandoned the assumption of plant genetic 
resources as a common heritage, declaring instead that “States have 
sovereign rights over their own biological resources” (UNEP, 1992, 
Preamble). The convention explicitly calls for “the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” 
(Article 1). According to the CBD, benefit-sharing is primarily based on a 
bilateral model of exchange and compensation based on the sovereign 
rights that States have over their plant genetic resources. Poor countries 
are to be compensated for the contribution of their plant genetic resources 
(Rosendal, 2006a).43 This model was further elaborated in the Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization in 2002 (UNEP, 
2002). Even though benefit-sharing is embedded in a Convention that 
aims also at the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources, 
the benefit-sharing aspect is nevertheless an independent basic objective 
of the CBD, which can thus be very well explained in terms of a purely 
political economy argument: developing nations should be able to reap the 
benefits of their biological resources (as they can with other natural 
resources such as oil and minerals) (ten Kate & Laird, 1999). 
Intended Outcome: Equity in international economic relations 
The fact that 1) the genetic resources are a natural resource of countries of 
the South which cannot be appropriated and traded by the country as part 
of natural wealth in the same way that can other natural resources such as 
oil or minerals, and that 2) the benefits from these genetic resources are 
largely accrued in the gene-poor industrialized countries of the North, is 
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 Nonetheless, the compensation model of the CBD only relates to the cross border 
movement of resources after the Convention came into force – i.e. 1992 or later, 
depending on the date of ratification of each country – and does not relate to resources 
that were acquired earlier. 
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an important motivation for benefit-sharing. Benefit-sharing is thus 
supposed to encourage equity in international economic relations, to be 
regarded as a compensation mechanism. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Approach 1 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
The South-North 
imbalance in resource 
allocation and 
exploitation 
National sovereignty 
over plant genetic 
resources 
Equity in international 
economic relations 
The need to conserve biodiversity 
“At the end of the day, we still, I think, do not escape a common 
responsibility for caring for these resources. It is totally irrelevant, 
long term, for us to talk about access and benefit-sharing if the 
resources themselves are allowed to die.” Cary Fowler, Executive 
Director, Global Crop Diversity Trust. 
A second and related rationale underlying the concept of benefit-sharing 
on genetic resources is the perception that investments have to be made to 
conserve biodiversity. In international agreements, the sharing of benefits 
derived from the utilization of genetic resources has always been 
connected to the conservation of these resources. The underlying 
assumptions are that 1) genetic resources have a global importance; 2) 
economic and environmental developments create pressures that work 
against the conservation of biological diversity (including deforestation, 
climate change, the modernization of agriculture and the globalization of 
plant and animal breeding); 3) countries where these pressures are most 
severe have least financial opportunities to counter them; and 4) benefit-
sharing for the use of genetic resources can provide a sustainable source of 
funds, knowledge and technology to conserve biological diversity 
(Emerton, 1999; Henne et al, 2003; Rosendal, 2006a; ten Kate, 2002). 
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Even though benefit-sharing in the CBD has a focus on encouraging 
equity in international relations (see Approach 1), it is embedded in an 
agreement that concentrates primarily on conservation (UNEP, 1992, 
Article 1). The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) is more specific in regard to the link 
between benefit-sharing and conservation:  
The Contracting Parties agree that benefits arising from the use of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that are shared 
under the Multilateral System should flow primarily, directly and 
indirectly, to farmers in all countries, especially in developing 
countries, and countries with economies in transition, who 
conserve and sustainably utilize plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture. (FAO, 2001, Article 13.3) 
Mechanism: Benefits to support conservation efforts  
Contracting countries to the CBD have the obligation to conserve the 
biological diversity in their territory and they have the opportunity to share 
in the benefits. There is however no explicit link between the two, 
although it is assumed that revenues can contribute to conservation efforts 
(Byström et al, 1999; ten Kate, 2002).44 The basic idea is that the CBD 
promotes the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by, on the 
one hand, creating incentives (i.e. the promise of benefit-sharing) for 
developing countries to protect their potentially valuable plant genetic 
resources, and, on the other hand, assisting them in gaining access to the 
means for conservation by promoting the flow of technology, information 
and financial resources (i.e. the content of benefit-sharing). 
 
One may, however, also claim that benefits derived from systematic 
bioprospecting contracts may actually make it less necessary to conserve 
the resource. The chances of finding new genetic material after an 
ecosystem has been systematically screened are smaller than before the 
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 The Bonn Guidelines (2002) refer to this by stating that “Benefits should be directed in 
such a way as to promote conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” 
(Article 48). 
Plants, Genes and Justice Three 
 
65 
 
bio-prospecting mission. Similarly, when all genetic diversity within a 
crop has been sampled and stored in a genebank, less emphasis may be put 
on on-farm management of diversity. However, forward-looking 
governments will continue to conserve biodiversity and promote its 
continued evolution in situ for future generations to sample and research 
with new technologies and for new purposes. 
 
Whether the funding strategy of the ITPGR will be able to generate 
enough funds to sustainably conserve crop genetic resources remains to be 
seen (Visser et al, 2005). The Global Crop Diversity Trust, which can be 
considered a supporting component of the ITPGR, is collecting significant 
amounts for the ex-situ component of the conservation strategy. The 
objective of this Trust is to be able to support the most relevant collections 
in order to keep them eternally available.45 The ITPGR is very specific 
that non-monetary benefits also may significantly contribute to the goals 
of conservation and the sustainable use of crop genetic diversity (FAO, 
2001, Article 13). 
Intended Outcome: Conservation and the sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources 
Both the CBD and ITPGR have clear objectives that aim to support 
conservation and the sustainable use of plant genetic resources. Benefit-
sharing may provide the incentives and tools to conserve biodiversity. 
Large programs, such as InBio in Costa Rica, create a significant capacity 
for nature conservation and diversity-related research (Cabrera Medaglia, 
2007). Linking these developments to eco-tourism seems to provide an 
effective longer-term financial capability to maintain the relevant forest 
reserves. The extent to which the ITPGR, with its more direct linkage of 
benefit-sharing to conservation, will manage to reach its conservation 
goals remains to be seen, but a first group of conservation projects is now 
being supported from the treaty’s benefit-sharing fund.46 
 
                                                 
45
 http://www.croptrust.org [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
46
 ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/noti/NCP_GB3_ppa09_e.pdf [Accessed 13 April 
2008]. 
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Table 3: Summary of Approach 2 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
The need to conserve 
biodiversity 
Benefits to support 
conservation efforts 
Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of PGR 
Biopiracy and the imbalance in intellectual property rights  
“If we want to have benefit-sharing we have to protect our 
traditional knowledge and medicine, but the current intellectual 
property regime is not working for that so we need a better regime. 
Now our problem is, when we speak we are not often heard. (…) it 
is really a matter of being allowed to sort our own thing out and 
for the world to accept the standards that we create, because it is 
really hard when all the time the standards have to come from the 
West, some of them are just not going to mix with the systems we 
have here.” Jennifer Orwa, Principal Research Officer; Wesley 
Ronoh, Marketing Officer; Robert Karanja, Research Officer, 
Kenya Medical Research Institute. 
A third interpretation or context in which discussions on benefit-sharing 
take place concerns an asymmetry in allocations of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) to and over plant genetic resources and related knowledge, 
and the subsequent acts or accusations of biopiracy (Shiva, 2001). 
Reviewing the way in which this asymmetry developed, we note that first, 
during the course of the 20th century, industrialized countries started to 
expand their IP systems to include new plant varieties and genetic material 
(Drahos & Blakeney, 2001; Dutfield, 2003b). In 1930, the Plant Patent 
Act of the U.S.A. provided exclusive rights to the breeders of most 
vegetatively propagated crops (Kloppenburg, 2004). In 1961, the national 
plant breeder’s rights systems in a number of European countries were 
harmonized under the Convention on the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (1961), administered by the International Union for the Protection 
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of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) as a means to encourage the 
development of new plant varieties and the international seed trade.47  The 
initial Act was adapted to the changing needs of the UPOV member 
countries in 1972, 1978 and 1991, gradually increasing the rights of the 
breeders. From the 1980s onwards, it became possible in a growing 
number of countries to obtain patent protection on living organisms and 
components of heredity of these organisms and the methods and tools to 
manipulate these, which provide a much stronger legal protection 
(Rimmer, 2006). In 1995, when the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was finalized and adopted by the 
newly formed World Trade Organization,48 the IPR concepts of the 
industrialized countries became global. 
 
The central issue now is that “the principles of western patent law 
unequivocally favour the biotech company rather than the indigenous 
community” (van den Belt, 2003, p. 237). Patents protect inventions that 
satisfy certain criteria, the most central of which are novelty, inventive 
step, and industrial applicability. For these reasons plants that have been 
used and developed by farmers and indigenous communities over 
centuries are not patentable; novel, derived or purified products are 
patentable, but these can normally only be obtained using technological 
and human resources beyond the capacity of such communities (Nature, 
1998). In addition to claims over genetic resources, this argument 
introduces into the debate the Traditional Knowledge (TK) of farmers and 
indigenous communities (Hansen & VanFleet, 2003). Such TK may not 
meet the novelty criteria of IPR, and tends to be of a collective cultural 
nature not easily attributed to an individual IP holder (Koopman, 2005). 
This asymmetry in allocations of intellectual property rights was the basis 
of the concept of biopiracy, described as “the appropriation of the 
knowledge and genetic resources of farming and indigenous communities 
by individuals or institutions who seek exclusive monopoly control 
                                                 
47
 http://www.upov.int [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
48
 http://www.wto.org [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
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(patents or intellectual property) over these resources and knowledge”.49 
Examples and charges of biopiracy are currently central to many debates 
on benefit-sharing (Hamilton, 2006; Laird & Wynberg, 2008; McGown, 
2006). 
 
The main argument of an imbalance of intellectual property rights between 
the local developers of genetic resources and related knowledge on the one 
hand, and the formal sectors of research and development on the other, 
focuses on individuals and communities rather than on nations. Benefit-
sharing is not a right in itself, it is based on inalienable rights that 
communities have on their resources, which should be at par with the 
strong intellectual property rights that inventors in the scientific 
community have. 
Mechanism: Countervailing rights systems and user measures 
Where the national sovereignty principle of the CBD is quite clear, the 
rights of indigenous communities over their genetic resources are difficult 
to capture in legal terms. Debates within the CBD over suitable concepts 
for and interpretations of its Article 8j50 on indigenous and local 
communities, have been ongoing for many years.51 Problems may include 
aspects of democracy (why would certain groups in the country have more 
rights than others?), demarcation (does a person in the city still belong to 
an indigenous community and is s/he allowed to share in benefits?), and 
representation (who can negotiate on behalf of the community?) 
(Schuklenk & Kleinsmidt, 2006; ten Kate & Laird, 1999). In the 
meantime, evermore examples of (alleged) biopiracy appear. 
                                                 
49
 Action Group on Erosion Technology and Concentration (ETC Group) website, 
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/issues/biopiracy.html [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
50
 Article 8j: Each party shall “Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and 
maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and 
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage 
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices”. 
51
 http://www.cbd.int/traditional [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
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Communities that give access to certain resources hardly ever receive in 
return a share in intellectual property rights on the products developed out 
of these resources (Hayden, 2007). For these reasons, calls have been 
made for the establishment of indigenous and collective sui generis 
intellectual property rights systems. Proposals range from the creation of 
Traditional Resource Rights to shareholder arrangements. In the Onge 
Corporation all members of the Onge community in India become 
shareholders of one corporation that protects and controls their natural and 
traditional resources in accordance with modern IP legislation (Norchi, 
2000). Traditional resources rights (TRR) are a sui generis system of legal 
rights that aim to protect both the tangible and intangible qualities of such 
resources as germplasm, knowledge and folklore, and even landscapes, 
through a “bundle of rights” taken from a variety of international 
agreements. Intellectual property rights are only one aspect of TRR 
because “Property for indigenous peoples frequently has intangible, 
spiritual manifestations, and, although worthy of protection, can belong to 
no human being. Privatization or commoditization of their resources is not 
only foreign but incomprehensible or even unthinkable” (Posey & 
Dutfield, 1996, p. 95). This is opposite to approaches that aim at 
maximizing benefits through the use of strong IPRs (Herold, 2003). Other 
methods here include the publication of community knowledge (a defense 
to patenting) (WIPO, 2002), and claims for geographic indications – e.g. 
as already used for wine, which could provide value to the genetic 
resource in the market (Correa et al, 2002). 
 
At the international level, discussions related to intellectual property rights 
for indigenous communities continue at the Intergovernmental Committee 
on Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) under 
the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),52 
while agreement has been reached in the field of agricultural genetic 
resources through the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and 
                                                 
52
 http://www.wipo.int/tk [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
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Agriculture (CGRFA).53 The IGC is still discussing draft provisions for 
the enhanced protection of traditional knowledge against misappropriation 
and misuse.54 The debate in the CGRFA, meanwhile, has produced an 
agreed formulation of the concept of farmers’ rights in the ITPGR – as 
rights arising from “the enormous contribution that the local and 
indigenous communities and farmers of all regions of the world, 
particularly those in the centers of origin and crop diversity, have made 
and will continue to make for the conservation and development of plant 
genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture 
production throughout the world” (FAO, 2001, Article 9.1). Contracting 
parties will promote farmers’ rights by protecting relevant traditional 
knowledge, promoting the right to share in the benefits arising from the 
utilization of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and by 
enabling farmers to participate in decision-making (Article 9.2). In 
addition, Article 9.3 states that “Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted 
to limit any rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-
saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law and as 
appropriate.” Benefit-sharing for and by farmers is thus enshrined as a 
farmers’ right. 
 
Another proposal tries to move completely away from such rights 
discourses and towards legal measures aimed instead at the users of 
genetic resources and related knowledge. Proponents of such user 
measures intend to avoid the tendency of ABS regulations to block access 
rather than promote benefit-sharing (Tobin, 1997). One of the user 
measures that is currently being discussed in international bodies is 
disclosure of “origin”, “source” or “legal provenance” (Barber et al, 
2003). This measure holds that applicants for patents are required to 
disclose information regarding the origin of the genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge that are utilized within the patent application. A 
subsequent requirement could be to provide evidence of prior informed 
consent and mutually agreed terms (including benefit-sharing), which 
                                                 
53
 http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
54
 http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/consultations/draft_provisions/draft_provisions.html 
[Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
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would then be a legal condition for any grant of IP protection. Failure to 
provide the required information would lead to the suspension of the 
application. In this way, the protection against biopiracy and the “soft 
law” requirements for benefit-sharing in the CBD could be backed up by 
the “hard law” of international IP legislation. Furthermore, the burden of 
proof would be shifted from the “weak” shoulders of indigenous and 
farming communities to the “stronger” shoulders of industrial companies 
and research centers.  
Intended Outcome: Equity in legal rights over plant genetic resources 
Different methods are described that try to counterbalance the perceived 
asymmetry in allocations of intellectual property rights in order to stop 
biopiracy. These examples form a central part of many discussions on 
benefit-sharing and are primarily concerned with a fight for recognition of 
the knowledge and resources that farmers and indigenous and local 
communities have managed, conserved and developed throughout 
centuries. The methods include several rights systems and user measures 
that aim to provide farmers and indigenous communities with the 
necessary legal rights over their plant genetic resources and related 
knowledge and products, so that they may be on a par with the strong 
intellectual property rights enjoyed by inventors in the scientific and 
industrial communities. 
 
Table 4: Summary of Approach 3 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
Biopiracy and the 
imbalance in 
intellectual property 
rights 
Countervailing rights 
systems and user 
measures 
Equity in legal rights 
over PGR and related 
knowledge 
A shared interest in food security 
“The continued access to improved crop varieties for further 
breeding, that is the essence, I think, of benefit-sharing. (…) this is 
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the ‘in kind’ benefit-sharing on which the agricultural sector is 
build.” Orlando de Ponti, Former Director of R&D, Nunhems, the 
Netherlands (translated). 
A fourth interpretation of benefit-sharing is mainly related to the 
agricultural sector. Within this field, the genetic resources for food and 
agriculture have been distributed around the world for millennia. For a 
long time, they were generally considered the Common Heritage of 
Humankind, as formally recognized by the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, a non-binding 
agreement under the FAO (FAO, 1983). This idea was strengthened by the 
state of affairs that had arisen whereby no country or even continent was 
self-sufficient in its agricultural plant germplasm (Flores-Palacios, 1997). 
While for example Latin-America has given the world, amongst others, 
the potato, tomato, cacao and maize, it has received rice and soybean from 
East Asia, wheat form West Asia, and coffee from Africa. Humans have 
probably been cultivating plant genetic resources through careful selection 
and breeding since the advent of agriculture (Fowler & Hodgkin, 2004). 
This has literally changed the food we eat. Today’s tomatoes, for example, 
are unrecognizable when compared to their early predecessors, which 
were the size of a berry. Because of population growth and the continuous 
threat of diseases, insect pests, and environmental stresses, plant and 
animal breeding are never-ending challenges. The conservation and 
exchange of the world’s genetic resources, the building blocks of further 
crop and breed development, is thus considered essential for global food 
security (Halewood & Nnadozie, 2008). 
 
It is in this context that the agricultural sector, including the seed industry 
(ISF, 2007), is in general critical of the CBD and its bilateral model of 
access and benefit-sharing (Correa, 2003; Hardon et al, 1994). The main 
problem is that in implementing the CBD, most nation states focus 
primarily on the protection of their plant genetic resources, creating all 
kinds of barriers for exchange and increasing transaction costs. As a result, 
the number of new collection missions (Falcon & Fowler, 2002) and the 
international transfer of plant genetic resources (Fowler et al, 2001) have 
declined dramatically since the ratification of the CBD. A decreasing 
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exchange of genetic resources may seriously endanger food security in the 
long run. In addition, since most developing countries are net importers of 
genetic resources, the CBD’s bilateral model of access and benefit-sharing 
is likely to hurt these countries most because they may have the greatest 
difficulties in negotiating and financing ABS contracts (Falcon & Fowler, 
2002). 
Mechanism: Facilitated access and exchange of plant genetic resources 
The specific characteristics of genetic resources for food and agriculture 
were recognized by the CBD (Stannard et al, 2004), but it was not until 
2001 that new international rules were designed to manage access and 
benefit-sharing for plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. In that 
year, the ITPGR set up a Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing that, while in harmony with the CBD, was better suited to the 
specific characteristics of the agricultural sector (FAO, 2001, Part IV). 
The multilateral system is based on a list of major crops and forages of 
which genetic resources under the control of the signatory governments 
are to be accessible under a standard material transfer agreement, thus 
avoiding the need for further negotiations.55 It includes a financial 
mechanism in which payment is liable – to be placed into a fund – when a 
commercial product is developed using resources from the multilateral 
system and the genetic resources of that product are not available anymore 
under the same conditions, e.g. if it is patented or bound by technical or 
other legal restrictions. The fund is then linked to the benefit-sharing 
provisions that aim to facilitate “the exchange of information, access to 
and transfer of technology, capacity-building, and the sharing of the 
benefits arising from commercialization” (Article 13), in particular to help 
small farmers in developing countries. Furthermore, it is stated that the 
facilitated access to the plant genetic resources of the multilateral system 
                                                 
55
 The division of plant genetic resources that fall under the CBD or ITPGR is not 
completely clear because the latter refers to all plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture but its multilateral system for which facilitated access has been arranged is 
based on a limited list of crops and forages. This means that governments can decide for 
themselves whether non-listed crops are exchanged under similar terms or whether access 
is provided under the CBD based regime. 
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“constitutes itself a major benefit of the Multilateral System” (idem). This 
reflects the idea of a common interest in food security as a basic rationale 
behind the system. 
 
Even though the ITPGR is built on a common interest in food security, the 
member countries have certainly not decided to return to the common 
heritage principle. That would be at odds with the contemporary 
international environment of intellectual property rights, concerns about 
biopiracy and the sovereign rights that states have over their plant genetic 
resources. Indeed, many Southern countries did not include all their crops 
that are important for food security in the list of the Multilateral System 
(Falcon & Fowler, 2002) – possibly because they expect more revenues 
from selling them bilaterally under the CBD – while Northern countries 
resisted the introduction of restrictions on existing intellectual property 
legislation into the treaty and very few (only Norway thus far) have come 
up with voluntary contributions to the funding mechanism.56 In fact, the 
only IPR-restriction in the Multilateral System is that intellectual property 
rights can not be claimed on germplasm “in the form received” (FAO, 
2001, Article 12). It can therefore be argued that subsequent 
transformations of the germplasm may render it patentable. Indeed, 
several NGO’s and farmer organizations are currently calling for the 
suspension of the ITPGR because it can, in its present form, be a vehicle 
for biopiracy (GRAIN, 2007a). Yet, despite these challenges, the ITPGR 
has established a new model of benefit-sharing based on the specific 
characteristics of the agricultural sector and a shared interest in food 
security. 
  
Outside of the FAO, the perceived importance of promoting the use of 
genetic resources has also led to a regional agreement among the Nordic 
Countries in Scandinavia to grant access to their genetic resources using a 
very liberal contract which does not include benefit-sharing.57 This 
approach contrasts with a number of other regional agreements, however, 
                                                 
56
 ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/news/noti005_en.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
57
 http://www.cbd.int/doc/measures/abs/msr-abs-nr.2-en.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2008]. 
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notably in the Andean and African regions, in which the collection of 
benefits appears to get preference over the food security argument 
(Louwaars et al, 2006). 
Intended Outcome: Food security and sustainable agriculture 
The objectives of the ITPGR are “the conservation and sustainable use of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food 
security” (FAO, 2001, Article 1). The multilateral system of access and 
benefit-sharing that the treaty introduces supports this aim by facilitating 
the free exchange of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and 
by stimulating the provision of the means for sustainable agriculture, 
especially to small-holder farmers in developing countries. It does so by 1) 
providing access as a means of benefit-sharing; 2) stimulating non-
monetary benefit-sharing, including the flow of information, capacity 
building and technology to the countries, and particularly to the farmers, 
that conserve and developed genetic resources; and 3) developing a 
funding mechanism that can support both monetary and non-monetary 
benefit-sharing. It should again be emphasized, however, that while these 
methods may favor and even target particular types of farmers, 
communities or nations, they are not so much based on the rights of these 
groups as on a common concern for sustainable agriculture and food 
security. 
 
Table 5: Summary of Approach 4 
Basic Justification Mechanism Intended Outcome 
A shared interest in 
food security 
Facilitated access and 
exchange of PGRFA 
Food security and 
sustainable agriculture 
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An Imbalance between Intellectual Property Protection and 
the Public Interest 
“Why should we patent a living organism (…) if it is for the 
common good for humans why should somebody own it? Why 
should somebody own a gene? We are struggling to get rid of 
hunger, how do you feel that you have all these resources within 
your region, you are watching people die but you are happy 
patenting and making money.” Jane Omari, Science Secretary, 
National Council for Science and Technology (Kenya). 
A fifth rationale underlying benefit-sharing has to do with concerns about 
the rise of intellectual property rights in the field of plant genetics and its 
effects on the public domain. The general worry is that current intellectual 
property legislation may block the equitable sharing of benefits of modern 
research and development within society. 
 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
patents create incentives for innovation as inventors obtain recognition 
and commercial protection for their inventions. This then contributes to 
“the continuing enhancement of the quality of human life” (WIPO, n.d., p. 
5). In addition, the inventor must disclose the patented invention to the 
public, so that others can gain the new knowledge and can further develop 
the technology. The formal goal of the patent system is thus to protect the 
intellectual property of inventors, and simultaneously to encourage 
innovation and the dissemination of its benefits into society. However, it is 
on this very matter that the present IP system is now highly criticized. One 
major complaint is that the IP system may trigger research and 
development (R&D), but cannot guarantee the dissemination of its 
benefits to all sections of society (Willison & MacLeod, 2002). Until now 
most research within the field of biotechnology has focused on 
commercial crops and medicine, and no serious investments have been 
made in the most important crops and diseases in developing countries 
(FAO, 2004; Global Forum for Health Research, 2004). Moreover, even 
when more products are eventually developed with applications for 
developing countries, it is feared that many people will be excluded from 
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using them because of the expensive patent royalties they will incur (Third 
World Network, 2001). Critics speak in this respect of a new divide 
between the developed and developing countries (Fresco, 2003b; Singer & 
Daar, 2001). 
 
Another point of criticism of intellectual property protection is that since 
genetic material, knowledge and technologies can be protected, R&D in 
this field finds itself in an “anticommons trap”. The “tragedy of the 
anticommons” is a scenario in which too many entities have rights of 
exclusion to a given resource, which makes the resource prone to under-
use (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). In such cases, innovation can be blocked 
because it becomes too costly for innovators to buy access to all the 
research material they need. An additional development that results from 
this state of affairs, at least in part, is the concentration of the 
biotechnology industry into few hands. Companies are tending to merge to 
acquire larger IP portfolios in order to bear the costs of expensive R&D 
trajectories and thereby facilitate further research – added to which, just a 
few multinationals nowadays dominate the market across the different 
economic sectors (pharmaceuticals, plant-breeding and agro-chemicals) in 
which biotechnology is involved. This global concentration of power in 
the new “life science industry” has created public concern that “a small, 
authoritarian minority is now dictating what kinds of research are 
permissible and which technologies and products should be available in 
the marketplace” (Kloppenburg, 2004, p. 314). The fact that the products 
involved are not mere luxury goods but some of the basic necessities of 
life has only increased public unease on this issue. 
Mechanism: Stimulating technology transfer and knowledge sharing 
Recently, several initiatives have been developed that try to correct the 
intellectual property / public interest imbalance and focus on ways to share 
the benefits of modern R&D more equitably. Worth mentioning in this 
respect are: 
- The open source movement in biotechnology, as represented by the 
Center for the Application of Molecular Biology to International 
Agriculture (CAMBIA), which emphasizes new collaboration and 
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licensing tools to maximize the freedom to operate on 
biotechnologies and thereby to “empower both public and private 
sectors to develop health and agricultural products and processes of 
real relevance to all sectors of society”.58 
- The Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA), 
which aims “to improve agriculture in emerging economies by 
decreasing intellectual property barriers and increasing technology 
transfer” in order to make sure that “technological innovations get to 
those who need it most”.59 
- The employment of Humanitarian Use Licenses, in which the right 
holder allows the use of the technology for specific uses in 
development – e.g. the license negotiated by Syngenta on Golden 
Rice that provides free of charge access to the product for resource-
poor farmer earning less than US$10,000 p.a. from farming60; or, 
and more far-reaching, the license agreed by the partners in the 
Generation Challenge Program that provides such licenses for all 
technologies that the program develops (Barry & Louwaars, 2005). 
- Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), which are playing an 
increasingly important role in the fight against neglected diseases in 
developing countries especially – according to a Wellcome Trust 
report, pharmaceutical companies that had moved away from  
unprofitable research on neglected diseases are now returning to this 
area on a no-profit-no-loss basis (Moran et al, 2005), a success that 
warrants further research on the application of PPPs in the similar 
neglected field of orphan crops. 
These initiatives are not directly related to the exchange of plant genetic 
resources and therefore are not often referred to in the literature on 
benefit-sharing. They are, however, aimed at finding ways in which to 
share the benefits of modern R&D more equitably by stimulating 
technology transfer and knowledge sharing. This is exactly what the 
existing models of benefit-sharing in the CBD and ITPGR aim to promote 
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under the heading of “non-monetary” benefit-sharing. Non-monetary 
benefit-sharing provisions are often regarded an important aspect of any 
benefit-sharing policy (Byström et al, 1999; Raymond & Fowler, 2001), 
but the implementation of the existing provisions on both the national and 
international level has proven rather difficult so far (Visser et al, 2005). 
One major reason for this is that governments, which, for example, have to 
comply with non-monetary benefit-sharing provisions under the ITPGR, 
“have to rely on various stakeholders in developing, financing and 
implementing mechanisms for non-monetary benefit-sharing in order to 
meet this obligation” (idem, 2005, p. 4). This is why it is a good idea for 
policymakers to look for the benefit-sharing initiatives that are already 
being undertaken by the different stakeholders in society, and to search for 
ways in which to facilitate and support these initiatives. 
Intended Outcome: Equity in distributing the benefits of research and 
development  
The initiatives described above try to correct the imbalance between IP 
protection and the public interest by stimulating technology transfer and 
knowledge sharing. In so doing, they hope to re-establish an open and 
stimulating environment for innovation and development, for the benefit 
especially of those in need. Altogether, one can see that in reaction to the 
increasing enclosure and concentration of resources, a range of open 
source projects, partnerships and sharing tools is being created to make 
available the necessary means for innovation and development in and for 
developing countries. The ultimate aim is to create a more equitable 
distribution of the benefits of modern research and development. 
 
Table 6: Summary of Approach 5 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
Imbalance between IP 
protection and the 
public interest 
Stimulating technology 
transfer and knowledge 
sharing 
Equity in distributing 
the benefits of research 
and development 
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Protecting the cultural identity of traditional communities 
in a globalizing world 
“With every agreement on benefit-sharing, the economic benefit 
can be big or small, but most important is an outcome in respect of 
the indigenous knowledge. (…) The most important benefit for 
indigenous people is respecting the culture, after that, economic 
benefits.” César Sarasara, Director; Mercedes Manriquez, Legal 
Advisor, Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru. 
(partially translated) 
A final perspective on benefit-sharing that plays a major role in the present 
debates on access and benefit-sharing is concerned with the cultural 
identities of traditional communities in today’s globalizing world. This 
motivation comes close to that described in Approach 3, the imbalance in 
intellectual property rights and the fight against biopiracy. The difference 
between the two is, however, substantial. The major concern of Approach 
3 relates to the growing influence of intellectual property rights used by 
the formal research sector and the means by which small farmers and 
traditional communities can protect themselves against biopiracy. In this 
section, we describe the opinion of many traditional communities that the 
concepts of access and benefit-sharing, and the (inter)national regulations 
on this matter, are in themselves already a form of globalization, one that 
encroaches on their traditional lifestyles and cultures. Instead of reacting 
to these foreign pressures, and in that act adapting to them, perspectives 
and initiatives that focus on the cultural identity of traditional communities 
are prioritised. The starting point here is the worldviews of the traditional 
communities themselves and an articulation of what they think that 
benefit-sharing should be about. 
 
Traditional communities often have a different frame of reference to that 
of other interested parties in the ABS debate (GRAIN, 2007b). They not 
necessarily enter into discussions about ends, but constitute ends in 
themselves, as they are inherently included in and objects of its aims, such 
as conservation. Benefit-sharing may mean supporting the stakeholders 
who maintain it. Such support is essentially external, coming, for example, 
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from the national and international agencies, and it is within and between 
these agencies that the complex negotiations about ABS take place. This is 
a world away from the rural settings of the vast majority of traditional 
stakeholders (Vermeylen, 2007). Ultimately, what is at stake is the cultural 
identity of traditional communities. 
 
The different perspectives of traditional communities and other 
stakeholders in the ABS debate are reflected in, for example, their 
different viewpoints on the concept of biopiracy. For some, access and 
benefit-sharing contracts are tools to stop biopiracy, to which end the CBD 
established its legal framework for bioprospecting (Dutfield, 2003a). 
Alejandro Argumedo, associate director of the indigenous NGO ANDES 
in Peru, has a radically different view. He claims that: 
Contractual benefit-sharing is like waking up in the middle of the 
night to find your house being robbed. On the way out the door, 
the thieves tell you not to worry because they promise to give you a 
share of whatever profit they make selling what used to belong to 
you.61 
Another clarification of the problem at hand comes from Jack Beetson, an 
Aboriginal activist who fights for the rights of traditional communities in 
several parts of the world. He warns that traditional ways of life can be 
destroyed in the very effort of protecting them. Inviting indigenous 
communities to an international conference, to put on a suit and negotiate 
their interests in English, straight away asks them to abandon their 
traditional way of life. When talking about capacity building in this 
context, Beetson wonders whether this should be aimed at indigenous 
communities, or whether the negotiators from governments, industry and 
other institutions should not instead build their own capacity – their 
capacity to go to the communities themselves, sit with them and discuss 
the issues in their language.62 
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Mechanism: Recognition for customary laws in ABS regimes 
The concerns about the cultural identity of traditional communities have 
led to specific ideas about what benefit-sharing should be about, or how it 
should be incorporated in international and national legislation. Brendan 
Tobin, co-founder of the Association for the Defence of Natural Rights 
(ADN), has conducted several research projects at the United Nations 
University aimed at the role of customary law in ABS regimes. He argues 
that natural resources and the ways of managing the land are still governed 
by customary law and traditional tenure rights in many parts of the world, 
and that these customary laws and practices are often undermined by the 
adoption of culturally insensitive national legislation, leading to the 
erosion of traditional authority and social structures within communities. 
Tobin concludes from this that what is required within the present ABS 
debate is “the adoption of a wider and more expansive view of the nature, 
role and values of traditional knowledge and its relationship to traditional 
resource management systems” (Tobin, 2004, p. 7), with the ultimate aim 
of “ensuring the effective recognition, respect and enforcement of 
customary law in any international regime on ABS” (idem, p. 1). 
 
Argumedo (NGO ANDES), who has been closely involved in setting up 
the Potato Park in the Peruvian Andes, speaks in this respect of reversing 
the ABS regime. The Potato Park is a centre of origin of potato diversity 
managed by six Quechua communities according to customary laws, 
including collective land tenure, community registers and resource 
management. In this way, the Potato Park aims to provide a truly effective 
protection of traditional knowledge, since it builds upon the practices and 
traditions of the communities themselves and incorporates all elements of 
that knowledge in situ. In 2005, the Potato Park signed an agreement with 
the International Potato Centre (CIP), one of the international agricultural 
genebanks, on the “repatriation, restoration and monitoring of 
agrobiodiversity of native potatoes and associated community knowledge 
systems” (GRAIN, 2005). According to Argumedo, this agreement 
reverses the traditional ABS regime because it puts the interests and 
customary laws of the indigenous farmers as central by 1) aiming to return 
to the local communities the samples of plant varieties and associated 
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knowledge once taken from them; 2) securing their access to the genetic 
resources of CIP, and ensuring that the genetic resources and knowledge 
remain under their custody and do not become subject to intellectual 
property rights in any form; and 3) recognizing the ability of the Andean 
farmers to conserve and develop the genetic resources for the benefit of 
their people and all mankind (Argumedo & Pimbert, 2005). 
Intended Outcome: Preserving and restoring traditional communities and 
their cultures 
The ultimate goal of the agreement signed between CIP and the Potato 
Park is the restoration and preservation of the rights and traditions of the 
indigenous communities in the park. This can be considered the general 
goal of those communities and related NGO’s that wish to reformulate 
national and international ABS legislation according to their own 
worldviews, putting them into their own words and reconciling them with 
their own customary laws. 
 
Table 7: Summary of Approach 6 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
Protecting the cultural 
identity of traditional 
communities 
Recognition for 
customary laws in ABS 
regimes 
Preserving and 
restoring traditional 
communities and their 
cultures 
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Reflection on major differences 
and consequences 
Six distinct strains of argumentation in which the concept of benefit-
sharing is embedded have been described. The different approaches are all 
valid, but they imply a range of different implementation mechanisms that 
in turn lead to widely different outcomes. If these outcomes were to point 
in roughly the same direction, it would be relatively easy to combine them 
in a common policy. We identify, however, significant friction between 
the different approaches in terms of their implementation, and a complex 
situation in analyzing stakeholder views and positions. This seems to 
explain the complexity of the current debates on benefit-sharing and their 
general lack of productive outcomes. 
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Table 8: Compilation of Approaches 1 to 6 
 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
1 
The South-North 
imbalance in 
resource allocation 
and exploitation 
National 
sovereignty over 
plant genetic 
resources 
Equity in 
international 
economic relations 
2 
The need to 
conserve 
biodiversity 
Benefits to support 
conservation efforts 
Conservation and 
sustainable use of 
PGR 
3 
Biopiracy and the 
imbalance in 
intellectual property 
rights 
Countervailing 
rights systems and 
user measures 
Equity in legal 
rights over PGR and 
related knowledge 
4 
A shared interest in 
food security 
Facilitated access 
and exchange of 
PGRFA 
Food security and 
sustainable 
agriculture 
5 
Imbalance between 
IP protection and 
the public interest 
Stimulating 
technology transfer 
and knowledge 
sharing 
Equity in 
distributing the 
benefits of research 
and development 
6 
Protecting the 
cultural identity of 
traditional 
communities 
Recognition for 
customary laws in 
ABS regimes 
Preserving and 
restoring traditional 
communities and 
their cultures 
Different approaches leading to a joint policy? 
Expectations 
The six different motivations and intended outcomes may be all valuable 
in their own right, but they do appear rather incompatible. The 
controversies about economic inequalities between North and South as 
debated in Approach 1, for example, would need to be followed by very 
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significant levels of benefit-sharing before one could speak of equity. This 
logically leads to the rejection of any system that would provide for 
benefits satisfying (only) conservation needs as outlined in Approach 2. 
Differences in expectations regarding the magnitude of benefits at best 
blur the debate, and may lead to impasse. 
Rights 
Debates focusing on rights may be held at different levels: while the CBD 
primarily operates at the level of nation states, the issue of rights to and 
over genetic resources may give rise to debate at the sub-state level of 
communities that claim to have developed or be custodian to the genetic 
resources, as well as at the private level (company, individual) based on 
intellectual property rights (Approaches 1, 3 and 5). When claims of right 
are made over the same resources at different levels, tension or outright 
conflict ensues. Attempts to balance such rights may lead either to 
increasing total levels of rights (Approach 3) or attempts to jointly reduce 
them (Approach 5). Currently, the general trend is towards the former 
approach, notwithstanding its consequences. Increasing the control level 
of genetic resource rights and rights to/over traditional knowledge to bring 
them on a par with intellectual property rights leads to “hyperownership” 
by those who have or can (afford to) buy control of the genetic resources 
(Safrin, 2004). Such impacts of Approach 3 are unlikely to be compatible 
with facilitated access to genetic resources for food security (Approach 4), 
or with the protection of the public domain (Approach 5), or the 
recognition of customary laws (Approach 6). It is also far from clear how 
the scenarios leading to hyperownership would stimulate conservation 
(Approach 2). 
Two meta-approaches 
There is a basic division in the six sections between the three approaches 
(1, 3 and 5) that are driven by the perception of imbalance and a 
motivation to increase equity (albeit in different ways, at different levels 
and to different ends), and the other three (2, 4 and 6), which concentrate 
on alternative aims, primarily nature conservation, food security, and the 
preservation of traditional cultures. The intended outcomes of these two 
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groups are fundamentally different and can thus be regarded as 
constituting two types of meta-approach, which makes coherent policies 
on the basis of a combination of these different ways of addressing the 
subject extremely difficult. 
Different mechanisms 
The mechanisms by which the various objectives are to be reached are 
fundamentally different, and sometimes contradictory. The bilateral 
contract model that follows from the principle of national sovereignty may 
also be used at the level of community-rights. This cannot be expected to 
lead to equity, we may note, unless the conditions enjoyed by the 
negotiating parties at the national and the community levels are 
themselves equitable, i.e. when the suppliers and users have equivalent 
capacities (negotiating capabilities, information bases, and financial 
resources) with which to engage in conflict resolution (Albin, 2001). Such 
contract-based approaches are even more difficult, however, in the 
systems associated with purposes other than equity. Food security and 
conservation goals cannot be easily captured in contracts between two 
parties – the multilateral system of the ITPGR is contract-based but in a 
standardized form. Similarly, incompatibilities can be observed between 
mechanisms that aim primarily at monetary benefit-sharing and others that 
explicitly value non-monetary benefits, notably Approach 5 that 
concentrates on technology transfer, Approach 6 that aims to protect the 
cultural identity of traditional communities, and Approach 4 that identifies 
access to genetic resources as an important benefit in its own right. 
Additional pressures: Another approach 
New challenges are continually arising. Industry, for example, is following 
the international ABS negotiations with some concern, fearful of the 
negative consequences these may have on business (Laird & Wynberg, 
2008). Companies do not oppose ABS measures in principle – as can be 
read in different statements from industry63 – but they are worried about 
the lack of clarity and precision in the current regulations (Intellectual 
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Property Watch, 2006). They also worry about the possible introduction of 
inefficient regulations and unrealistic stipulations in future international 
policymaking on the issue. Disclosure measures are highly criticized for 
that reason, because “[patent] disclosure obligations enacted by CBD 
Members have had a documented chilling effect on bioprospecting and 
GR commercialisation. (…) mandatory patent disclosure regimes place at 
risk the very basis for the recoupment of investment” (ABIA, 2008, p. 3). 
 
A major starting-point for industry is the argument that effective and 
competitive trade regulations, including strong intellectual property rights, 
are needed in order to produce the benefits to be shared (Herold, 2003). In 
general terms, the argument is that if industry is flourishing everybody 
will gain, whether through ABS contracts or direct economic growth. For 
that reason, industry is also pushing for simple and liberal access 
regulations to secure the easy availability of resources for its businesses.64 
This thus represents a new motivation in the current debates on access and 
benefit-sharing, one which reacts to the other motivations for benefit-
sharing described above, and in obvious contradiction with some of them. 
 
Table 9: Summary of Approach 7 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
Protecting the interests 
of the biotechnology 
industry 
Liberal access, strong 
IP, and simple benefit-
sharing regulations 
Healthy industry for the 
benefit of all 
Conclusion 
It seems clear from this reflection that the differences between the various 
motivations for benefit-sharing are extensive and that the mechanisms that 
derive from these are not likely to yield one broad outcome that will 
satisfy the expectations of all involved in the debate. 
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Stakeholder analysis 
What is the effect of all these different approaches with their colliding 
motivations and contradictory mechanisms on the international 
negotiations on ABS that are currently taking place within the Ad Hoc 
Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing of the CBD? 
To answer that question we might first see if we can classify the different 
stakeholders involved in these negotiations in accordance with the sections 
described above. Analysis of the complex state of the current debate 
would certainly be easier were it is possible to link each of the different 
approaches to a major stakeholder group in society. Unfortunately, 
however, such a one-to-one correspondence does not reflect reality. The 
presented scheme of motivations and mechanism of benefit-sharing is not 
simply a stakeholder analysis, and in fact stakeholders appear to pursue a 
mix of different aims and objectives in the debates on access and benefit-
sharing: 
- Indigenous communities are mainly concerned with biopiracy issues 
and their rights over their genetic resources and related knowledge 
(Approach 3). Within this, however, some communities do not 
oppose the use of strong intellectual property rights while others fear 
that IPRs and ABS regulations threaten their cultural identity 
(Approach 6).  Also, most communities are highly interested in the 
conservation of biodiversity (Approach 2) and issues of food 
security (Approach 4). 
- The FAO is primarily concerned about food security (Approach 4), 
but it also has a stake in conservation (Approach 2) and aims to 
stimulate technology transfer (Approach 5). In addition it has taken 
some measures to stimulate biotechnology (Approach 7) and to 
support traditional farmers and the preservation of their traditional 
cultures (Approach 6). 
- Most governments of developing countries focus first on their 
national sovereignty over plant genetic resources (Approach 1). 
However, they differ widely in their attitudes towards the rights of 
indigenous communities (Approaches 3 and 6), conservation issues 
(Approach 2), intellectual property rights (Approach 5), food 
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security policies (Approach 4), and stimulating measures for bio-
industry (Approach 7). 
- Industry is primarily interested in liberal access and benefit-sharing 
regulations that create enabling conditions for biotechnology 
(Approach 7). Those industries with a close dependence on genetic 
resources are also concerned with conservation (Approach 2), and 
the plant breeding industry sees a certain level of social 
responsibility towards global food security (Approach 4). Most 
businesses are also willing to work within some sort of ABS 
framework “to overcome fears of intentional misappropriation” 
(Intellectual Property Watch, 2006) (Approach 3). The acceptable 
level of complexity of regulations related to such a framework 
depends heavily on the size of the corporations involved, providing 
the smaller corporations with the largest challenges. The size of 
corporations may also have an effect on their attitudes towards IP 
protection policies (Approach 5). 
Conclusion 
The schema presented in this article cannot be considered a mere 
stakeholder analysis on the basis of which we can order the different 
stakeholder positions. The fact that every stakeholder seems to have a mix 
of objectives and motivations with respect to benefit-sharing is likely to 
further complicate any possibilities of reaching consensus in the 
international negotiations on this matter. This begs the question of where – 
indeed, how – to go from here?  
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Ways Forward? 
A worldwide standstill 
The range of different, not infrequently opposing, conceptions about what 
benefit-sharing is and what its intended outcomes should be, together with 
the fact that the stakeholders involved pursue different combinations of 
motivations, has resulted in a worldwide standstill in the access and 
benefit-sharing negotiations, both at national and international levels. At 
the national level, governments have generally failed to arrive at effective 
ABS regulations that produce shared benefits. Also, the ABS contracts 
signed nowadays are few in number and the efforts to reach such 
agreements often lengthy and costly (Visser et al, 2005).65 These problems 
were an important reason for the call for an International Regime on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing within the framework of the CBD. Progress in 
the international negotiations on such a regime has, all too predictably, 
been painfully slow over the last few years, notwithstanding a recently 
reconfirmed commitment to come to an agreement before the tenth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2010 (UNEP, 2008). 
Searching for ways out 
During the sixth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing, a new approach was taken for moving the 
negotiations forward. To cope with all the differences involved, and to 
build trust among the different parties, the co-chairs distilled simple and 
concise building blocks from the submissions of the different parties on 
the main components of an international regime. Without making 
reference to the nature (e.g. binding or non-binding) or scope (e.g. 
including or excluding derivatives) of such a regime, each building block 
was agreed upon one by one, turning it into a brick of the international 
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regime, or into a bullet point for further consideration (IISD, 2008). The 
obvious rationale behind this approach is the need to search for common 
ground between the negotiating partners, and effort revived the 
expectations of a positive outcome after the earlier breakdown of the 
negotiations in Granada (2006) and Montreal (2007).66 The Conference of 
the Parties in Bonn, May 2008 reconfirmed this “careful” optimism 
(UNEP, 2008). 
 
The search for common ground is essential for forward movement in the 
international negotiations on access and benefit-sharing. In this process, it 
is important that the different motivations and expectations of the 
stakeholders involved are clear. We have tried to show that there are 
several different approaches to benefit-sharing, which are pursued by 
different stakeholders in many different combinations. As long as these 
differences remain implicit, unstated, no joint outcome of negotiations is 
to be expected. When persons with widely differing views on a concept 
debate without making their basic perceptions clear, they are bound to fail 
to come to an agreement. Essentially, they are discussing different things, 
talking at cross-purposes, and there is no commonality on which to agree 
to begin with. The overview presented in this article can be a tool to map 
the different interpretations of benefit-sharing and reflect upon the major 
contradictions involved. Clarity and insight on these differences can 
inform and improve decision-making in respect of future applications of 
benefit-sharing at both national and international levels. 
Some possibilities 
It appears that an appropriate balance needs to be sought between the 
different motivations for benefit-sharing and their intended outcomes if a 
consensus is to be reached among countries and among stakeholders 
within nations. In the likely event that an agreement on this balance fails 
to materialize, a pragmatic approach may have to be pursued which 
creates different ABS mechanisms for different types or uses of genetic 
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resources in different contexts. Creating a specific approach for 
agricultural plant genetic resources within the overall framework of the 
CBD, the ITPGR may be considered a first step in this direction. Other 
important initiatives are needed, for example in creating a balance 
between rights to/over genetic resources and knowledge at the individual, 
community and national levels, but without rushing into a situation of 
hyperownership. Ultimately, a menu of ABS options can be incorporated 
into international legislation in order to balance the voices of private 
companies, traditional communities and nation states on a case-by-case 
basis. Provided, of course, that clear and effective regulations on 
procedures and compliance are put in place that take into account the 
special needs of developing countries and their communities (Tvedt & 
Young, 2007). 
 
A more pragmatic approach may also incorporate initiatives that so far 
have not been included in traditional models of access and benefit-sharing 
within the framework of the CBD. The overview in this article presents 
different possibilities in this regard. In Approach 5 for example, several 
initiatives are described that aim to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and 
transfer of technology, such as the open source biotechnology movement 
and public-private partnerships. The agreement between CIP and the 
Potato Park in Peru outlined in Approach 6 represents a new form of 
benefit-sharing that stimulates both nature conservation, food security and 
the preservation of traditional communities. The remarkable aspect of 
these initiatives is that they have all been initiated by groups in society, 
without the help of the governments that are presently negotiating the 
International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing. We therefore 
recommend that governments take good notice of the benefit-sharing 
initiatives that are already being undertaken by different stakeholders in 
society, and search for ways to support and facilitate them. 
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Conclusion 
The global debate on equitable benefit-sharing is complex and has not 
resulted in an effective implementation of access and benefit-sharing 
policies since the concept was formalized in international law in 1992. In 
this article, we have shown that there are fundamentally different 
approaches to the concept of benefit-sharing. The observed distance 
between the basic motivations which direct stakeholders’ arguments 
explains the knot in which the debate has found itself entangled for over 
fifteen years now, since the signing of the CBD. Our analysis shows that 
the different motivations lead to widely differing mechanisms for benefit-
sharing and significantly different expectations of the nature and value of 
the benefits that are to be shared. Opportunities to cut through the knot are 
reduced, moreover, insofar as the different approaches cannot be simply 
translated into stakeholder positions. Stakeholders often assume to employ 
a combination of two or more different approaches. 
 
This overview of different approaches does, however, not only explain the 
current deadlock in national and international ABS negotiations, it also 
gives indications for what has to be done to overcome it. A first step is 
increasing insight in the different viewpoints that people have in order to 
contribute to a better informed and balanced debate in which policy-
makers and other stakeholders are more aware of the various interests that 
are at stake. By presenting the different interpretations and perspectives 
that can be distracted from the current debates, this paper aims to facilitate 
the “fair representation of all relevant arguments” and improve the 
“rationality of public debate and decision making” (Keulartz et al, 2002, p. 
256). From here, it is still a long way towards an International Regime on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing that incorporates and balances all the different 
perspectives. We therefore recommend a pragmatic approach that takes on 
board not only the divergent interests of the various stakeholders, but also 
their creative ideas and initiatives for new models of benefit-sharing.
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What is fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing?67 
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Abstract 
“Fair and equitable benefit-sharing” is one of the objectives of the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In essence, benefit-
sharing holds that countries, farmers and indigenous communities that 
grant access to their plant genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge 
should share in the benefits that users derive from these resources. But 
what exactly is understood by “fair” and “equitable” in this context? 
Neither term is defined in the international treaties. A complicating factor, 
furthermore, is that different motivations and perspectives exist with 
respect to the notion of benefit-sharing itself. This paper looks at six 
different approaches to benefit-sharing that can be extracted from the 
current debates on “Access and Benefit-Sharing”. These approaches form 
the basis of a philosophical reflection in which the different connotations 
of “fair and equitable” are considered, by analyzing the main principles of 
justice involved. Finally, the various principles are brought together in 
order to draw some conclusions as to how a fair and equitable benefit-
sharing mechanism might best be realized. This results in several 
recommendations for policymakers. 
Introduction 
Since 1992, 191 signatories to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) have committed themselves to “the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (UNEP, 
1992, Article 1). This figures as one of three objectives of the Convention, 
along with the conservation and the sustainable use of biological diversity. 
Put briefly, the benefit-sharing objective holds that countries (and 
communities) granting access to their genetic resources (and traditional 
knowledge) should receive a share of the benefits that users derive from 
these resources. But what is to be understood by fair and equitable in 
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relation to benefit-sharing, however, is unclear. Neither term is defined in 
the Convention, and, given the continuing negotiations on an International 
Regime of Access and Benefit-Sharing, many will indeed agree that there 
remain “widely divergent views on what constitutes fair and equitable 
benefit sharing and how best to promote it” (Artuso, 2002, p. 1355).68 
 
The United Nations Environmental Program admits that “whether the 
sharing of benefits is ‘fair and equitable’ is a question that (…) depends on 
the value system upon which the judgment is based” (UNEP, 1998, p. 9). 
However, as Byström and colleagues argue, it should be possible to reach 
consensus on certain criteria and conditions necessary for establishing a 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing relationship, for otherwise “it is difficult 
to envisage how the CBD provisions in this respect could ever be 
meaningfully implemented” (Byström et al, 1999, p. 26). Following their 
attempt to launch a list of such criteria and conditions, a number of studies 
have analyzed the standards of “fair and equitable” in different case 
studies and Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) agreements (Mulligan, 
1999). Most conclude, however, that much is still to be done, for example 
because fair and equitable benefit-sharing “too often constitute merely 
pious rhetoric and remain unrealized in the field” (Laird, 2002, p. 418); or 
because when an ABS agreement is made, it is possible that “significant 
inequities in knowledge and power between indigenous peoples and 
companies” will result in definitions of fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
“that are predominantly shaped by the latter.” (Vermeylen, 2007, p. 423). 
 
This article aims to contribute to this ongoing project by linking the 
concept of benefit-sharing to different principles of justice, initiating a 
philosophical discussion on the meaning of fair and equitable benefit-
sharing. To facilitate such discussion, the present work will not focus on a 
particular ABS agreement or case study, but instead build upon the 
different approaches to benefit-sharing, as identified by (De Jonge & 
Louwaars, Forthcoming). Providing an overview of the assumptions, 
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perspectives and arguments employed in the current debates on plant 
genetic resources, that study identifies six distinct approaches to benefit 
sharing, each with its own central motivation and objective (and preferred 
mechanism(s) by which to realize that objective). Employment of this 
overview facilitates an analysis of the different conceptualizations of “fair 
and equitable” at play in the contemporary arena of benefit-sharing 
negotiations. 
 
The six approaches to benefit-sharing distinguished are characterized by 
their central motivation, thus: 
- The South-North imbalance in resource allocation and exploitation 
- Biopiracy and the imbalance in intellectual property rights 
- Protecting the cultural identity of traditional communities 
- A shared interest in food security 
- The need to conserve biodiversity  
- An imbalance between intellectual property protection and the 
public interest 
These approaches form the basis of a philosophical reflection and will be 
discussed in parallel with different principles of justice in the following 
sections. The aim is to provide more insight into the meaning of “fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing” and, ultimately, to draw some conclusions on 
how a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism could best be realized 
Commutative justice and the 
characteristics of plant genetic 
resources and traditional 
knowledge 
A first approach to benefit-sharing is based on the imbalance in the 
allocation and exploitation of plant genetic resources between developed 
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and developing countries. Our world is rich in biodiversity, and although 
threatened, this diversity remains the basis of human life and something 
from which, clearly, we all benefit. Still, some parts of the world are by 
nature richer in these resources than others; also, historically, some parts 
have benefited more from these resources than others. The current 
situation is that many developing countries are rich in biodiversity, while 
many developed countries are considered biodiversity-poor (Faith, 1996; 
Vavilov, 1951). The rise of biotechnology has only reinforced the practical 
implications of this asymmetry, especially as it is the gene-poor 
industrialized countries that most have the capacity to invest in the biotech 
industry and benefit from the new ways of exploiting the world’s 
biological resources. This resulting imbalance is an important motivation 
for benefit-sharing. Indeed, it is the basic rationale behind the ABS model 
in the CBD. This model can best be described as a compensation 
mechanism, requiring that developing countries be compensated for the 
contribution of their biological resources. Fair and equitable benefit-
sharing, then, comes down to fair compensation, where “each party gives 
one thing and receives another, with a focus on the equivalence of the 
exchange” (Schroeder, 2007, p. 207). In philosophical terms, this can best 
be summarized by the Aristotelian principle of commutative justice or 
justice in exchange (Ritchie, 1894). 
 
So, commutative justice refers to fair compensation and focuses on the 
equivalence of a transaction between two parties. In the context of ABS, 
the parties involved in the exchange, or transaction, are the providers and 
the users of plant genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge (TK). It 
is, however, not always clear who the legitimate users and providers of 
these resources are, because the resources have non-rival and non-
excludable characteristics. Non-rival means that the use and consumption 
(of the resource) by one person does not prevent others from enjoying the 
same resource or good; and non-excludable indicates that it is difficult or 
simply impossible to exclude others from consuming the resource in 
question. 
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Commutative justice is relatively easy to realize when a resource is 
rivalrous and excludable in nature. Food products or a barrel of crude oil, 
for example, go from one hand to another, and an equitable arrangements 
for their exchange need not be overly complex. A plant, and even the 
minuscule combination of biochemicals that make up its genes, have a 
similar character. But every gene is at the same time a “basic unit of 
heredity”, which by directing the production of RNA, determines the 
“synthesis of proteins that make up living matter and are the catalysts of 
all cellular processes.” (Kleinedler, 2005). Genes are carriers of 
information, which is continuously reproduced and is, obviously, the locus 
of value of plant genetic resources (Parry, 2005). But information is a non-
rival resource and plants are non-excludable, insofar as they normally 
grow and multiply in vast quantities across countries and continents. It is 
rather hard, therefore, to envisage how the genetic information contained 
in any specimen (or part thereof) of a particular plant species could 
become subject to a fair and equitable exchange between two parties. 
 
The CBD aims to solve this problem by “Recognizing the sovereign rights 
of States over their natural resources” (UNEP, 1992, Article 15.1), and 
refers to the “country of origin of genetic resources” (Article 2) in order to 
more specifically define the so-called “user and provider countries” 
involved. As several studies have shown, however, the country of origin of 
a particular genetic resource is very difficult to determine (Petit et al, 
2001), and the ability to exercise national control over the movement of 
genetic resources virtually impossible (Safrin, 2004). But how should a 
just exchange of the valuable, but primarily intangible properties of 
genetic resources (and traditional knowledge) then be organized? The 
most suitable mechanism for this seems through the application of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), since such rights aim to protect and 
control the exchange of “items of information or knowledge” (WIPO, n.d., 
p. 3). 
 
IPRs are designed to protect a variety of intangible assets, such as literary 
and artistic works, scientific discoveries and industrial design, or, more 
generally “inventions in all fields of human endeavour” (WIPO, 1967). In 
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their natural form, plant genetic resources are, of course, no human 
inventions and consequently cannot be protected by IPRs. In many 
countries, however, it is possible for an individual, company or other 
institution to apply for such rights upon developing a new plant variety,69 
or even when just a single gene or genetic sequence has been isolated and 
its function specified (Drahos & Blakeney, 2001). The state of affairs is 
thus that (developing) countries in which the genetic resources occur 
naturally cannot protect these resources with IPRs, but the inventions 
based on those genetic resources can be so protected – which occurs 
especially in (developed) countries with a liberal IPR system and strong 
biotechnology industry.  
 
This discrepancy is the central concern in a second approach to benefit-
sharing, which focuses on the imbalance in IPRs and subsequent acts of 
“biopiracy”. The term “biopiracy” was coined by the North American 
Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration to refer to the 
“appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and 
indigenous communities by individuals or institutions who seek exclusive 
monopoly control (patents or intellectual property) over these resources 
and knowledge”.70 In addition to the fact that IPRs cannot be employed to 
protect natural plant genetic resources, most indigenous groups and 
farming communities are generally unable to apply such rights to their 
traditional knowledge and technologies. Even though these are human 
inventions, the traditional lifestyle and production methods of 
communities are typically ineligible for IP protection.  
 
Patents, for example, protect inventions that satisfy criteria such as 
novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability. These criteria are 
specifically designed for a competitive, industrial context. Traditional 
knowledge is developed in a cultural context, and tends not to meet the 
criteria of novelty and inventive step in that it is often “communicated and 
applied openly” (Koopman, 2005, p. 527). In addition, the collective 
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character of most traditional knowledge prevents it from being easily 
attributed to an individual IP holder (Roht-Arriaza, 1997). Thus, IPRs do 
not seem to support a fair and equitable exchange model of plant genetic 
resources and related (traditional) knowledge. On the contrary, as is clear 
from the above definition of biopiracy, IPRs may be regarded as a primary 
vehicle for unfairness and inequity. 
 
So what does all this say about the possibilities for realizing fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing on the basis of commutative justice? The answer 
to this question is not very promising. Plant genetic resources are a 
valuable resource for many developing countries but, because of their non-
rival and non-excludable characteristics, cannot be appropriated and 
traded in the same way as can other natural resources, such as oil or 
minerals. To secure a fair share of the benefits that derive from the use of 
these resources abroad, a provider country must either protect all its plant 
genetic resources (and genetic information) from crossing its borders, or it 
needs to track and negotiate a share of the benefits of all usages of its 
resources in all countries of the world – and this only provided that it can 
prove that it is the country of origin of these resources. Farmers and 
indigenous communities encounter similar problems when attempting to 
protect and control their traditional knowledge (from regional and national 
as well as international interests), and they are likely to have even less 
means to prevail. Conclusion: it is practically impossible for providing 
countries and communities to secure a fair exchange of the plant genetic 
resources found within their territory, or the traditional knowledge present 
in their culture. 
 
But any transaction involves two parties, so if a just exchange of these 
resources is indeed to be realized then it follows that the users (and user 
countries) need also to be an active party in the arrangements. 
Unfortunately, so-called “user-side measures” have mostly been neglected 
in the international negotiations and country legislations on ABS. The 
predominant idea is that provider countries should put their ABS 
legislation in place and users act in accord with this while collecting 
resources in those countries. But as the foregoing has shown, this strategy 
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does not really suit the resources in question. Furthermore, the lack of 
user-measures has resulted in a situation in which “users who do not know 
or disclose the source country of the resources they are using are not 
required to engage in any benefit sharing or substitute activity” (Tvedt & 
Young, 2007, p. 130). This loophole has rendered the current system of 
access and benefit-sharing very ineffective and, obviously, unfair. 
 
One of the few proposals that aims to counter this loophole is that of a 
“disclosure measure”, to be included in patent applications worldwide 
(Tobin et al, 2008). This would require applicants for patents to disclose 
information regarding the origin, source or legal provenance of the genetic 
resources and/or traditional knowledge utilized within the patent 
application (Barber et al, 2003). This would establish a legal liability for 
compliance with ABS conditions on the user side. It is, however, uncertain 
whether such an initiative would really make a difference to the problem 
at hand. There is first an issue of coverage, as the proposal does not 
pertain to all non-patented resource applications – but the main question, 
again, is how it would be practically possible to track the origin or even 
source of, for example, every parent line used in a new tomato variety 
which has built upon centuries of cross-breeding. Or how patent officers 
could verify such information.  
 
This disclosure measure does, however, have one advantage, which may 
suit the link between plant genetic / traditional knowledge resources and 
benefit-sharing much better. We have already seen that the specific 
characteristics of these resources make a benefit-sharing model based on 
their physical exchange very difficult: user-oriented measures such as the 
disclosure of origin indicate that benefit-sharing responsibilities could as 
well be invoked by the utilization of such resources (and benefits arising 
there from), instead of their specific exchange. But if benefit-sharing is not 
tied to a transaction between two parties, then how can we decide to whom 
the benefits should go and what a fair and equitable distribution would be? 
Questions of how a fair division of a certain good can be realized amongst 
a group of recipients belong to the domain of distributive justice. This 
domain has a much broader usage and tradition in philosophy than 
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commutative justice and different theories of distributive justice present 
different guidelines as to how such division should look and who the 
legitimate recipients would be. 
The principle of entitlement and 
issues of procedural and 
cognitive justice 
Distributive justice is primarily concerned with how to “render to each his 
due” (Miller, 1976, p. 21). The main question is, of course, how to decide 
what a person’s (group’s or country’s) “due” exactly is. The principle of 
entitlement holds that someone’s due is that to which one has a right or is 
entitled to. The aforementioned sovereign rights and intellectual property 
rights over plant genetic resources and related knowledge can thus be 
considered entitlements that may guide the fair and equitable allocation of 
benefits. We have already seen, however, that these rights are extremely 
problematic in this respect: since the resources in question have non-rival 
and non-excludable characteristics they are not easily defensible as items 
of property (Thompson et al, 1994), which means that it is far from 
obvious that it is possible to clearly specify the subsequent entitlements on 
which a fair distribution of benefits could be based. Furthermore, 
intellectual property rights appeared to be considered a vehicle for 
biopiracy instead of fair and equitable benefit-sharing. 
 
Still, there are many who argue that such entitlements need to be 
established because without reference to private (or community) 
ownership and intellectual property, the resources in question should be 
considered public goods for which no compensation or benefit-sharing can 
be demanded (Hamilton, 2006). One may be hopeful that philosophy can 
help in this respect, for example by deciding on how and when resources 
become ownable. Indeed, many philosophers have shed light on and done 
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battle over the ontological status of property, and lately, several studies 
have focused on this topic in relation to the new biotechnologies and 
genetic resources (Górski, 2005; John, 2000). However, I am inclined to 
agree with Thompson’s conclusion that “the philosophical case for 
recognizing intellectual property rights in genes, sequences and genetic 
processes is mixed, and that no thoroughly decisive arguments can be 
brought to bear either way.” (Thompson, 2007, p. 253).  
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the concept of biopiracy does 
presuppose that intellectual property rights exist and that the problem of 
biopiracy does not lie with these rights as such, but with their current 
organization. Take for example the aforementioned criteria for patent 
protection. According to these criteria one cannot legally apply patents 
either to plant genetic resources in their natural state, or to any knowledge, 
invention or product already established before the new patent application 
is made. The problem is that the traditional knowledge and other 
inventions (e.g. plant varieties) of many communities are not documented 
and therefore not known to the patent office examiners checking for any 
“prior art” relevant to new applications – so a patent can easily be granted 
to an invention that free-rides upon such knowledge and resources. A 
subsequent problem is that traditional communities rarely have the means 
to go through the complex and costly procedures to challenge that patent 
in court (Hamilton, 2006). Here then, the problem lies not with IPRs per 
se, but with the “failure of international patent systems to recognize the 
contributions (e.g. the prior ownership) of indigenous farmers” and the 
“disparity between the access of the rich and the poor to legal services.” 
(Thompson, 2007, p. 256). 
 
This conclusion points to another principle of justice, namely procedural 
justice. More commonly referred to in jurisprudence than in philosophy, 
this principle aims especially at the accuracy of legal processes and the 
participatory rights of those involved; these must be satisfied in order for 
a procedure to be considered fair (Solum, 2004). Even though procedural 
justice is not concerned with the allocation of benefits (i.e. distributive 
justice), it is equally important in the context of fair and equitable benefit-
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sharing as it focuses on the fairness of the processes through which this is 
realized. Fair procedures within the international IPR system are necessary 
to realize a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism, which will 
otherwise continue to be seriously undermined so long as the system 
favors the powerful (e.g. biotech companies) rather than the weak (e.g. 
indigenous communities) (van den Belt, 2003). 
 
Procedural justice is also especially important since ABS negotiations at 
both the international and local level involve such diverse stakeholders as 
national governments, international NGOs, traditional communities and 
multinational corporations. These stakeholders have access to widely 
diverging levels of financial and legal resources, and thus, power. These 
differences, and particularly the special needs of developing countries and 
traditional communities – but also of minority groups (e.g. women) within 
countries and communities - in this regard, have to be taken into account if 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreements and regimes are to be 
realized (Albin, 2001; Alvarez-Castillo & Feinholz, 2006). It is for this 
reason that the CBD has established some initiatives and funds to support 
traditional communities.71 Their active involvement in national and 
international negotiations remains an issue of concern, however, for which 
there are many reasons, including such basic problems as a lack of 
resources (money, personnel, etc.) with which to participate in 
negotiations, language barriers, and a lack of established (lobbying) links 
with state representatives, the primary decision makers. In fact, the 
fundamental issue at stake here can better be described in relation to a 
third approach to benefit-sharing, which is essentially concerned with the 
cultural identity of traditional communities in a globalizing world. 
 
The cultural differences between traditional communities and other parties 
in the ABS negotiations are substantive. Many indigenous communities 
have fundamentally different worldviews and conceptions of benefits, 
sharing and property from our “western” ones. The notion of genetic 
resources, for example, derives from a modern technical development and 
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so just does not exist in many traditional cultures. The rapid expansion of 
modernization threatens many of these cultures and the ABS framework is 
itself, of course, a form of globalization. Therefore, in order to make sure 
that ABS regulations do not constitute an extra pressure on traditional 
communities, forcing them to adopt foreign standards and demands, one 
has to take their ideas about how benefit-sharing should be organized 
seriously into account. This may take the form of including the customary 
laws of such communities in ABS agreements (Tobin, 2004), or it might 
imply that their right to be left alone is respected if they do not want to be 
involved in such agreements. 
 
The importance of taking into consideration differences in culture and 
even worldviews during ABS negotiations may more aptly be described 
with reference to the principle of cognitive justice. This principle is 
particularly referred to in the field of science democratization (Leach & 
Scoones, 2006; van der Velden, 2009). Recognizing the plurality of 
knowledge systems, it aims to secure the equal treatment and 
representation of different ways of comprehending the world. As such, 
cognitive justice goes beyond the focus on fair processes and equal 
participation in procedural justice, underscoring the “constitutional right 
of different systems of knowledge to exist as part of dialogue and debate” 
(Visvanathan, 2005, p. 92). In the context of ABS, this means that the 
different cultures and conceptions of things like plants and benefits need 
to be equally represented in a dialogue in which one does not dominate 
another. 
 
In line with this, it must be acknowledged that many traditional 
communities find the link between benefit-sharing, IPRs and the 
subsequent commodification of resources particularly problematic. 
Whereas land tenure, private property and capitalism are central notions in 
Western culture, many indigenous communities consider that land and 
related resources can belong to no human being. Or as they state, 
“patenting and commodification of life is against our fundamental values 
and beliefs regarding the sacredness of life and life processes and the 
reciprocal relationship which we maintain with all creation.” (Tauli-
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Corpuz, 2004). Returning to the concept of biopiracy, Hamilton observes 
indeed that “what is problematic for many contesting biopiracy is not 
necessary who owns it, or who will benefit, but that the debate is framed 
in these terms to begin with.” (Hamilton, 2006, p. 173). Access and 
benefit-sharing agreements are, therefore, considered by many indigenous 
peoples’ organizations to “simply coerce Indigenous peoples into 
participation in the economic exploitation of their knowledge and 
resources” (IPCB, 2004), and those entering into such agreement are 
advised to “carefully evaluate the political, social, and cultural costs” 
(Reihana, 2006, p. 11). 
 
It is not only these cultural differences that need to be taken into account. 
On a socio-political level the marginalized position of many traditional 
communities and minorities may warrant further measures. When 
analyzing the statements of different indigenous peoples’ councils and 
organizations, one soon learns that the CBD is just another forum where 
these groups (have to) fight for their basic human rights (UN PFII, 2007). 
One such statement proclaims, for example, that “without recognition of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to control access to both their genetic resources 
and Indigenous knowledge, no benefit sharing process will be fair and 
equitable” (GRAIN, 2007). The statement refers to the lack of land rights 
and self-determination of traditional communities in many countries, 
which gives a completely different dimension to their demands for benefit-
sharing.72 
 
So, traditional communities are likely to have not only a different 
understanding of some of the central notions underlying ABS, but also an 
agenda that goes beyond that of many of the other stakeholders involved. 
These differences, together with the imbalances in negotiation capacity, 
have to be respected and observed if fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
arrangements with such groups are to be established. Here, the principle of 
entitlement, with its obvious link to intellectual property rights, seems not 
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to be the best standard by which to guide the allocation of benefits. And it 
is in this context that the principle of desert can be of use. 
Principles of desert, need and 
equity 
According to the principle of desert, a person’s due is not based on one’s 
entitlements but on what one deserves in light of one’s actions. There are 
different desert-based principles regarding what should count as the basis 
for deserving (Lamont, 1994; Miller, 1976), but in the context of ABS 
one’s contribution to the conservation and/or development of a certain 
plant or product seems most relevant. Employed thus, the principle of 
desert can enable the sharing of benefits in proportion to the contributions 
of specified groups or individuals without making reference to intellectual 
property rights. Furthermore, the Bonn Guidelines73 refer explicitly to this 
principle of desert in stating that “benefits should be shared fairly and 
equitably with all those who have been identified as having contributed to 
the resource management, scientific and/or commercial process” (UNEP, 
2002, Article 48).  
 
One issue related to this principle is that of how to classify or quantify 
different contributions. Obviously, it is very difficult to decide upon the 
relative contribution of different parties involved in the creation of a new 
drug or crop variety: what, for example, is the contribution of an 
indigenous community in the Amazon that for centuries has nurtured a 
medicinal plant in relation to that of a company that has invested millions 
of dollars in a commercial cleansing gel of which one ingredient is derived 
from that plant? 
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The current transaction model of ABS in the CBD seems to imply that 
some sort of prize tag can be attached to plant genetic resources, 
traditional knowledge, and the contributions of those that nurture and 
develop them. Many consider this approach problematic for several 
reasons, for example because there is no historical context or precedent, a 
market system for these resources has never existed in the past (Falcon & 
Fowler, 2002). On the contrary, the values of plant genetic resources and 
related contributions are matters of deep dispute: where some negate the 
value of wild plants and landraces for the biotechnology industry and 
commercial breeding (Wolfe & Zycher, 2005), others speak of the “green 
gold” and “untold billions of dollars” that these industries have already 
earned from such resources (Kloppenburg, 2004; Sharma, 2005). There is, 
however, another treaty that refers to fair and equitable benefit-sharing in 
relation to the principle of desert but without building upon a market-
based transaction model. 
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGR) of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
states that fair and equitable benefit-sharing is “fundamental to the 
realization of Farmers’ Rights” (FAO, 2001, Preamble). These rights are 
based on the “enormous contribution that the local and indigenous 
communities and farmers of all regions of the world (…) have made and 
will continue to make for the conservation and development of plant 
genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture 
production throughout the world” (Article 9.1). The ABS mechanism of 
the ITPGR introduces a Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing that establishes a list of major crops and forages that are freely 
accessible to farmers, breeders and researchers of member countries (Part 
IV). 
 
The Multilateral ABS System of the ITPGR is germane to a fourth 
approach to benefit-sharing, one that is primarily concerned with our 
shared interest in food security. Based on the understanding that no 
country or even continent is self-sufficient in its plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture, this approach prioritizes a benefit-sharing model 
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that facilitates access and exchange of genetic resources essential to food 
production across the world. The ITPGR states, indeed, that the facilitated 
access to these resources “constitutes itself a major benefit of the 
Multilateral System” (FAO, 2001, Article 13.1). Furthermore, it goes on to 
state that the benefits accruing from this system, be they in the form of 
information, technology or money, “should flow primarily, directly and 
indirectly, to farmers in all countries, especially in developing countries, 
and countries with economies in transition, who conserve and sustainably 
utilize plant genetic resources for food and agriculture” (Article 13.3).  
 
This contribution of farmers in developing countries and around the world 
is central to benefit-sharing in the ITPGR. In this general form, however, 
it does not (and cannot) serve as a concrete allocation principle. While 
recognizing the contributions of farmers, the sharing of benefits that arise 
from the multilateral system is aimed at supporting the main objectives of 
the treaty, namely food security and sustainable agriculture.74 Indeed, a 
first group of conservation projects is now being supported from the 
treaty’s benefit-sharing fund.75 The ITPGR distribution of benefits seems, 
therefore, to be guided by another principle of justice, namely the 
principle of need. 
 
Holding that goods should be distributed in accordance to people’s needs, 
the principle of need is again subject to different interpretations of its basic 
concept – what should be considered as “needs”. Happily, however, this is 
not overly problematic in this case as most interpretations agree at least on 
the inclusion of the basic material necessities for human life, like food, 
shelter and medical care. Indeed, we might refer here to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948). These “ideal rights” are 
directed towards providing a minimum standard of decent living, and 
should not, therefore, be confused with “entitlements” (Feinberg, 1970, p. 
255). Obviously, the ITPGR is particularly concerned about the 
fundamental need for food security, to which fair and equitable benefit-
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sharing is linked in its principal objective (along with sustainable 
agriculture – Article 1.1). Furthermore, with the repeated references to 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition, to which 
the benefits of the multilateral system should primarily flow, the treaty 
acknowledges the special needs of these countries and their farmers in 
respect of this objective.  
 
A similar connection between benefit-sharing and the principle of need 
can be found in the CBD. The CBD Preamble, for example, states that 
“conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is of critical 
importance for meeting the food, health and other needs of the growing 
world population, for which purpose access to and sharing of both genetic 
resources and technologies are essential” (UNEP, 1992). The need to 
preserve our biodiversity – as reflected in the first two of the three listed 
objectives – is central to the whole CBD and constitutes a fifth approach 
towards benefit-sharing. Although the first two objectives are not 
explicitly linked to fair and equitable benefit-sharing, the third objective, it 
is generally considered that the prospect of benefit-sharing constitutes an 
important incentive for developing countries to protect their potentially 
valuable plant genetic resources, and that benefit-sharing operates as an 
instrument which assists these countries in gaining access to the means for 
conservation by promoting the flow of technology, information and 
financial resources. So even though benefit-sharing in the CBD is set up as 
a model of commutative justice, it employs the distributive justice notion 
of need: both in relation to the universal requirement to conserve 
biodiversity in order to meet fundamental needs of humankind, and with 
respect to the special needs of developing countries and traditional 
communities in so doing. 
 
The principle of need thus has an important role in both the ITPGR and 
CBD. Yet, the multiple references to the special needs of developing 
countries point also to another principle of distributive justice, namely the 
principle of equity. The principle of equity aims to inform and/or modify 
general rules such as the distributive justice principles discussed, in order 
to take account of morally relevant differences in particular situations. It 
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seeks to provide ethical decisions in such situations by holding that 
“equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally” (Barry, 1965, 
p. 152). The relevance of this principle to our inquiry into fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing is manifest: poor countries and communities 
deserve extra support in order to satisfy their fundamental needs, protect 
their resources and entitlements in the international IPRs system, and also 
raise their negotiation capacities. The principle holds that due to the 
existing inequalities, extra efforts have to be undertaken if a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing mechanism is to be realized. 
 
There seems, however, to be a tension between the principles of need and 
equity introduced here and those of commutative justice and entitlement 
discussed earlier, along with the recently considered principle of desert. 
Even though the latter two (entitlement and desert) do not involve a 
specific exchange between two parties (as commutation does), the sharing 
of benefits according to all these three principles is directed to those that 
have specific claims based upon certain rights they hold and/or particular 
contributions they have made. In essence, parties receive compensation. 
The principles of need and equity, however, do not work like this. They 
focus instead on the distribution of benefits to those who need them most. 
So the question is which of these two directions or purposes of benefit-
sharing is most important? 
 
At first sight, the idea of compensation seems crucial to the whole ABS 
debate. Indeed, developing countries and communities strongly resist the 
free and uncompensated use of their biological resources, which were 
originally considered the common heritage of mankind (De Jonge & 
Korthals, 2006). This resistance was a major driving force for the 
incorporation of benefit-sharing in the CBD in the first place, and it 
continuous to be the main motivation behind accusations of biopiracy and 
the call for (binding) benefit-sharing provisions in international and 
national legislation. So, the idea of compensation is very important in the 
context of benefit-sharing, but can the same be said about the focus to 
distribute benefits to those in need? 
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Yes it can. The main reason for this is that one can argue that a benefit-
sharing model which aims to compensate or reward parties for their 
contributions would not be needed in a just and fair world, or even in the 
affluent countries of today. With respect to health care, for example, 
Schroeder argues that in many Western societies a “viable and essentially 
fair exchange model is already in existence between the health care 
industry and human research subjects” (Schroeder & Lasén-Díaz, 2006, p. 
140). DNA donors with a particular disease can expect to receive direct 
benefits from research and development based on (their) DNA in the form 
of (potentially) therapeutic treatments and medicines that are generally 
quite accessible through the health care (insurance) systems in their 
countries. Furthermore, indirect benefits can be expected through jobs and 
wealth generated by the industries involved. In this case, an extra benefit-
sharing mechanism to reward donors for their contributions is 
unnecessary.76 The main issue is that in an ideal world, it “does not 
matter” who provides the blood or traditional knowledge that lead to new 
inventions “as long as we all have access to the benefits of their use” 
(Schroeder & Pogge, 2009). 
 
For many people in this world, however, this ideal situation is non-
existent. On the contrary, some two billion people lack access to essential 
medicine (Hollis & Pogge, 2008), millions die from preventable diseases 
every year (WHO, 2008). The figures are similar with respect to food and 
agriculture: in 2007 the number of chronically hungry and undernourished 
people rose to 923 million (FAO, 2008, p. 9), and most farmers in 
developing countries (i.e. most farmers in the world) lack access to 
improved seeds and other agricultural inputs. A large proportion of people 
in the world simply do not have access to the products and benefits of 
modern research. Not even to those goods that can save their lives. It is 
against this background that the demands for benefit-sharing become 
obvious and, indeed, justified (Schroeder & Pogge, 2009). The principles 
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 This may, of course, be different if excessive profits are made from the donor 
contributions. 
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of need and equity are not just relevant to the concept of benefit-sharing – 
they are elemental. 
 
A sixth, and final approach to benefit-sharing relates to this aspect of 
human poverty, focusing on the imbalance between intellectual property 
protection and the public interest. We have already seen that IPRs provide 
exclusive rights to the creators of such intangible assets as knowledge, 
inventions and scientific discoveries. In biotechnology, IPRs play an 
important role and many consider them a major trigger for research and 
development in the field (Oldham & Cutter, 2006). So far, however, this 
research and development has hardly benefited the poor because it is 
primarily aimed at commercial markets where IP can generate revenues 
(FAO, 2004; Global Forum for Health Research, 2004). Furthermore, the 
growing numbers of IPRs may block access to new biotechnology tools 
and products as it becomes too expensive for private organizations and 
state institutions in developing countries to pay the multiple royalties and 
purchase the necessary licenses to make use of them (Atkinson et al, 
2003). In this context, a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism is 
not concerned with compensating parties for their rights held or 
contributions made, but aims primarily to stimulate a more equitable 
distribution of the benefits of modern research and development. 
Towards a fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing mechanism 
So, what does all this tell us about the central question, how a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing mechanism can best be realized? One of the 
main outcomes is that fair and equitable benefit-sharing is not merely 
about the mechanics of an ethical distribution (or exchange) of benefits. 
Before anything else, we need to consider two important prerequisites that 
have to be satisfied if a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism is 
even to have a chance of being properly developed and sustained. 
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One relates to the socio-political power differences between the different 
stakeholders in ABS negotiations at both national and international levels. 
For this reason, the principle of procedural justice, with its emphasis on 
fair and accurate processes and equal participation, certainly needs to be 
emphasized. This means, amongst other, that investments in the 
negotiation capacities, knowledge base, and provision of access to legal 
services of developing countries and traditional communities especially is 
and will be a long term necessity. It is important to realize that ABS is not 
an issue for national governments and international organizations alone, 
but includes the involvement of many non-state actors at all levels, from 
the local to the international. Careful analysis of the complex relationships 
between these stakeholders, and especially between national governments 
and traditional communities (e.g. regarding their respective rights over 
specific resources), is required in order to facilitate a fair process and 
equitable outcome of negotiations. 
 
Closely related to this issue are the substantive, cultural differences and 
worldviews involved. Most important here is to realize that stakeholders 
may have radically different conceptualizations of the world (cosmos) and 
completely different understandings (if any at all) of such central notions 
as genetic resources, property and sharing. The principle of cognitive 
justice aims to emphasize the equal status of these different conceptions as 
a starting point for debate and genuine dialogue. This would, for example, 
imply that the link between benefit-sharing and intellectual property rights 
is weakened or, at least, not taken for granted. If a party to a particular 
ABS agreement is uncomfortable with the application of intellectual 
property rights to their resources or the products derived from them, this 
should be respected and other forms of product protection considered. 
 
Moving beyond these two preconditions, we can make the generalization 
that, despite the evident diversity of approaches to the concept, benefit-
sharing aims to realize some form of compensation and of equity. These 
two ideas were found to be fundamental to benefit-sharing. Together with 
the more specific objectives of biodiversity conservation and food 
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security, this give us some indications as to how a fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing mechanism might best be organized. 
 
The main conclusion to be drawn is that the current exchange model of 
ABS in the CBD, and subsequent focus on commercial transactions and 
contracting in ABS policies, is not the best way forward. There are several 
reasons for this. One is that the resources in question often do not fit a 
two-party exchange model. Of course, in some cases a specific provider 
and user can be discerned, who can then mutually negotiate the desired 
ABS contract. But these are the exemption. Because of the non-rival 
and/or non-excludable characteristics of plants and related (traditional or 
genetic) information, it is practically impossible for providing countries 
and communities to control their movement and, therefore, to secure their 
fair exchange. 
 
This situation is particularly problematic because, up until now, the 
responsibility for benefit-sharing has largely been left to the national 
governments and local communities of developing countries. But many of 
these have very little capacity (and many other priorities) to put ABS 
policies in place, let alone to track the movement of all their biological 
resources and traditional knowledge. Furthermore, many of these 
resources have long since left their territories and can, for example, be 
found in botanical gardens, genebanks and libraries around the world. This 
state of affairs, where the resources in question are extremely difficult to 
monitor, already widely dispersed, and user measures are almost non-
existent, has created many loopholes in the current system of ABS. 
Indeed, if a user-party is not literally collecting its resources in a provider-
country (under a Material Transfer Agreement), then it is soon unclear 
what benefit-sharing obligations, and to whom, are required, which simply 
means that no benefit-sharing will take place. 
 
Another problem with the current transaction model of the CBD is that 
most attention (and expectation) is and has been paid to commercial 
contracts as the primary way to put the ABS policies in practice. Here, the 
problem is not only that there has never existed a market for plant genetic 
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resources and traditional knowledge, but also, and more pressingly 
perhaps, that commercial mechanisms leave very little room to incorporate 
broader, social goals, such as securing human needs and equity. 
Furthermore, food security and conservation goals also are not easily 
captured in contracts between two parties. Added to the fact that the focus 
on commercial contracts is oblivious to the alternative worldviews of 
many traditional communities, we have to conclude that the current ABS 
model of the CBD is in need of fundamental revision. 
 
How then should (or can) a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism 
be organized? An alternative model, briefly mentioned above, might focus 
on the utilization of resources as the trigger for benefit-sharing rather than 
their specific exchange. Tvedt & Young (2007) have made a detailed 
study of the central requirements for an ABS system that would build 
primarily on the utilization-trigger. Three important steps towards such a 
system that can be extracted from this study are: First, the development of 
clear and effective legislation in the user countries, which involves various 
disincentives for non-compliance and incentives for compliance. Second, 
the definition of exact conditions for benefit-sharing, such as a clear start 
and end point for benefit-sharing obligations, and “internationalized 
mechanisms” that regulate the collection and distribution of “orphan 
shares” if the source country or country of origin is unknown or 
undisclosed. And third, the development of clear standards for the 
valuation of resources and benefit-sharing in order to provide a concrete 
basis for the whole system and prevent unrealistic expectations and 
uncertainties for both providers and users. 
 
Obviously, such a model faces many practical challenges, but in 
emphasizing the responsibilities for benefit-sharing at the user side it starts 
with an important advantage. If users and user countries are serious about 
benefit-sharing and commit themselves to the corresponding objectives in 
the CBD and ITPGR, they have to work towards the realization of those 
objectives. In fact, the principle of equity holds that the strongest parties 
have the biggest responsibilities in this regard. This implies, for example, 
that “if the experiential data on ABS to date indicates that it has not been 
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financially beneficial to developing countries, the Contracting Parties have 
an obligation to make it beneficial, rather than to drop it as an unpromising 
concept” (Tvedt & Young, 2007, p. 94). So, in contrast to the current 
situation, we have to conclude that the developed countries and parties 
must take their responsibility and make the system work. 
 
Other advantages of an utilization model vis-à-vis the current ABS system 
of the CBD are that it does not focus on the movement of plant genetic 
resources,77 and that it demands the sharing of benefits irrespective of 
whether a specific ABS contract is attached to them. Tvedt and Young 
hold that determining whether “the user took an action that is considered 
to be the ‘utilization of the genetic resources’ [is] a question that can be 
answered objectively and documented by evidence” (Tvedt & Young, 
2007, p. 59). This will only be possible if the Contracting Parties to the 
CBD manage to clearly define exactly which activities do and do not 
constitute a utilization of genetic resources. If realized, this would mean 
that a clear entry point for when the ABS system applies can be defined. 
Together with the proposed user measures, this could cut out many of the 
current loopholes in the system and secure that benefit-sharing does 
actually take place. 
 
The establishment of the requisite legislation is obviously an important 
step towards fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Although it does not in 
itself say anything about what a “fair and equitable” benefit-sharing 
arrangement is or should look like, if one takes into account that many 
developing countries and communities are frustrated with the historic and 
continuing use of “their” plant genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge without receiving anything in return, then one can imagine that 
the guaranteed implementation of benefit-sharing provisions is more than 
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 Unfortunately, Tvedt & Young (2007) focus primarily on plant genetic resources and 
do not discuss the same model in relation to the utilization of traditional knowledge. This 
topic will need extra research and attention because an utilization model for traditional 
knowledge needs to take into account the right of the knowledge holders to prior 
informed consent, which means that they need to be consulted before their resources are 
actually utilized. 
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just a good move in the right direction. It is, in fact, a necessary 
precondition for fair and equitable benefit-sharing and crucial first step 
towards its realization.  
 
A second step then is to establish clear standards for the valuation of 
resources and contributions and, thus, benefit-sharing. As argued, this 
valuation should not be based on commercial criteria alone, but needs to 
be informed by the broader objectives of benefit-sharing. First, it would be 
necessary for the international community to agree on some minimum 
standards for benefit-sharing, so as to provide a concrete basis for the 
whole system and facilitate the collection of the so-called orphan shares 
into an international fund. At the same time, however, the challenge is to 
leave enough room for the multiple objectives and perspectives as 
reflected in the diversity of approaches to benefit-sharing. What could be 
developed, therefore, is a “menu of ABS options”, which would lay out, 
next to the minimum standards of benefit-sharing, several forms of sharing 
information, technology and capacity.78 
 
Ultimately, one has to decide how, and to whom, the benefits should be 
distributed in a fair and equitable way. This article has discussed the main 
allocation criteria that can be employed in this respect. It has been shown 
that entitlements can set clear standards for distribution, but with respect to 
plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge it is often unclear who 
their legitimate right holders are. If the (group of) right holder(s) to a 
particular resource is well-defined, then the user and provider parties can 
mutually negotiate the benefit-sharing terms and process (taking into 
account, of course, the standards set by the international community on, 
for example, issues of procedural  and cognitive justice, compliance, and 
the minimum standards for benefit-sharing). And where resource right 
holders are not well-defined, one may opt for a multilateral approach in 
which the benefits are distributed according to a combination of the other 
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 Both the CBD and ITPGR already pay a lot of attention to such non-monetary benefit-
sharing options. The ITPGR, furthermore, includes provisions for an international fund 
and a standardized Material Transfer Agreement with specific benefit-sharing 
percentages. The utilization model can connect to and draw from these initiatives. 
Plants, Genes and Justice Four 
 
121 
 
principles discussed – one could, for example, set allocation criteria that 
aim to compensate regions or groups of people (countries, communities) 
in accordance to their (historical) contributions to the conservation of 
biodiversity and food security, and with special attention to those with 
particular needs in this respect. 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that “fair” and “equitable” benefit-sharing is not defined 
in the international treaties in which it appears, discussion of the relevant 
principles of justice in this article has resulted in some rather specific 
recommendations on how such mechanism can best be realized. One 
major conclusion is that the current, bilateral exchange model in the CBD 
is in need of a major overhaul. It should be replaced by a system that has 
more room and ability to support the broader objectives of benefit-sharing, 
and less loopholes that undermine the benefit-sharing provisions in the 
first place. Several allocation and procedural principles have been 
discussed that can inform a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism, 
and the utilization model seems a promising framework upon which to 
build in this respect. Ultimately, the international community has to come 
to an agreement on the exact terms and provisions of a fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing mechanism, and considerable investments (and 
compromises) from all parties will be needed to move forward 
successfully from the current stalemate that the international community 
has found itself in. Crucially, the developed countries and parties have to 
realize that they have the biggest responsibility to make the system work. 
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Between sharing and 
protecting: Public research on 
genetic resources in the year 
of the potato79 
                                                 
79
 This Chapter is written by Bram De Jonge and previously appeared as a scientific 
article in the Journal Genomics, Society & Public Policy, 2008, 4. 
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Abstract 
Countries, companies and farming communities are increasingly involved 
in issues of sharing and protecting plant genetic resources, (traditional) 
knowledge and technologies. Intellectual Property Rights and Access and 
Benefit-Sharing policies currently regulate the transfer and usage of much 
of this genetic material, information and related production, which is 
employed in multiple research projects involving public research 
institutes. Strikingly, not much is known about how these institutes deal 
with the transfer and usage regulations. And what, furthermore, are their 
responsibilities while serving a civil society in which there is such a range 
of diverging interests in and opinions about such regulations? In order to 
shed more light on these questions, two public research institutes will here 
be studied, the International Potato Centre in Peru and Wageningen 
University & Research Centre in the Netherlands. These institutes are both 
heavily involved in research into genetic resources, knowledge and 
technologies related to the potato, and work together with a wide spectrum 
of stakeholders that have a direct interest in the sharing and/or protection 
of these resources. The two institutes are continuously weighing up the 
various stakeholder interests in their attempts to strike a balance between 
policies geared towards sharing and those aimed at protection. It will be 
argued that public research institutes must dare to share, and that they 
need to develop new ways of sharing and protecting in order to adhere to 
their mission and best serve the public interest.  
Introduction 
The international landscape with respect to plant genetic resources has 
changed dramatically over recent decades. Regarded as the “common 
heritage of mankind” until the 1980s (FAO, 1983), with patents on plants 
and other living organisms mostly forbidden (Louwaars et al, 2005), plant 
genetic resources are now described in terms of ‘hyperownership’, in 
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which “exclusive ownership and restrictions on the sharing of genetic 
material are the international norm” (Safrin, 2004). 
 
Initially, industrialized counties started to expand their Intellectual 
Property (IP) systems to include new plant varieties and genetic material 
in search of new markets and to stimulate economic growth. Not much 
later, however, developing countries became aware of the (potential) value 
of their plant genetic resources and started to resist the free flow of genetic 
resources from their territories. With the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO, 1994), the IP concepts of the industrialized countries 
received global recognition, and in 1992 the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) abandoned the common heritage idea, declaring instead 
that “States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources” 
(UNEP, 1992, Preamble). Significantly, the CBD also demands “the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources” (Article 1) – i.e. the providers of plant genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge should be compensated for their 
contributions to the products developed by the users of these resources. 
 
Now, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and regulations of Access and 
Benefit-Sharing (ABS) set the conditions under which plant genetic 
material can be accessed and transferred. Clearly, different parties have 
different interests when it comes to protecting or sharing plant genetic 
resources and related knowledge and technologies. But what exactly are 
the interests of public researchers and their institutes in this respect, and 
what are their responsibilities while doing research for the common 
good?80 These questions will be explored by examining the specific 
positions and environments of two public research institutes in their work 
related to the third most important food crop in the world, spotlighted by 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2008: The 
International Year of the Potato.  
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 The terms ‘common good’ and ‘public interest’ are not strictly defined here, being used 
to refer to the general notion that public research institutes should work for the benefit of 
society as a whole. 
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The public sector plays an important role in the research and development 
of the potato, in both developed and developing countries. We will focus 
here on the International Potato Centre (CIP) in Peru, where the potato 
originated (Spooner et al, 2005) – and Wageningen University and 
Research Centre (Wageningen UR) in the Netherlands, the world’s 
foremost supplier of certified seed potatoes.81 Working in very different 
contexts and with a wide, representative range of stakeholders, these two 
institutes illustrate well the current situation facing public bodies in their 
exposure to a variety of opinions and pressures related to the sharing and 
protection of potato genetic resources, (traditional) knowledge and 
technologies.82  
Sharing for the common good? 
A good example of the tradition of sharing and collaboration in public 
science in order to produce benefits for society as a whole is the 
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), of 
which the International Potato Centre (CIP) in Peru is a member. The 
CGIAR is an internationally funded, collaborative partnership of fifteen 
international agricultural centers that aims to achieve sustainable food 
security and reduce poverty in developing countries. In its mission 
statement, the CGIAR states that: 
The new crop varieties, knowledge and other products resulting 
from the CGIAR’s collaborative research are made widely 
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 http://faostat.fao.org/ [Accessed August 2008]. 
82
 In addition to policy documents, news reports and scientific literature, input for this 
analysis comes from an international conference organized in Wageningen on April 11, 
2008, together with a total of 33 interviews conducted with individuals from research 
institutes and other (non-)governmental organizations in Peru and the Netherlands 
between April 2007 and September 2008 (names and affiliations of the interviewees are 
included if permission was granted; otherwise only the affiliation is mentioned). 
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available to individuals and organizations working for sustainable 
agricultural development throughout the world.83 
Sharing for the sake of food security 
An important task of CGIAR is to maintain international genebanks to 
“preserve and make readily available the plant genetic resources that form 
the basis of food security worldwide”.84 It is supported in this endeavor by 
the FAO, which declared the International Year of the Potato to raise 
awareness of the importance of this crop, and of agriculture in general, in 
addressing issues of global hunger, poverty and threats to the environment. 
Both organizations, CGIAR and FAO, cherish the rationale that in 
agriculture no country, or even continent, is self-sufficient in plant genetic 
resources (GFAR & IPGRI, 2000). Everybody depends on the genetic 
diversity found in other countries, and the continuous exchange of plant 
genetic resources is vital in fighting new pests and feeding a growing 
world population. The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) aims to support this global 
exchange with the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing 
(FAO, 2001), which establishes a list of major crops and forages – 
including the potato85 – which are freely accessible to member countries 
under a standard material transfer agreement. 
 
It is in this spirit that CIP director Dr. Anderson sees the job of the 
institute as to “produce global public goods that will contribute to the 
alleviation of hunger and poverty (…) and share the benefits of the genetic 
resources that we conserve” (Anderson, 2003). The primary beneficiaries 
of this sharing she cites are the broader research community, the national 
agricultural research systems, and the farmers and farming communities. 
A complicating factor in this mission, however, is that CIP is based in a 
country that does not univocally support it. 
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 http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html [Accessed August 2008]. 
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 http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html [Accessed August 2008]. 
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 With the exemption of one species, the Solanum phureja. 
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Peru and the fight against biopiracy 
In contrast to the sharing rationale of CIP and FAO, Peru is primarily 
interested in the control and protection of its plant genetic resources in 
order to reap their benefits. Indeed, Peru and her neighbors in the Andes 
established the Andean Community which designed the Common Regime 
on Access to Genetic Resources for just this purpose in 1996. Creating a 
legal framework for the collection of genetic resources in the Andean 
Region, the Common Regime states that the Andean Community Member 
Countries “exercise sovereignty over their genetic resources and their by-
products and consequently determine the conditions for access to them” 
aiming to ensure a “just and equitable participation in the benefits of the 
access” (Andean Community, 1996, Articles 5 & 11).  
 
The central idea is that Peru has much to gain from its genetic resources, 
the region being a ‘centre of origin’ for many plant and animal species, 
including the potato, tomato, coca and alpaca. Mrs. Rosell of the National 
Council of the Environment, the agency responsible for ABS in Peru, 
expresses the Peruvian argument thus: 
If you want to develop an invention and you are using somebody 
else’s screws you pay for the screws, [so] if you are using 
somebody else’s genetic resources why don’t you pay for them? 
(personal communication, 2007) 
When biological resources or related traditional knowledge is taken and 
commercialized without permission one often speaks of ‘biopiracy’. For 
some policymakers in Peru, CIP’s genebank collections could be “one of 
the main sources of ‘leakage’ of genetic materials” (Correa, 2003, p. 804). 
CIP has indeed been faced with accusations of biopiracy – in respect of 
which, states a communication officer at CIP, “we have to answer 
questions on the centre’s policies and activities on a regular basis” 
(personal communication, 2007).86 
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 E.g. questions were raised when traditional Peruvian varieties of Yacon from the CIP 
genebank ended up in Japan, where new commercial varieties were being developed 
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A different outlook on genetic resources 
Another group in Peru that follows the sharing and collecting activities of 
CIP with a critical eye are the farming and indigenous communities in the 
Andes. Potato crops have been cultivated here for more than 8000 years, 
with some 5000 varieties currently being grown.87 The natural 
characteristics of these potatoes are strongly interwoven with the cultural 
and spiritual life of the Andean communities. Several initiatives aiming to 
protect and sustain this natural and cultural diversity have recently been 
set up, including the Indigenous Coalition Against Biopiracy in the Andes, 
a Peruvian coalition that made the news in 2007 after sending a letter to 
the multinational Syngenta protesting against its patent on a genetic 
method that could be used to stop potatoes from sprouting unless a 
chemical was applied. The letter expressed concerns that this ‘terminator 
technology’ threatened the region's biodiversity, cultural traditions and 
food security. Furthermore, it stated that: 
We feel greatly disrespected by corporations [which], by making a 
single genetic alteration to a plant, claim private ownership to it as 
their invention, despite the fact that these plants are the result of 
thousands of years of careful selection and breeding by indigenous 
peoples and local communities around the world. (IIED, 2007) 
The fight against biopiracy and call for benefit-sharing of the Andean 
communities is different from that of Peru as a country, however. These 
communities want to make their own rules, according to their worldviews 
and traditions, and resisting against all outside, intruding forces. To many 
Andean communities the Peruvian State is just another one of these forces, 
along with the international genebanks that come to take their “genetic 
heritage” without giving anything in return (Argumedo & Pimbert, 2005, 
p. 10). According to Dr. Argumedo, associate director of the Association 
for Nature and Sustainable Development (ANDES), the national and 
international ABS regulatory system “reduces all things into genes and 
                                                                                                                         
(ETC Group, 2001; GRAIN, 2001). In this case it transpired that CIP had transferred the 
material at the request of the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture. 
87
 http://www.potato2008.org/en/index.html [Accessed August 2008]. 
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commercial commodities that then can be traded”, which has nothing in 
common with the way indigenous communities manage their land and 
resources: 
When you don’t take into consideration how local people perceive 
the resources, the way they understand the so-called genes and 
seeds, you just impose a new paradigm that will only serve the 
interests of research organizations and corporations. (personal 
communication, 2007) 
Competing interests 
So what does – should – CIP do in response to this regional/national and 
local opposition to its mission to collect and share genetic resources in the 
name of the common good? In general, the public research sector is far 
from positive about the current ABS climate and tries to stay away from it. 
A recent, CBD-linked, report states that “Researchers in both academia 
and industry express significant concern about the negative impact ABS is 
having upon basic science and upon traditions of trust and collaboration 
among scientists” (Laird & Wynberg, 2008, p. 128). In the report, one 
researcher argues that “both academic researchers and companies today 
are reluctant to access genetic resources overseas for fear of ‘…becoming 
part of a very dangerous socio-political environment in which anyone can 
claim they are biopirates at any time’” (idem, p. 122). The report also 
acknowledges that many academic researchers do not take the CBD 
seriously, “and while paying lip service prefer in practice to ‘ask 
forgiveness rather than ask permission.’ Some see the new obligations as 
too burdensome and expensive in time and funds” (idem, p. 124). 
 
Indeed, the current situation is far from satisfying. The global exchange of 
plant genetic resources has decreased dramatically since the ratification of 
the CBD.88 In Peru, the acquisition of new genetic resources “essentially 
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 CGIAR’s annual admissions, for example, averaged 9782 for the five calendar years 
prior to the CBD, a figure which dropped to just 563 in 1997, with the drop in the number 
of collection missions being even sharper (Falcon & Fowler, 2002). 
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came to a halt in 1994, primarily as a result of the conflicting natures of 
the international, regional and national laws” (Anderson, 2003). Despite 
the fact that Peru has ratified the ITPGR, which should ease the way for 
the collection and exchange of the potato resources, it is still unclear 
exactly which national regulations apply (Correa, 2004; Ruiz, 2003).89 In 
such a “policy vacuum (…) it is easy for anxiety and suspicion to 
proliferate”, confirm Rosenthal and Katz (Rosenthal & Katz, 2004, p. 
463). They conclude, however, that researchers should work to overcome 
this situation and develop effective collaboration: 
The research community needs to demonstrate that this work can 
be done in a flexible and accommodating manner that recognizes 
the environmental and socioeconomic context in which these 
organisms exist, or we will lose access to them in the near term 
through politics, and eventually through extinction. (Rosenthal & 
Katz, 2004, p. 465) 
New ways of sharing for the public interest 
CIP and the broader public research community have a responsibility to 
work towards a solution of the present situation where fears about the 
misuse and disagreements about the sharing or protection of genetic 
material are rife. A first step towards a solution is for research institutes to 
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 For example: The Dutch gene bank CGN, part of Wageningen UR, organized an 
expedition collecting wild potato varieties in Peru in 1999 – i.e. after the CBD and the 
Andean Regime on Access to Genetic Resources came into force and before the ITPGR. 
The expedition was organized together with CIP, the Peruvian National Institute of 
Agrarian Research, and the National Research Support Program 6 of the US, and 
permission was granted by the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture. Agreed was that all four 
partners would receive the same seed accessions. At the end of the expedition, however, a 
conflict had arisen between the Peruvian Ministries of Agriculture and the Environment 
about the export permission of the collected material. Due to the legal uncertainty this 
caused, CGN and its US partner decided to leave the country without the collected seeds, 
which were left behind. Now, almost 10 years later, the director of CGN Dr. Visser is still 
trying to get the accessions to the Netherlands: “Since Peru has ratified the Multilateral 
System of the FAO Treaty, which includes the potato, this should be legally possible but 
the practical circumstances are still uncertain” (personal communication, 2008). 
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listen and be open to the opinions of the stakeholders they are working 
with, or for. Since the mission of CIP is to support developing countries 
and their farming communities, it would make no sense to simply ignore 
or dismiss their views. A second step, then, would be to reassess the exact 
meaning of CIP’s tradition of sharing genetic material in the name of the 
public good, because it has become clear that the free, international 
exchange of resources that originated in the Peruvian Andes is not 
necessarily considered to be in the best interest of the country or its 
indigenous communities. And this is exactly what CIP has been doing in 
recent years. 
 
When, in 2004, Peru established the National Anti-Biopiracy Commission 
to develop “actions to identify, prevent and avoid acts of biopiracy with 
the aim of protecting the interests of the Peruvian State” (WIPO, 2005, p. 
3), CIP became a member; it now helps the Commission in its technical 
research. With respect to the protection of traditional knowledge and 
potato resources of small farmers, CIP developed a catalogue of native 
potato varieties grown by eight farming communities in the Huancavelica 
region. CIP and the communities, in collaboration with the Peruvian patent 
office, collected botanical information and traditional knowledge about the 
varieties, together with details about their genetic make-up and portraits of 
the families that grow them (CIP & FEDECH, 2006). According to one 
person involved, this initiative has several important benefits, since it is a 
tool “to hold onto the knowledge, to protect the intellectual property of 
farmers, and to raise self-esteem of the involved communities: they now 
manage their own databases” (personal communication, 2007). 
 
Another example is the 2005 Repatriation Agreement that CIP signed with 
the Potato Park, a centre of origin of potato diversity, co-founded by 
ANDES and managed by six Quechua communities, which aims to protect 
the “collective bio-cultural heritage” of Andean communities, by building 
upon the practices and traditions of the communities themselves within 
their natural environment (Argumedo & Pimbert, 2006). The Agreement 
announces the repatriation of traditional potato varieties in the CIP 
genebank back to the indigenous communities of the Potato Park. 
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Furthermore, it establishes a collaborative effort to conserve, monitor and 
develop agricultural biodiversity by linking the in-situ conservation at the 
Potato Park with the ex-situ conservation practices of CIP. In the 
Agreement, CIP recognizes the customary rights and responsibilities 
through which the indigenous communities manage their land and 
resources, in line with which the centre aims to “Ensure that genetic 
resources and knowledge remain under the custody of the communities 
and do not become subject to intellectual property rights in any form.” 
(GRAIN, 2005).90 
 
These examples show that CIP is well aware of the variety of perspectives 
on the sharing and protection of genetic material. It respects these 
perspectives and tries, where possible, to help the Peruvian state and 
farming communities protect their resources against misuse. Furthermore, 
it continues to find new ways of sharing for the public good – i.e. ways of 
sharing that suit its environment: the centre works together with the 
Peruvian government and patent office and shares with them its technical 
expertise, and it collaborates with farming communities and provides them 
with different products, knowledge and genetic resources. Of course, the 
centre still aims to collect new potato varieties and facilitate their 
international exchange for the sake of food security, but it does so within 
the limits set by its host country and the communities it intends to support. 
Thus does CIP build a relation of trust – of the type that might well be a 
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 At present, CIP and most other CGIAR centers consider intellectual property issues 
mainly a defensive necessity. On the issue the director of CIP states: “Our primary 
objective here is to protect the physical and information assets that have been developed 
as global public goods and guarantee that they remain in the public domain” (Anderson, 
2003) But according to the conclusions of a CGIAR Science Council report, this 
approach no longer suffices. “In order to respond to the increasing needs for IPR 
guidelines, tools and services, the CGIAR should strengthen its overall capacity in these 
areas […] Inaction is no longer an option.” (CGIAR Science Council, 2006, p. 8). It still 
has to be seen what IP policy the CGIAR centers will eventually adopt and what 
consequences this will have for CIP’s agreement with the Potato Park. For reasons of 
clarity and scope this debate on IPRs within the CGIAR, and on ABS issues at 
Wageningen UR, have not been included in this article. 
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prerequisite to overcoming the present impasse in the collection and 
exchange of plant genetic resources. 
Protecting for the common 
good? 
So far, what has been described is a situation in which a public research 
institute, whose mission it is to stimulate the free exchange of potato 
resources for the public interest, finds itself in an environment that does 
not support that same goal and instead has to deal with the protection of 
what stakeholders consider to be their genetic resources or heritage. The 
opposite situation occurs when a public research institute aims to protect 
certain genetic resources, knowledge and technologies for the common 
good, but with consequences that can go against this objective – a 
situation that will be analyzed in relation to the potato research at 
Wageningen University and Research Centre in the Netherlands. 
 
Wageningen UR is a framework of cooperation between a university 
(Wageningen University), a university of professional education (Van Hall 
Larenstein), and several specialized research institutes organized under the 
umbrella of a non-profit, private institute (DLO Foundation). This has 
created a structure in which education is combined with fundamental, 
policy-oriented and applied research. Together, the mission of 
Wageningen UR is “to explore the potential of nature to improve the 
quality of life” (Wageningen UR, 2008, p. 4). 
Public research to support the private sector 
An important reason for Wageningen UR to protect certain resources is 
that the institute aims to support the Dutch private sector – to assist it in 
attaining “the most competitive position possible” (Wageningen UR, 
2007, p. 21). The potato sector represents an important part of Dutch 
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agriculture, with an export value of seed potatoes worth €300 million a 
year and of starch potatoes and processed products up to €1.5 billion a 
year (CSG & Wageningen UR, 2008, Presentation Prof. Stiekema). 
Indeed, the Netherlands has become the global market leader in the 
development of new potato varieties and the export of certified seed 
potatoes, and has a large share in the export market of potatoes for 
consumption and processing.  
 
Mr. van Winden of the Dutch Ministry for Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality acknowledges that the Dutch government aims to “create 
favourable preconditions for the sector” in order to “help the Dutch 
breeding sector to retain its leading position in potatoes and other crops” 
(van Winden, 2007). One precondition is to support research and 
innovation by funding public-private collaborative research projects. An 
example is the Technological Top Institute Green Genetics (TTI GG), an 
institute led by the commercial partners which, in close collaboration with 
public institutes, notably Wageningen UR, has established a strategic 
research agenda to “develop and apply genetic information for the creation 
of crops with improved performance and improved quality”.91 Because the 
main objective is “to convert knowledge developed in the program into 
value for the Dutch economy” (TTI GG, 2005, p. 12), intellectual property 
protection plays an important role within this research program. This 
means, for example, that the public research partners are bound to 
regulations on confidentiality over research results and only allowed to 
publish after the valorization of knowledge has been considered and, if 
relevant, intellectual property protection applied for (TTI GG, 2007). 
Valorization strategies 
According to Prof. Visser, head of Plant Breeding at Wageningen UR, 
these issues are well organized within the research project and the interests 
of public researchers secured: Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have 
simply “become part of the game” in public research (personal 
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 http://www.groenegenetica.nl/pro1/general/start.asp?t=about [Accessed August 2008]. 
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communication, 2008). In fact, public funding organizations are not only 
supporting public-private partnerships, but are also increasingly promoting 
the application of IPRs in public research itself. Organizations like the 
Technology Foundation STW and the Netherlands Genomics Initiative 
(NGI) – both part of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research 
(NWO) – aim to combine high quality research with its social application, 
a mission which has resulted in a strong focus on valorization and an 
important role for IP policies. 
 
NGI funds the Centre for BioSystems Genomics (CBSG), another public-
private partnership in which Wageningen UR collaborates with Dutch 
industries (through the complete chain of  potato breeding and 
processing). The Centre’s aims include unraveling the genetic code of 
potato plants “to reduce the use of chemical pesticides and improve 
product quality for consumers and industry” (CBSG, n.d.). NGI has set 
targets for the Centre at 25 patents, 20 licenses and 2 spin-off companies 
by 2012 (Heselmans et al, 2008a). Thus NGI aims to go “[from] 
knowledge to the market: from concept to product or company”, in order 
to “get the most out of genomics”.92 Indeed, according to one valorization 
officer, if a public researcher were to discover a new genetic trait that 
stimulates resistance to an important disease but publish before patenting, 
the discovery might not be developed further, precisely because it could 
not be protected in the marketplace and investments recuperated (personal 
communication, 2007). 
 
But Wageningen UR also has its own reasons to develop an effective 
valorization and IP policy. In order to “generate value from knowledge” 
(Wageningen UR, 2008, p. 18), the institute has established the 
Wageningen Business Generator (WBG), to “identify promising 
opportunities and turn them into thriving businesses”.93 According to 
Wageningen UR’s Dr. Louwaars, one reason for the institute to invest in 
intellectual property strategies is to generate extra income, especially since 
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 http://www.genomics.nl/Valorisation.aspx [Accessed August 2008]. 
93
 www.wbg.wur.nl [Accessed August 2008]. 
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genomics and biotechnology research is extremely expensive and funding 
bodies hardly ever finance the total costs of a research project. Other 
reasons are to maintain a position at the frontier of science through 
maximizing its own freedom to operate, and to remain attractive for 
market parties and acquire research contracts and partnerships (CSG & 
Wageningen UR, 2008, Presentation Dr. Louwaars). In other words, an 
extensive IP portfolio can both strengthen one’s bargaining position in the 
market place and reduce the possibility of one’s research agenda being 
blocked by the intellectual property rights of others. 
Uncertainties 
We conclude that Wageningen UR aims to protect certain resources and 
research results in order to 1) support the economically important potato 
sector, 2) meet the terms of funding organizations and stimulate the 
valorization of research outcomes, and 3) strengthen its own financial and 
strategic position so as to perform cutting-edge science. All these reasons 
are likely to support the public interest. Still, there are several 
uncertainties about whether the protection of research outcomes in public 
science is the best way forward and whether this is, indeed, for the 
common good. 
 
At the practical level, it is not an easy task to develop an efficient and 
profitable IP and valorization strategy. Wageningen UR now has to 
establish effective methods of identifying and then promoting 
commercially promising innovations, including the negotiation of 
corporate IP contracts. This is a process only complicated by the 
disinterest in intellectual property issues of many public researchers. 
According to one researcher at Wageningen UR, intellectual property 
issues are often very complex and fall completely outside the expertise of 
most researchers, for which reason many consider dealing with them a 
trying business. (personal communication, 2007). Another practical point 
of uncertainty is a doubt about whether IPRs will, in fact, generate much 
income, especially when the costs of filing a patent are known to be high. 
One study shows that American universities received, on average, only 
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0.56% of total revenues from their patenting strategy in 2003 (Benkler, 
2006, p. 340). 
 
At the theoretical level, issues range from philosophical questions about 
the patentability of living matter (Marchant, 2007; Schonmann, 1998) to 
reflections on the possible incompatibilities between the call for 
valorization and the traditions of disinterestedness and independence in 
public science (Busch et al, 1991; Rhoten & Powell, 2007; van den Belt, 
Forthcoming). The biggest worry, however, is that IPRs go against the 
public interest because they can block access to research tools and results 
and thereby hamper innovation instead of stimulating it (So et al, 2008; 
Boettiger & Bennett, 2006; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Agricultural 
research can be particularly vulnerable to this because much research is 
“based on pre-existing plant material, and each incremental improvement 
now brings with it a number of IP and germplasm constraints that have 
accumulated in the plant material” (Atkinson et al, 2003, p. 174). The fear 
is that developing countries especially will suffer from this. 
Research for development 
This issue was the central theme of a one-day symposium at Wageningen 
UR organized in the context of the International Year of the Potato. The 
symposium built upon a recent statement by Mr. Koenders, Minister for 
Development Cooperation: 
I would also urge Dutch universities and research institutes to 
adopt institutional IP policies that take account not only of 
valorisation of knowledge and incentives for researchers, but also 
the importance of access to knowledge and freedom to operate for 
development purposes. (Koenders, 2008, p. 7) 
The key issue is twofold. On the one hand, an increased focus on 
valorization can steer public research towards profitable research areas 
like commercial farming – away, that is, from the low or no profit crops of 
small farmers, especially in developing countries. On the other hand, IPRs 
can block access to biotechnologies and related knowledge, especially for 
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parties that have no resources to negotiate and pay for access licenses and 
patent royalties. During the Wageningen UR symposium, CIP 
biotechnology advisor Dr. Ghislain confirmed that his centre experiences 
severe difficulties with accessing IP-protected knowledge and 
technologies: 
The transfer of proprietary biotechnology from the private sector 
(…) has never been so difficult, not to say impossible, (…) the 
public sector is still transferring proprietary technology but with 
increasing difficulties and restrictions. (CSG & Wageningen UR, 
2008, Presentation Dr. Ghislain) 
The rector of Wageningen UR, Prof. Kropff, agreed at the symposium that 
the institute has to take these issues into account because it wants to 
support the Millennium Development Goals – and thus to make 
knowledge and technology available for developing countries – but it also 
aims to generate income and spin-off companies by applying intellectual 
property rights. A possible strategy in this respect is one applied in 1996, 
when researchers from Wageningen UR transferred a patent on a 
molecular technology to modify cassava to a Dutch company through a 
Humanitarian Use License that ensured the royalty-free use of the 
technology for food security goals and local use, but not for the world 
trade in starch (Heselmans et al, 2008b). One complicating factor here is 
that Wageningen UR shares most of its intellectual property with other 
research partners, so “the question how to transfer that IP and make it 
available for developing countries is something that we have to discuss 
together with those partners” (CSG & Wageningen UR, 2008, Panel 
discussion Prof. Kropff). 
New ways of protecting for the public interest 
So, the main question is how public research institutes like Wageningen 
UR can balance protection with sharing for the common good. Protecting 
public research outcomes with still stronger and broader IPRs is not likely 
to be in the public interest, but neither is the rejection of any form of IP 
protection in public research. The real challenge lies in deciding on the 
Five Plants, Genes and Justice 
140 
 
optimum form and amount of IP protection in order to “support innovation 
for the benefit of society” (Pompidou, 2007, p. 3), which is the ultimate 
goal of IP regimes and the mission of most public research institutes. 
 
In order to reach that balance, according to the International Expert Group 
on Biotechnology, Innovation and Intellectual Property (IEGBIIP), public 
research institutes need to turn away from two “faulty assumptions” that 
currently characterize IP policies generally, namely “that since some 
intellectual property is good, more is better; and that IP is about 
controlling knowledge rather than sharing it” (IEGBIIP, 2008, p. 13). 
Rather, IP protection should be seen for what it is: 
(…) a cog in a large system of innovation that brings researchers, 
universities, companies, government, non-governmental 
organisations, patients and technology users together to create, 
improve, disseminate and use new practical knowledge. (IEGBIIP, 
2008, p. 13) 
IEGBIIP pleads for a new era of intellectual property protection, which 
“stresses sharing and collaboration instead of increased protection, leading 
not only to greater levels of innovation, but better access to new products 
and services” (IEGBIIP, 2008, p. 8). 
 
A first step towards such an era is to stop putting IPRs on a pedestal, as if, 
for example, the amount of patents acquired says something about the 
success of a research project. Instead, funding organizations and public 
research institutes should look for ways of measuring success that relate 
directly to their public missions, e.g. the number of partnerships and 
research platforms in which the institute participates, the number of 
trainees, or the scope of dissemination of research results. From an ethical 
perspective, public research projects should surely be judged by their 
success in enabling global access to their research results for development 
purposes. 
 
A second step, of course, is to start formulating IP policies that stimulate 
collaboration and knowledge sharing for the benefit of society. 
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Wageningen UR is now in the process of developing an IP policy and 
should look seriously at promising examples in this regard. One such is 
the white paper issued by a group of universities in the US (California 
Institute of Technology et al, 2007), which offers guidelines for 
universities in formulating license agreements with the private sector that 
facilitate the broad dissemination of university-generated technologies and 
allow the scientific community to conduct further research and 
development of the licensed material. Another example is the Public 
Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture initiative, which brings 
together public sector intellectual property to make agricultural 
technologies available to innovators around the world.94 
 
Wageningen UR has also built itself experience in this matter, however, as 
with the cassava license referred to above, the question is whether and 
how this strategy can be turned into general policy. Given that 
Wageningen UR shares much of its IP with other parties, decisions have to 
be negotiated. A complicating factor in such negotiations, according to 
Prof. Visser, is that “if you want to have a say in the IP management of a 
research project, you have to bring something to the table” (personal 
communication, 2008). This means, for example, that the public partner 
has to share in the costs of the research project and its IP strategy, which 
can be financially problematic for cash-strapped public institutions. 
Wageningen UR should, therefore, initiate serious consultation with its 
research partners and the Dutch government and public funding 
organizations, in order to reflect on the desired role of IPRs within public 
research and work together towards new ways of protecting for the 
common good. 
Between sharing and protecting 
Manifestly, the two public research institutes described operate in a 
complex environment in which different stakeholders – including the 
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institutes themselves – have diverging interests in, and opinions about the 
sharing and protection of plant genetic resources, related knowledge and 
technologies. For public research institutes charged with serving the public 
interest, finding the right balance between sharing and protection is no 
easy task. In the case of CIP, we have an institute which is primarily 
concerned with the global exchange of plant genetic resources for the sake 
of food security but situated in a country that does not consider this 
sharing rationale to be in its primary interest and where concerns about 
biopiracy are widespread. To simply reject the Peruvian position as 
counterproductive because Peru is as dependent on foreign plant genetic 
resources as any other country would be to miss the point. Mrs. Rosell 
agrees that we all have benefited from the former tradition of free 
exchange of plant genetic resources, but asserts that “there are some that 
have benefited more” and now “we want some compensation for the 
contributions of Peru” (personal communication, 2007). It is not that the 
benefits of sharing go unacknowledged, but rather that the benefits of 
protecting may appear to be more substantial (to say nothing of perceived 
historical injustices). 
Self-interest 
It is not only gene-rich countries and communities that choose to protect 
their genetic material in order to reap the benefits and preclude 
misappropriation. Industrialized countries, biotechnology companies and 
public research institutes set up IP policies for similar reasons. The basic 
rationale that underlies most decisions about sharing or protecting is rather 
simple: sharing carries more risk, is more insecure. Protection is a 
defensive stance in which one holds on to and enjoys the benefits from 
what one has; sharing gives away the competitive advantage of exclusive 
access for the promise of benefits that are often indirect and insecure, 
because they depend on the actions of others, who may even misuse or 
misappropriate what is shared. 
 
An example of the academic dimension of the defensive stance can be 
described with respect to the Potato Genome Sequencing Consortium 
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(PGSC), coordinated by Wageningen UR. The Consortium aims to 
sequence the complete potato genome by the end of 2010 in order to 
“meet the world’s food needs in the future”.95 The project is based on “an 
open information policy where all data is intended to be freely shared 
between the partners and the scientific community at large”.96 In such 
‘community resource’ projects, however, scientists might be data users or 
data producers (or both). The former are interested in rapid access to all 
data while the later can be reluctant to put their genome sequences into an 
open database straightaway, fearing that others might use the data in 
publications before the providers themselves have been able to publish and 
take credit for their work (Foster & Sharp, 2007). 
 
In 2003, the Wellcome Trust organized a meeting to discuss this issue, 
which concluded that the “scientific community will best be served if the 
results (…) are made immediately available for free and unrestricted use,” 
but continued by stating that “it is crucial that the scientific community 
recognizes and respects the important contribution made by the scientists” 
(Wellcome Trust, 2003, p. 3), and going on to urge resource users to 
acknowledge resource producers and cite data sources. Nevertheless – and 
importantly, I would suggest – the Trust does come with the additional 
recommendation: 
Resource producers should recognize that even if the resource is 
occasionally used in ways that violate normal standards of 
scientific etiquette, this is a necessary risk set against the 
considerable benefits of immediate data release. (Wellcome Trust, 
2003, p. 4, emphasis added) 
Dare to share 
In order to promote sharing as beneficial to the wider community, 
academics and the academic community are urged to take the risks of 
sharing. A recent CBD-linked report similarly recommends gene-rich 
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countries and communities not to “sacrifice the invaluable benefits of 
scientific collaboration (…) out of fear that commercial research cannot be 
adequately regulated or monitored” (Laird & Wynberg, 2008, p. 130). In 
this context, Safrin points out that developing countries have repeatedly 
maintained that they would “completely open up access to raw genetic 
material within their borders (…) if developed countries would place 
improved genetic material in the public domain” (Safrin, 2004, p. 672). 
 
The overall message of these examples is that it takes something extra to 
share. The benefits and risks of sharing depend on the actions of others, 
like their willingness to reciprocate and potential to misuse resources. 
Sharing means vulnerability. But as the benefits of sharing for the wider 
community can be considerable, these risks and uncertainties should 
sometimes be set aside. For research institutes whose mission it is to serve 
the public interest, this is exactly what they should do. Even while they are 
continuously searching for the best balance between sharing and 
protecting plant resources, knowledge and technologies, the contemporary 
situation demands that research institutes reconsider their policies in order 
to develop new ways of sharing – and protecting – for the common good. 
In a time of hyperownership, public research institutes have a 
responsibility to show that the current trend of enclosure and protection of 
genetic material and knowledge can be overcome by daring to share.  
Conclusion 
CIP and Wageningen UR are situated in totally different environments, 
but both interact with a range of stakeholders that have strong and 
diverging interests in respect of the sharing and protection of the plant 
genetic resources, knowledge and technologies the institutes work with. 
While CIP aims to promote the sharing of potato genetic resources 
throughout the world for the sake of food security, Wageningen UR is 
concerned with supporting the Dutch potato sector. CIP is also, however, 
confronted with a society that is deeply ambivalent about the sharing goal 
and where concerns for biopiracy proliferate, while Wageningen UR has 
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to ensure that its IP and valorization strategies do not impede its research 
for development goals. It is clear that public research institutes have a 
difficult job in balancing their sharing/protecting policies in order to cope 
with the variety of interests involved. 
 
This task is, furthermore, set against the current situation of 
hyperownership, in which countries, companies and indigenous 
communities alike fear for their resources and aim to protect them. Public 
institutes like CIP and Wageningen UR thus have to collaborate with 
stakeholders from the starting point of respecting their protectionist 
interests. In order to work towards new ways of operating that support 
both their direct environment and the global community, however, these 
and other public research institutes should pay attention not to overly 
protect their own resources. The negative dynamics of hyperownership 
can only be overcome if all parties take reciprocal steps towards a more 
open system (Safrin, 2004), but someone has to take the first step. In order 
to fulfill their mission and serve the common good, public research 
institutes should not hesitate to take that first step and dare to share. 
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 Reconsidering intellectual 
property policies in public 
research: Start document & 
report of a symposium97 
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 This chapter is written by Marianne Heselmans, Bram De Jonge, Wietse Vroom, and 
Niels Louwaars, and previously appeared as two separate documents (Start document and 
Report) on the website of the Centre for Society & Genomics, The Netherlands 
(http://www.society-genomics.nl/publicaties.html). 
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Start document: Sharing 
biotechnology with developing 
countries  
Innovators often have to obtain scores of licenses before they can 
introduce their biotechnology product destined for poor farmers. 
The process costs a lot of time and money and does not guarantee 
success. In this way Intellectual Property Rights can block 
innovation in developing countries. The question for public 
research institutes is how they can prevent their intellectual 
property policy from hampering innovation in poor countries. The 
most promising strategies so far are ‘humanitarian licenses’ and 
‘open source biotechnology’. 
By 1995, the Papaya Ringspot Virus (PRSV) had almost completely 
devastated the papaya industry in Hawaii. Thus there was an enormous 
need to introduce a disease-resistant papaya. The transgenic papaya 
developed by Cornell University in New York and Hawaii University had 
already shown excellent resistance in field trials, so the Papaya 
Administrative Committee (PAC) in Hawaii asked the American law firm 
Nixon Peabody to analyze the patent landscape, and negotiate licenses. At 
least ten licenses seemed to be needed, and the law firm encountered 
serious problems, but eventually the negotiations succeeded. Nixon 
Peabody and PAC were able to explain that the true beneficiaries were 
small papaya growers, and where sympathy for the growers was not 
sufficient, the United States Department of Agriculture (that created PAC) 
was helpful. As the USDA is an important regulatory agency, the licensors 
wanted to remain in the USDA’s good books so as to avoid jeopardizing 
approvals for their own projects. All license agreements were completed 
by April 1998 and distribution of transgenic papaya seeds started in May 
1998 (Goldman, 2007). 
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Access becomes more difficult 
This case, extensively described in the IP Handbook of Best Practices 
(www.iphandbook.org – free access), demonstrates how difficult it has 
become to introduce a ‘small’ crop developed using modern 
biotechnology. But in this ‘best practice’ at least, the negotiators 
succeeded. This was due to a number of factors: The Papaya 
Administrative Committee had enough money to pay a vested law firm, 
they received assistance from the influential USDA, and this papaya, 
developed in 1992, has fewer IPR’s than more recently developed 
transgenic varieties. In many other cases - rarely described in the literature 
- the negotiators did not succeed, or didn’t even start due to lack of money, 
legal expertise and time. 
 
As biotechnology becomes more complex, the number of IPR’s - and the 
risks of infringing them - increases. A cursory search of plant-related 
utility patents shows that patents filed under the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPT) plant classification have increased steadily 
from 5 in 1981 to 777 in 2006 (Yancey & Stewart, 2007). About 45 
patents and 6 material transfer agreements alone are associated with the 
famous vitamin A enriched Golden Rice. These patents are owned by 
approximately 30 companies and public institutions. Another example is 
the International Vaccine Institute in Seoul, devoted to bringing vaccines 
to the poor. It makes use of at least six distinct technology fields for the 
plant-derived vaccines they produce: engineering of antigens, antigen 
production and accumulation in plants, genetic transformation of plants, 
selectable marker systems (for the identification of plant cells that have 
successfully taken up the DNA), transcription regulatory elements (to 
ensure that the introduced genes are expressed in plants), sub-cellular 
targeting systems and bioprocess engineering for extraction and 
processing. All these areas are protected by scores of patents, confidential 
information agreements, and material transfer agreements. 
 
Access to IPR is not only a problem for transgenic crops. Conventional 
plant breeders are also increasingly making use of molecular technologies. 
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Both these (enabling) technologies and the databases with (genomic) 
information are often protected. 
Two problems for the creators of products  
The increasingly complex patent landscape has led to two major problems 
for the creators of products for neglected markets. The first is the 
expensive process of analyzing the IPR landscape: which patents and other 
agreements do they need licenses for, and what are the chances of 
obtaining them? In many cases, searching for a biotechnology patent has 
become an inexplicably frustrating process. There is no streamlined, 
universal approach for searching for patents filed at the various patent 
offices. The three main repositories of English language filings – the 
European Patent Office (EPO), the US Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) and the World Trade Intellectual Property Organization’s Patent 
Cooperation Treaty – offer databases with online search tools that all work 
differently, even displaying different results. To make it worse, each 
patent of interest must be downloaded and printed one page at a time – 
even though it may be 100 pages long, and although patents and patent 
applications are disclosed, license agreements are often not. As 
researchers from the University of Tennessee conclude in Nature 
Biotechnology of November 2007: “Add to the mix defensive patenting, a 
complex classification system and a lack of information available on the 
license status of certain technologies, and it becomes difficult to know 
what privately developed technologies are available for use by 
researchers” (Yancey & Stewart, 2007). 
 
An even more serious problem is obtaining all licenses free, or for a price 
that the innovator can afford. In the case of the Hawaiian papaya, Michael 
Goldman from Nixon Peabody describes the bottlenecks: “All licensors 
were sympathetic to the need to introduce a transgenic, disease-resistant 
papaya in Hawaii”, he writes. “However, each had its own strategic 
interest, which needed to be protected” (Goldman, 2007). Most public 
institutions did not, at that time, have an institutional policy of, or 
experience with, licensing out and were reluctant to proceed with setting a 
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corporate-wide strategy based on a license for a very small crop. Some 
were concerned that the deal with the Papaya Administrative Committee 
would dictate the terms for future licenses on more important crops. In 
addition, when the licensors saw that large, well-known fruit packing 
companies were members of PAC, questions were usually raised as to who 
was being aided by the licensors. So PAC had to explain a lot about the 
papaya industry. What made the negotiations more difficult was that many 
of the individuals working on business development for the licensors were 
very busy, and did not have much time for such a small crop with its 
potentially small economic return. 
Dilemma for public institutes  
The universities and the National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARS) 
are now confronted with a dilemma. Researchers – also in the South – 
have been increasingly stimulated to protect their knowledge. With a 
stricter patent policy, financers hope to recoup the investment in research, 
and stimulate private-public cooperation and ‘valorization’. For instance, 
the Netherlands Ministry of Education, Science and Culture wants to 
stimulate patents on universities with a new measure: researchers will 
receive a part of the return from their own patents for private use, in order 
to keep top quality scientists in the public sector. Also the private sector – 
increasingly collaborating with universities – tends to lean toward stronger 
Intellectual Property protection (The World Bank, 2006). 
  
However, public institutions also want to assist poor countries. The 
Wageningen University and Research Centre’s 2007-2010 Strategic Plan 
states that they want to “both strengthen international cooperation in the 
field of research and education, and take a more serious look at the 
possible international applications of existing knowledge” (Wageningen 
UR, 2007). So on the one side researchers have to protect their knowledge, 
and on the other they have to share their knowledge in support of 
development goals. This issue was recently put on the agenda by the 
Netherlands Minister of Development Cooperation, Bert Koenders, at the 
‘Knowledge on the Move Conference’ in The Hague on 28 February 
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(2008). This ministry is a strong proponent of sharing knowledge. “In 
relation to developing countries, access to knowledge is more important 
than possession of knowledge”, Koenders stated. He would also “urge 
Dutch universities and research institutes to adopt institutional IP policies 
that take account not only of valorisation of knowledge and incentives for 
researchers, but also the importance of access to knowledge and freedom 
to operate for development purposes” (Koenders, 2008). The EU is also 
paying attention to this problem. A workshop at the International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI) this year – sponsored by the EU – will address 
the issue that formal intellectual property right protection may impede the 
transfer of advanced technologies from EU public research to developing 
countries.  
Adapting the patent policy  
So there may be several reasons for public research institutes to reconsider 
their own intellectual property policy, but what can they do to prevent 
developmental goals from being hampered by this policy. In the United 
States, each of the top four public recipients of U.S. patents in 2004 states 
‘public benefit’ as an explicit goal in its patent policy. For instance, the 
California Institute of Technology (135 patents) has formulated it thus: 
“(…) If there are innovations or discoveries that result in the filing of 
patent applications and the acquisition of patents, the Institute intends to 
serve the public interest by prudent and appropriate efforts to transfer the 
technology to those who will facilitate public use”.98 And the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (132 patents) writes: “(…) It is in 
the context of public service that M.I.T. supports efforts directed toward 
bringing the fruits of M.I.T research to public use and benefit”.99 
 
Such general policy statements are needed to adapt the usual Intellectual 
Property strategy in an institute, but they do not provide insight into the  
management of a specific project. When a Dutch public-private 
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 See http://www.ogc.caltech.edu/Patent_Policy.htm [Accessed March 2008]. 
99
 See http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/community/guide4.html [Accessed March 2008]. 
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consortium starts breeding a Phytophthora resistant potato, or when an 
international consortium starts sequencing the banana, how can these 
consortiums formulate an IP strategy that doesn’t hamper the development 
of crops for neglected markets? Out of the international debates in the past 
twenty years, two concrete strategies have emerged: Humanitarian 
Licenses and Open Source Biotechnology. Neither option infringes current 
IPR law, have been practiced, and are being developed for biotechnology. 
Humanitarian Licences 
Humanitarian Use Licenses (HULs) have always been part of IPR law. 
Governments are even allowed to force HULs, when they think a specific 
patent blocks a public goal, but they seldom use this right. According to 
Wikipedia, Humanitarian Use Licenses “set the conditions for the 
provision of access to innovations for people in need on a royalty-free 
basis or at lower costs.” 
 
Universities offer several examples of humanitarian IP management. In 
1996, the Wageningen University has transferred a patent (on a molecular 
technology to modify cassava) to the Dutch company Avebe. However, 
the university has ensured that the cassava technology can be used royalty 
free for food security goals and local use, but not for the world trade in 
starch. The Cornell University has transferred its ring-spot-virus-resistant 
papaya to Haiti and Thailand. And the most cited example is Golden Rice. 
The inventors of the technology (University of Freiburg) licensed their 
invention related to golden rice to Greenovation, a biotech spinout 
company, owned by the inventors themselves. Greenovation then 
exclusively licensed its Golden-Rice-related patents to AstraZeneca (now 
Syngenta). However, in the licensing arrangements, a humanitarian-use 
clause was used to commit the inventors to donating their technology to 
the poor. The arrangement allows for the granting of licenses to any bona 
fide research organization for the development of Golden Rice. The rice 
can be used royalty free and allows farmers to earn up to US $10,000 per 
year from its sale. Higher sales would require farmers to acquire a 
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commercial license from Syngenta. Other companies holding Golden-
Rice-related patents also agreed to the same arrangement.100 
 
Multinationals have already shown willingness to segment markets - they 
facilitate access to some of their technologies in poor countries. Examples 
include not only Golden Rice, but also the successful commercialization 
of the transgenic, insect-resistant hybrid eggplant and the transgenic, 
disease-resistant groundnut in India. Both are orphan crops, developed 
with royalty-free licensed technology from Monsanto. In the case of the 
groundnut story, an agreement was penned for non-exclusive licensing of 
the so-called Coat Protein technology. The licenses are free of royalties 
and upfront payments to public institutions planning to develop the 
varietal groundnut, but they include upfront payments and royalties for 
companies planning to develop hybrid groundnut cultivars. 
High transaction costs 
Companies can win greater esteem from the public by accepting 
humanitarian licenses and, in some cases they also appear to use 
humanitarian licenses to open up a new market, for example by including 
specific obligations in the license. Hence humanitarian licenses may also 
be favorable for the donator. However, humanitarian licenses alone will 
probably not provide a solution for the long term, because of the high 
transaction cost involved with the need to arrange so many different 
licenses for an individual project. The market is already responding to this 
problem. Several initiatives aim at supporting technology transfer and 
lowering transaction costs for the creators of poor farmers biotechnology 
products. For example, the International Service for the Acquisition of 
Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) and, more recently, the African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) have both been established 
to provide a broker role between technology users and providers. The 
ISAAA -  financed by companies, foundations and governmental institutes 
-  has brokered several transfers, including the transfer of local varieties of 
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 See http://www.goldenrice.org/ [Accessed March 2008]. 
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potato from Monsanto to Mexico, as well as the transfers of ring-spot 
virus resistant papaya from Monsanto and the delayed-ripening papaya 
from Syngenta - both in Southeast Asia. However, neither the goodwill of 
the multinationals, nor the mediation by such organizations can provide a 
structural solution. These broker organizations do indeed reduce the 
transaction costs for the creators of products aimed at poor farmers, but 
barely reduce the total transactions costs. 
Formats for humanitarian licenses  
Transaction costs may be reduced by services designed to help steer 
clients to information and access to patented technology, some of which 
are for free. For instance, PatentMonkey (www.patentmonkey.com) offers 
free database searching, only charging fees for more extensive services. 
There are several non-profit organizations that specialize in helping 
underserved communities in the developing world. The Coalition for 
Patent Fairness (www.patentfairness.org) is an advocacy group working to 
reform innovation-stifling practices and address patent litigation issues. 
 
Public institutes could lower transaction costs by accepting a format for 
humanitarian licenses that could serve as a standard in all cases. Consortia 
of research institutes could develop a clause in the consortium agreement 
that automatically grants a humanitarian license to all users of a certain 
category in a similar manner as the ‘Golden Rice’ contract. Such a clause 
has been developed by the participants of the Generation Challenge 
Programme, a program of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The partners in this program collectively 
work to use genomic techniques to increase the accessibility of genebank 
collections and to improve crop productivity in drought-prone 
environments (Barry & Louwaars, 2005). 
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Open source biotechnology 
Another solution may be open databanks and pools of biotechnologies 
made freely available for humanitarian use. Databanks could list 
technologies, identify the owners and provide information on the specific 
licensing terms for each listed technology, including type of license, field 
of use and the intended beneficiaries for the use of the technology. One of 
the organizations working on this is the Public-Sector Intellectual Property 
Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA), based in the US. This organization, 
funded by the Rockefeller and McKnight Foundations, identifies and 
develops approaches for encouraging technology managers to adopt 
humanitarian licensing models, and helps its members (through 40 
institutes in the North and the South) access new agricultural technologies 
(Atkinson et al, 2003). PIPRA analyzes the members’ IP policy (on 
request), gives IP management workshops and has recently released the 
“IP Handbook of best cases”. The initiative also involves the development 
of a database to pool the IP assets (patents and licenses) of the 
participants.101 
 
The public plant biotechnology institute CAMBIA based in Australia 
(www.cambia.org) develops technology for its own open technology bank, 
named BIOS. The technology has been patented, but is free under the 
terms of the group’s “Biological Open Source Licence”. Anyone using the 
technology has to contribute the improvements they make to the core 
toolkit – a model similar to the general public license used in open-source 
software. The CAMBIA technology includes a version of the important 
GUS technology, called GUSPLUS, and Transbacter, which bypasses the 
established and heavily patented transformation process for transferring 
genes into plants.102 
 
A second, more recent initiative (in an even newer branch of technology) 
is the open bank of the BioBricks Foundation. The BioBricks Foundation 
is a not-for-profit organization founded by ‘synthetic biologists’ from 
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 See http://www.pipra.org/ [Accessed March 2008]. 
102
 See http://www.cambia.org/ [Accessed March 2008]. 
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MIT, Harvard, and the University of California. This foundation 
encourages the “development and responsible use of technologies based 
on BioBrick™ standard DNA parts that encode basic biological 
functions”. Everyone is invited to use the free DNA sequences, and to 
collaborate in building this bank. To stimulate participation, the 
foundation organizes an annual competition for student teams, called the 
International Genetically Engineered Machine competition (Igem). Each 
university team is obliged to put the DNA parts they have used for the 
Igem competition into the open source.103 
Are the public institutes really confronted with a dilemma? 
Studying these initiatives, a second question may emerge: are the public 
institutes really confronted with a dilemma? The Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AASS) in the United States anticipates that at 
least some types of humanitarian IP strategies will have little or no impact 
on licensing revenues for the technology creator. As Amanda Brewster 
from the AAAS put forward in the IP Handbook, “Whether that will be the 
case may depend on whether humanitarian licensing becomes commonly 
practiced and accepted” (Brewster et al, 2007). The same will probably be 
true for collaborating with open databanks. When biomedical scientists 
Harold Varmus, Patrick Brown and Michael Eisen put forward their idea 
of high quality, free PLoS journals in 2000 many scientists were skeptical, 
but since the start in 2003, an increasing number of leading scientists have 
started to publish in a PLoS journal. Now, a publication in a PLoS journal 
has almost the same impact-factor for a research group as a publication in 
Science or Nature. 
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Figure 1: Conference Program 
 
 
 
Chair: Julian Kinderlerer (TU Delft) 
 
Defining the problem and setting the scene 
 
10:00 – 10:15  Prof. Julian Kinderlerer Welcome (TU Delft) 
10:15 – 10:45 Dr. Henk van den Belt Defining the problem: How has 
intellectual property protection in biotechnology evolved? 
(Wageningen UR) 
10:45 – 11:15 Dr. Marc Ghislain Defining the problem: The case of 
international potato research for development countries 
(International Potato Centre, Peru) 
11:45 – 12:15 Dr. Niels Louwaars Developments in institutional IP 
policy: the case of plant sciences (Centre for Genetic 
Resources; Wageningen International) 
12:15 – 12:45 Dr. Ard Cools Developments in institutional IP policy: 
The case of the Dutch Technology Foundation (Dutch 
Research Council; STW-NWO) 
 
Current practice and pathways to possible solutions 
 
14:00 – 14:30 Prof. Willem Stiekema Current practice: The case of 
CBSG (Centre for Biosystems Genomics) 
14:30 – 15:00 Prof. Steve Hughes Possible solutions: Open-source 
biotechnology (CAMBIA; Egenis centre for Genomics in 
Society) 
15:30 – 16:00 Dr. Kyle Jensen Possible solutions: Public sector 
Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) 
 
 Reflection on the problems and proposed solutions: 
Panel discussion 
 
16:00 – 17:00 Chair: Prof. Michiel Korthals (Applied Philosophy, 
Wageningen UR) 
Panel members: Prof. Martin Kropff (Rector, WUR), Dr. 
Sjefke Allefs (Agrico Research), Geoff Tansey 
(Consultant), Dr. Victoria Henson-Apollonio (CGIAR 
CAS-IP) 
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Report: Increasing access to 
biotechnology results104 
Formulating a general patent policy that satisfies all stakeholders 
will not be easy for Wageningen University and Research Centre 
(WUR) and other public institutes. The different interests at stake 
within the organizations were very clearly apparent at the 
workshop ‘Reconsidering Intellectual Property Policies in Public 
Research’, held on 11 April (2008) in Wageningen. The following 
is a report of the main discussions and findings of the workshop. 
Intellectual property protection is caught in between the need for 
valorization of research outcomes, and the wide availability of these 
outcomes. For example, biotechnologists regard patents as a crucial tool in 
acquiring research contracts. Added to that, they can help safeguard a top 
position in research rankings and may boost income. Using patents as 
‘currency’ – to remain attractive for market parties – is a worldwide trend, 
and it is very difficult not to go along with it, because research funding 
bodies including the Dutch government organizations such as STW and 
NWO currently promote patenting of research results. For instance, those 
funding the Wageningen Centre For BioSystems Genomics (CBSG) have 
set a target of obtaining 25 patents, 20 licenses and 2 spin-offs – all in the 
coming five years.  
 
However, as a public organization, Wageningen University and Research 
Centre has a mission to contribute to agricultural development in poor 
regions, and this goal may be hindered by the fast growing number of 
patents. Rector Martin Kropff formulated the dilemma during the closing 
debate: “The millennium goals are important for us, they are part of our 
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strategy, and technology has to be available for developing countries. But 
we also have to follow the current system of IPR,  for instance because we 
want to generate spin-out companies.” While the rector did not yet have a 
concrete answer, he promised that the existing policy group on Intellectual 
Property Rights at WUR would take into account the outcomes of this 
symposium. 
Liability: bottleneck for the patent holders 
Research institutes devoted to poverty reduction indeed face increasing 
difficulties in obtaining the biotechnology they want, stated Marc 
Ghislain, biotechnology advisor at the potato institute CIP in Mexico. 
“Today”, he concluded in his speech, “the transfer of proprietary 
(bio)technology from the private sector (…) has never been so difficult, 
not to say impossible.” According to Ghislain, public institutes are still 
transferring proprietary technology, but are encountering increasing 
difficulties. He gave the example of potatoes bred at CIP using a parent 
with engineered PLRV resistance (acquired in 1993). This technology 
could not be provided to India due to lack of response from the technology 
holder. A second example concerned a Bt gene construct for insect 
resistance; the company has refused to provide this construct due to 
liability and reputation risks. 
  
In the last decade, it has become more difficult to obtain (humanitarian) 
licenses, and liability of the patent holder is a major cause at present. The 
patent holder cannot fully control what happens with his genes or enabling 
technology, and he fears brand name damage in the case of misuse or bad 
product performance. What makes this worse is that according to the 
Cartagena protocol on Biosafety, the patent holder is likely to be liable for 
financial claims in case of damage caused by transgenic technology.  
 
In addition, the patent-holder may fear that licensing to several institutions 
in the South decreases the patents’ value and jeopardizes negotiations with 
commercial partners. The requesting institutes often have weak 
infrastructure and weak funding, and they lack expertise on Intellectual 
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Property issues which worsens their credibility. Added to that, many 
public institutes devoted to poverty reduction lack a clear definition of the 
end-product(s) that they want to produce, and they may not be able to 
guarantee that only resource-poor farmers will commercialize the 
products. It is therefore clear that institutes devoted to poverty reduction, 
including the CGIAR institutes, will have to elaborate a clear patent and 
R&D policy if they are to increase their credibility in the eyes of the patent 
holders. 
Lowering the transaction costs 
Nevertheless, Ghislain and some other professionals at the workshop 
expected that humanitarian licenses for these poverty-reduction-institutes 
can at least partly solve the dilemma. Victoria Henson-Apollonio, IP 
advisor for the CGIAR institutes, asked why public institutes shouldn’t 
formulate a general policy that guarantees some sort of a humanitarian 
license or freedom to operate for these institutes in all patent negotiations. 
This could be realized with clauses that prevent misuse. For instance, a 
clause such as that used by the Wageningen University in the cassava 
project in 1996: the cassava technology can be used royalty free for food 
security goals and local use, but not for the world trade in starch. 
Similarly, CGIAR’s Generation Challenge Programme uses a consortium 
agreement in which the use of humanitarian licenses has been standardized 
for all projects under the program. The advantage of such arrangements is 
that they lower the transaction costs, which can be a significant hurdle for 
humanitarian licenses. Wageningen UR is party to this consortium.  
 
An alternative approach to lowering the transaction costs for humanitarian 
licenses was presented by Kyle Jensen of PIPRA - the Public sector 
Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture. PIPRA is an IP 
management office, started by the land-grant universities in the USA, 
which facilitates the transfer of technology to developing countries. 
PIPRA aims to pool the currently fragmented intellectual property in the 
public sector and making it easily available through a database. This way, 
any person interested in a specific technology can easily find out whether 
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it is publicly available, and from which institutes. While many participants 
agreed that this initiative is promising, Jensen acknowledged that the 
patent pool has had limited impact so far. PIPRA has therefore extended 
its activities to Intellectual Property research, capacity building and the 
creation of packages of available proprietary technologies that together 
constitute a valuable asset for research in the South (e.g. transformable 
vectors). 
 
Geoff Tansey was, however, critical towards the capacity building 
program within PIPRA. He questioned the role of intellectual property 
protection in developing countries more fundamentally. The Intellectual 
Property system has been developed from a Western perspective, with 
rules that suit Western countries. By accepting this international patent 
system (signing the TRIPS agreement), developing countries no longer 
have the chance to copy technologies, which was crucial for developed 
countries in the past. Therefore, according to Tansey, capacity building 
can also be regarded as a way of promoting acceptance of this Western 
system.  
Open source for fundamental research  
The social scientists presented many arguments in favour of patent pools 
and open source strategies, such as that of PIPRA and CAMBIA in 
Australia. Henk van den Belt from the Applied Philosophy Group at WUR 
reminded the audience that we should not necessarily take for granted the 
science ethos behind the current patenting strategy. In 1942, Robert 
Merton defined the “ethos of science” then as “communism, universalism, 
disinterestedness and organized scepticism” – totally different from the 
current ethos, in which biotechnologists are stimulated to file patents for 
commercial reasons.  
 
Van den Belt and other social scientists also suggested economic reasons 
for adopting open source strategies: the proliferation of patents upstream 
(genes, DNA fragments, research tools) hinders innovations downstream 
(e.g. drugs, transgenic crops). Besides, the transaction costs to obtain 
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freedom to operate are very high, the patents are only profitable for the 
biggest potential ‘blockbusters’, and they cause market under-investment 
in public goods.  
 
Steve Hughes, a social scientist from Exeter University, pointed out how 
disappointingly low the revenues are that American universities receive 
from their patenting strategy: only 0.56 % of their total revenues come 
from licensing and royalties. He suggested that patenting no longer fits the 
current ‘network’ character of genomics research. A highly interconnected 
network of dozens of research groups will be more productive if there are 
many soft ties rather than hard property rights. The patenting system does 
not mesh with the latest ideas about innovation either. In the new 
innovation strategies, all stakeholders (institutional, professional and 
individual, including farmers) ‘co-generate’ knowledge and innovation. In 
such a learning and interactive network, patents can be very unproductive.  
 
Some professionals at the meeting therefore proposed putting all research 
financed by public money in an open source domain. However, most 
participants were not convinced about the advantages of such a general 
policy. Farmers – also poor farmers – can benefit from patented 
technology, for instance, because patents can stimulate local business to 
bring those technologies to the market. This is why the potato institute CIP 
in Peru – financed with public money – applies for Intellectual Property in 
some cases. For innovation, it will be more important to put the results of 
fundamental research in an open source domain than the products and the 
results of more applied technologies, according to some participants. 
Access to non-patented technology 
Kyle Jensen already noted that simply having a patent pool is not 
sufficient for transferring technology, and therefore, PIPRA is getting 
more involved in outreach activities such as capacity building. Victoria 
Henson Apollonio suggested to include also non-patented technologies in 
the technology pools that PIPRA offers. “The patented part of the 
knowledge is relatively easy to find”, she said. “But all other knowledge, 
Six Plants, Genes and Justice 
164 
 
and especially the knowledge that is important for low-tech solutions, is 
often not available.” 
 
The access problem not only concerns the untraceable low-tech solutions, 
but also the fact that scientific articles are often either untraceable or too 
expensive to read (because they are published in expensive journals). 
Considering that, so far, most knowledge developed within public research 
institutions have not been patented, the lack of access must have other 
causes than the patent policies alone. The rectors of the Dutch universities 
have recognized this broader access problem, said Martin Kropff, and they 
will evaluate this point in the coming months.  
 
A final point is that access to technology, material and knowledge – 
patented or free – is often not enough for innovation to take place in poor 
regions. For instance, breeders are free to use planting material protected 
with (only) plant breeders rights. However, breeders in developing 
countries seldom use this material for further breeding. Institutes in the 
South also need opportunities, funding and expertise to be able to use 
open-access knowledge and technology. This means that public institutes 
have to do more than just adapt the current Intellectual Property Policy: 
they need to teach PhD students from the South, collaborate in innovation 
projects and participate in other ways in capacity building in the South. 
Therefore, they must continue to invest money in North-South research, 
some professionals remarked. 
Epilogue  
In 2007, the European Patent Office (EPO) published a report, called 
“Scenarios for the future”. This report questions the validity of the current 
patent system for biological products, and illustrates the unclear impact of 
patents in innovation. It also acknowledges the significant differences 
between innovation in biological materials and industrial products, and 
opens the door to a differentiated understanding on how a system for 
intellectual property protection can serve best innovation (EPO, 2007). 
Because the report comes from EPO, the statement can have important 
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consequences for the legal and policy environment in which public 
research institutes such as Wageningen University and Research Centre 
(WUR) have to operate, and therefore for the problems that have been 
discussed in this workshop. The issues discussed show that public research 
institutions in the North should carefully reflect on the role of public 
funded research and the institutional settings in which such research takes 
place. Initiatives such as PIPRA and CAMBIA may provide some 
guidance in this process. In addition, requirements set by research funding 
organizations concerning valorization of research need to be reassessed. 
 
The workshop has emphasized the complexity of the IP debate and the 
various approaches that can be taken to increase the ‘freedom to operate’ 
for researchers in developing countries. Overall, the conference has made 
clear that the patent discussion needs to be placed in a wider context. 
Liability issues, weak infrastructure and a lack of control over production 
processes at most public research institutes in the South seriously weaken 
their credibility in the eyes of patent holders willing to provide 
technologies via humanitarian licenses. High transaction costs and the 
difficulty of finding useful technologies – both patented and non-patented 
- further complicate the access to technology. As such, it became clear that 
access to intellectual property is only a precondition for a wider strategy in 
which capacity building and institutional partnership can truly contribute 
to the development in the ‘South’. 
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Valorizing science: Whose 
values?105 
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Valorizing science: Whose 
values? 
Valorization — essentially, the creation of economic value — has become 
a new maxim of modern research, in particular for areas with a strong link 
to technological development. This trend is a result of the growing 
influence of the market economy in public policy, which has asserted that 
public investments into science should generate returns that benefit the 
economy. Indeed, research managers are evaluated increasingly on the 
basis of various economic outputs — similar to the bonus-driven contracts 
of financial managers — which can include the number and value of 
patents and license contracts, the number and value of research contracts, 
and the number of publications. This growing emphasis on valorization 
goes hand-in-hand with the concept of ‘the enterprising university’ 
(Williams, 2003). 
 
The growing emphasis on intellectual property (IP) rights as crucial 
elements in the valorization trend, their exploitation, and the inevitable 
secrecy that is required to protect them, clash with the traditional scientific 
values of openness, transparency and the sharing of knowledge. Moreover, 
too strong a focus on exploiting the economic benefits of research 
impinges on potential societal benefits, particularly those that would 
improve conditions for poorer communities or developing countries. This 
discussion, about the use of knowledge generated by public research, is 
one of the tensions between science and society, and is an important target 
for convergence work to reconcile different views. However, as our 
experience has shown, there are major challenges to convergence, notably 
when stakeholders might not easily agree on the problem to be resolved. 
 
The trend towards valorization remains strong. Consider, for example, the 
Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI), which was established in 2002 by 
the Dutch Government “to get the best from genomics” and “to ensure that 
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society and economy benefit from the breakthroughs enabled by 
genomics”.106 NGI sets ambitious goals for its research projects, which are 
funded by the government to the value of €280 million. In addition, NGI 
expects to receive around €220 million in investments from industry, 
academia and research institutes between 2008 to 2012. The research 
program has set itself a task of producing 370 invention disclosures, 185 
patent applications, 150 licenses, €45 million in investments from private 
parties and 16 spin-offs.107 
 
In a similar manner, Wageningen University and Research Centre 
(Wageningen UR, the Netherlands) — comprised of Wageningen 
University, Van Hall Larenstein University of Professional Education and 
several research institutes — considers itself to be an enterprising 
university promoting “science for impact” (Kropff & Kalwij, 2008), and 
generating “value from knowledge” (Wageningen UR, 2008). To this end, 
Wageningen UR established the Wageningen Business Generator (WBG) 
with the intention to “identify promising opportunities and turn them into 
thriving businesses”.108 
 
Such strategies bring science closer to society, and respond to the view 
that scientific endeavor can no longer be separated from society because 
science and society affect each other in many ways (MacKenzie & 
Wajcman, 1985; McGinn, 1991). The trend towards economic valorization 
can be seen as an extra dimension in this continuing integration of science 
and society. The primary idea behind it is that the private sector is more 
closely linked to society and its needs, and is therefore better suited to 
making science work for society by creating new products, services and 
applications. 
 
But, is this focus on economic indicators and progress the optimal policy 
for science to contribute to society? Moreover, is it good for the 
advancement of science itself? Bart Penders and co-authors (Penders et al, 
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2009) have argued in this Science & Society Series that the profound 
changes that have taken place in the research environment since the 1960s 
“raise the relevant question of how to shape the interaction between 
science and society”. The trend towards valorization feeds into this 
interaction and must be subject to its reflection. 
 
The focus of funding agencies and public research institutes on economic 
benefits is the result of policies that began in the 1980s. In particular, both 
President Ronald Reagan’s administration in the USA and Margaret 
Thatcher’s government in the UK markedly reduced public expenditure 
and increased the influence of the private sector in all areas of society, 
including research. The protection of IP seemed crucial both for creating 
effective linkages with the private sector and for universities to generate 
income from research. 
 
The Bayh–Dole Act in the USA, which was adopted in 1980 and allows 
universities and research institutes to economically exploit their IP , is 
generally considered to mark the beginning of the valorization of publicly 
funded research; it “overturned the presumption that publicly funded 
research could not be privately owned or exploited” (Hope, 2008). It even 
managed to replace — or, at least, to weaken — the basic maxim of the 
manner in which science has advanced historically. According to the 
philosopher Karl Popper (1902–1994), the advancement of science is 
based on conjecture and refutation: new insights and theories are 
considered to be valid for as long as they have not been proven wrong. 
However, this approach only works in an ‘open society’ with guaranteed 
access to information and research tools that allow others to attempt to 
confirm or refute scientific findings (Popper, 1969). The increasing focus 
on valorization through patents and licenses therefore puts constraints on 
the open access to, and use of, information, thus jeopardizing Popper’s 
views of scientific advance. In particular, a US Federal Court decision in 
2002 has since restricted the ‘research exemption’, which had previously 
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allowed public research with no direct commercial goal to circumvent 
intellectual property rights.109 
 
Moreover, the growing protection of the raw materials of science — 
knowledge, tools and genetic material — raises the danger that research 
and development might fall into an ‘anticommons trap’. This term refers 
to the “tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998), in which 
too many entities have exclusive rights to a given resource, with the effect 
that this resource becomes underused. Exclusive rights in the form of 
patents can hinder innovation, as innovators might find it too costly or 
even impossible to use the knowledge or research material that they need 
— a situation that would not serve the needs of either science or society. A 
related cause for concern is ongoing company mergers, which are driven, 
in part, by IP portfolio strategies. Mergers reduce the number of players in 
the market and discourage newcomers, and the concentration of power in 
only a few hands makes it more difficult to acquire licenses on IP 
protected technologies (Kloppenburg, 2004). 
 
Conversely, it can be argued that ‘open science’ cannot serve the strategic 
needs of modern societies. In this context, the NGI can again act as an 
example. The NGI is funded by the Dutch Government, which decided to 
invest the revenue it receives from the exploitation of natural gas reserves 
in the ‘knowledge economy’. Under the traditional research model, 
published knowledge is not bound by national borders or any other 
borders. However, a government that makes investments to secure and 
increase the prosperity of a nation will favor strategies that predominantly 
benefit its economy and other players within its borders. As investments in 
genomics and other biotechnologies are very cost-intensive, the focus on 
IP protection and the involvement of the private sector is therefore a 
rational strategy. 
 
So, should society be bothered about losing some of its academic freedom 
when, in return, it obtains significant funding for a research environment 
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that is specifically focused on supporting its economic goals? A major 
argument against such a deal is the fact that not all of society’s goals and 
objectives are economic. In the context of the current valorization trend, 
we might well wonder whether we are exchanging the traditional ivory 
tower built on the pretence of ‘pure’ science for a fortress constructed on 
the foundations of market philosophy. 
 
The traditional role of scientists — as researchers who work to advance 
science in order to serve the public good — is still very much alive. At a 
local and national level, this role might indeed coincide with a country’s 
economic goals, but the same might not be true at a global level, where 
‘science valorization’ has a different connotation. Globally, values do not 
simply relate to national economic competitiveness but instead to global 
societal objectives, notably the reduction of poverty, hunger and child 
mortality. The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been 
established to address these challenges and science is expected to have a 
crucial role in achieving the goals (Juma et al, 2005).110 Nations, as well as 
organizations, have subscribed to the MDGs, and universities have 
committed to contribute their knowledge, research capacity and 
technology through education, collaborative research and technology 
transfer. How then, can the economic valorization and public–private 
partnerships relate to supporting the MDGs and the poor? 
 
IP, in fact, has a crucial role in this regard. The main goal of patents is to 
promote investments in innovation by giving the innovator a time-limited 
exclusive right to commercially exploit their invention. Second, patents 
aim to promote technology transfer because the value of IP tends to 
increase with wider commercial use of the invention. The questions, then, 
are how efficient are IP rights in promoting innovation for the poor, who 
do not constitute an effective market; and to what extent do they drive up 
the transaction costs or even block technology transfer, especially for 
commercially less interesting applications? 
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Molecular biology, for example, has both enormous economic and societal 
potential. It can be used, for instance, to develop crops suited to the needs 
of farmers in developing countries or to produce medicines and vaccines 
to tackle diseases that predominantly affect the poor. However, the 
products of molecular biology, genomics or biotechnology have so far 
hardly benefited poorer countries and their citizens because the technology 
is primarily used to develop products that are either too expensive or 
targeted to the particular needs of wealthy populations (Fresco, 2003b; 
Singer & Daar, 2001). Supporting one societal goal might therefore be to 
the detriment of another societal objective. Market mechanisms might not 
work well for non-commercial objectives, but universities are expected to 
serve both at the same time. This dilemma was formulated by the Dutch 
minister for Development Cooperation who urged “Dutch universities and 
research institutes to adopt institutional IP policies that take account not 
only of valorisation of knowledge and incentives for researchers, but also 
the importance of access to knowledge and freedom to operate for 
development purposes” (Koenders, 2008). 
 
In response to this call, a conference was organized at Wageningen UR in 
2008 under the title “Reconsidering intellectual property policies in public 
research — sharing the benefits of biotechnology with developing 
countries” (Heselmans et al, 2008a). The meeting was co-organized by the 
Centre for Society and Genomics (CSG, the Netherlands), which is funded 
by the NGI to provide “insight into the relationship between society and 
genomics, while at the same time stimulating the dialogue between all 
stakeholders involved”.111 The conference brought together participants 
from fields as diverse as plant sciences, development studies, research and 
intellectual property management, the private seed industry and civil 
society. As such, it was an example of the ‘convergence work’ that the 
CSG and its researchers try to practice. As Peter Stegmaier wrote in the 
introduction to this Series, convergence work is “the joining of research 
with dialogue, analysis with advice, different academic disciplines with 
one another and with non-academic practices, and communication with 
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critique, in order to realize and balance the interests of various 
stakeholders” (Stegmaier, 2009). 
 
The conference took up this challenge by bringing together presentations 
from a broad range of perspectives on the topic: the changing trends of 
intellectual property management at Wageningen UR; the perspective of 
public funding organizations on the valorization of research outputs; the 
limited freedom to operate as experienced by researchers in developing 
countries; current practices of IP management in public–private 
partnerships; and potential strategies to increase the freedom to operate for 
‘research and development’. Many issues and perspectives came to the 
fore. 
 
On the one hand, various attendants pointed out the ‘incentives’ that push 
universities towards economic valorization. First, funding bodies 
implement the valorization policies through inclusion of economic 
parameters in their contracts. Universities are eager to participate in large 
programs such as the NGI for both academic and financial reasons; the 
sheer size of the program allows them to develop and use research 
capacity in terms of equipment and human resources that other funding 
mechanisms would be unable to finance. By participating in the NGI , 
however, universities have to comply with the economic indicators. 
Second, universities also invest in economic valorization for their own 
purposes. For example, they apply not only for patents to generate 
additional income, but also to strengthen their position in public–private 
partnerships. Third, there is a herd mentality: everybody seems to invest in 
IP these days, so public research organizations do the same in order to 
maintain their position at the frontier of science and to maximize their 
freedom to operate. As Marc Ghislain from the International Potato Centre 
(CIP, Peru) pointed out, the result is that “[t]he transfer of proprietary 
biotechnology from the private sector […] has never been so difficult, not 
to say impossible, […] the public sector is still transferring proprietary 
technology but with increasing difficulties and restrictions.” 
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However, defining the problem and then discussing pathways to possible 
solutions, as the conference program stated, turned out to be a bigger 
problem than we had envisaged. It became clear that for many 
participants, the whole topic and most of the problems were new. Some 
questioned the whole idea that IP rights might obstruct research for 
development; as patents are only temporary rights, eventually everybody 
can benefit from the innovation. Others could see possible downsides of 
the current patent system with respect to blocking the freedom to operate 
for development purposes, but did not consider these relevant for their 
particular research area in which ‘soft’ IP rights, such as plant breeder’s 
rights, are used. In addition, many other issues that could complicate the 
transfer of knowledge and technologies to developing countries were 
brought to the table, such as liability issues, especially in the case of 
genetically modified organisms; lack of necessary infrastructure and 
capacity in poor countries; or even the difficulty of accessing scientific 
information published in expensive journals. 
 
Convergence work focuses on problems that transgress scientific and 
social disciplines. In order to come to workable solutions for such 
problems, it is necessary to involve different stakeholders and disciplines. 
However, before these people can work together, they first have to agree 
on what is the exact problem. What one group considers to be a problem 
might be business as usual for another, even within the same institute. 
Valorization officers, for example, who are evaluated solely on the 
number of patents and revenues earned, are likely to have a different 
perspective on IP rights than researchers who focus on the MDGs or 
scientists in more fundamental areas of research, who are concerned 
primarily about their freedom to operate. Moreover, the actions of one 
group might cause problems for another. 
 
It is a paradox that interdisciplinary problem solving cannot begin before 
there is a general agreement that there might be a problem at all, and that 
parties see no point in getting together in the first place in the absence of 
such an agreement. Indeed, simply by stating our perception of the 
problem, we made some of the invited stakeholders appear embarrassed or 
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attacked, and they distanced themselves from the conference. 
Convergence work, when it is really needed, is extremely sensitive and 
value-laden. 
 
The next challenge is to keep the debate going. The fact that stakeholders 
from various areas have different interests and may even speak separate 
languages makes it hard to engage and continue a productive debate. 
Convergence takes time, and requires effort and flexibility from all the 
stakeholders involved. People who feel that the status quo is not a problem 
for them, or people who feel that their attitudes and interests are being 
challenged will not be too eager to invest time and resources, and are 
likely to leave the debate. Indeed, the debate that began in Wageningen 
soon lost momentum and the WBG, which was proposed by the University 
management to address the dilemmas, was disbanded soon after the 
conference, which made it particularly difficult to continue the debate. 
However, almost one year after the conference, some research projects on 
the roles of IP in reaching the MDGs, including the importance of 
university policies are now taking off. In this regard, the links established 
during the conference with the ‘open source’ and ‘patent pool’ 
mechanisms of CAMBIA and PIPRA will be further examined.112 
 
Valorization of research by universities is an issue that requires the 
convergence of a wide variety of views. Without clear and workable 
mechanisms to merge the commercial interests of universities and their 
private partners with the societal goals of reducing poverty, universities 
are caught between a rock and a hard place. This issue includes a wide 
range of normative choices and attitudes. It is crucial to defining the role 
of public institutions, the priorities of managers at different levels within 
these institutions, and to the role of individual researchers and of their 
research in society. If universities and governmental funding agencies 
want to remain public organizations, they need to expand their definition 
of valorization to include various societal values, not just economic ones. 
This will allow them to balance opposing goals and to translate these into 
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strategies that take a clear position on their relationship with the 
commercial sector. But, doing so will require continued input and dialogue 
between the various stakeholders, as well as a proper reflection on the 
broader definition of valorization in order to develop mechanisms that are 
able to match differing goals in patenting and licensing strategies. 
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Towards Justice in Benefit-
Sharing 
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Introduction 
Five articles and two documents related to an international conference 
have been presented as the major results of this research project on 
benefit-sharing in the field of plant genetic resources. Every chapter 
includes its own conclusions, which will not be reproduced in similar 
detail in this final chapter. Rather, the main goal here is to bring together 
the major findings and to consider the general conclusions that can be 
derived from this collation. This will be done by returning to the research 
questions originally posed in the introduction of this thesis. These were: 
1) When did the concept of benefit-sharing originate and for what 
purpose was it developed? 
2) What are the major difficulties (practical, as well as ethical) that 
complicate the current negotiations on and implementation of 
benefit-sharing policies? 
3) What normative positions and objectives are incorporated in the 
a. international legislation on benefit-sharing? 
b. benefit-sharing policies of international, national and local 
organizations? 
c. stakeholders’ perceptions of benefit-sharing? 
4) What is the relation between benefit-sharing and intellectual 
property rights: do they support or impede each other? 
5) What is fair and equitable benefit-sharing and how might it best be 
realized? 
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The origin and development of 
benefit-sharing in international 
law 
The first research question that we posed, regarding the beginnings of the 
concept of benefit-sharing, is dealt with in Chapter 2. Originally, we 
discover, benefit-sharing was linked to the notion of a common heritage of 
humankind. The earliest international treaties that refer to benefit-sharing 
do so in respect of the equitable distribution of the benefits derived from 
resources discovered on the moon and the deep seabed (UN, 1979; UN, 
1982). These resources were considered not to be the property of any 
State, organization or individual, and their exploitation was to be carried 
out so as to benefit humankind as a whole. Benefit-sharing, therefore, 
started out as an idea about common goods to which everyone should have 
equitable access. The sharing of benefits refers here to a logic of 
distribution, insofar as the benefits of a common good should be equitably 
distributed.  
 
It was not, however, until the introduction of benefit-sharing in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992 that the concept 
became well-known and operative at both international and national 
levels. Here, benefit-sharing relates to biological resources, which 
previously had also been generally considered a common heritage of 
humankind. The CBD emphasizes, however, that “States have sovereign 
rights over their own biological resources” (UNEP, 1992, Preamble). It 
declares, furthermore, that access to genetic resources should be subject to 
“sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and 
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other 
utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such 
resources.” (Article 15.7). 
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Sovereign ownership versus common heritage 
Through the CBD, States can regulate access to their resources and 
negotiate the accompanying benefit-sharing conditions. Benefit-sharing is 
thus considered a compensation mechanism between the providers and the 
users of plant genetic resources. Notably, this new understanding of 
benefit-sharing was a reaction against the common heritage idea to which 
it was formerly linked. In the years preceding the conclusion of the CBD, 
poor but gene-rich developing countries had become increasingly 
dissatisfied with the free and uncompensated use of their biological 
diversity. With the rise of the new biotechnology industry and 
accompanying intellectual property regulations in industrialized countries, 
genetic resources became more and more valuable but their benefits 
accrued largely in the gene-poor, developed countries. The Access and 
Benefit-Sharing (ABS) framework of the CBD opposes this imbalance as 
an iniquity, by regulating for a part of the benefits that users derive from 
genetic resources to flow back to the original providers.  
 
The CBD itself is primarily aimed at the conservation and sustainable 
development of the world’s biodiversity. The benefit-sharing component 
is generally considered instrumental to these broader objectives as it 
creates incentives for developing countries to conserve their biodiversity 
(the promise of benefit-sharing), and at the same time assists these 
countries getting access to the means for conservation (the content of 
benefit-sharing). Thus, in theory, the CBD creates a win-win situation. 
Indeed, it is often described as a ‘grand bargain’ between the rich and poor 
parts (or parties) of the world: the fast growing bio-industries in the 
financially rich but gene-poor developed countries would benefit from 
access to the genetic resources of the financially poor but biodiversity-rich 
developing countries, which in turn could benefit from a share in the 
benefits (information, technologies, profits) accrued from these industries. 
And all promoting, ideally, the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity. 
 
In this respect, the affirmation of the CBD that plant genetic resources fall 
under the sovereign rights of States seems well chosen. One argument 
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supporting this approach is that were the resources still to be considered 
part of the common heritage of humankind, it would be logically 
impossible to demand compensation for access. On the contrary, it might 
well be argued that if resources are commonly owned then “Who gets to 
use them should not depend on accidents of space and time” (Risse, 2005, 
p. 17). This involves the idea that countries which happen to be rich in 
certain resources ought to no more than grant, facilitate and regulate 
access to them by those that do not. 
 
Another argument for sovereign rights over plant genetic resources is that 
it may prevent a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), in which 
private gains ultimately become a universal loss. If everybody has equal 
access to a common, but limited resource, and countries and individuals 
acting primarily in their self-interest are motivated to maximize use of the 
free resource, even to the point that it is exhausted, then the resource will 
be lost, even though this will not actually be in anybody’s long-term 
interest. Such a scenario is, of course, particularly pertinent in respect of 
genetic resources given the increasingly vulnerable state of the world’s 
ecosystems housing its biodiversity – the pressing need to conserve which 
being, after all, the reason why the CBD was developed in the first place. 
 
But is this classification of plant genetic resources really well chosen? 
Certainly, the on sovereign rights based bilateral exchange model of ABS 
had a serious drawback which soon became apparent as, shortly after the 
signing of the CBD in 1992, a rapid decline was observed in the 
international transfer of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, 
and the number of new collections. The main reason for this was that 
many countries prioritized the protection of their plant genetic resources 
against misuse, which created all kinds of barriers for exchange and 
increased transaction costs. Furthermore, the immature status of the new 
ABS regulations in combination with the growing number of allegations 
of biopiracy scared away many potential users and collectors. This is 
widely considered detrimental to agriculture and food security because 
crop improvement has always depended significantly on extensive flows 
of genetic material around the world. 
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Another difficulty with the sovereign rights model of the CBD is that 
biological diversity and plant genetic resources do not fit a national 
ownership model very well. Living organisms such as plants grow and 
multiply in large numbers and their seeds can travel across vast distances. 
Their valuable content lies especially in their DNA, which can be found in 
any part of every specimen. Furthermore, this DNA can be translated into 
information (i.e. the genetic sequence) which can in turn be disseminated 
through the internet – and then utilized even without the user ever having 
access to the plant itself. These non-rival and non-excludable 
characteristics (Chapter 2 & 4) mean that plant genetic resources cannot 
be appropriated and traded by a country in the same way as can other 
natural resources, such as oil or timber. 
 
But doesn’t this difficulty merely restate what was an important 
motivation behind the ABS framework in the CBD in the first place? It is 
precisely because plant genetic resources were originally considered a 
common heritage of humankind, and still have many characteristics (of a 
public good) that suit this conception, that the current model of benefit-
sharing as a compensation mechanism was established. Indeed, the ABS 
system does only attempt to assure that countries receive some 
compensation for the use of their plant genetic resources because the 
resources can otherwise so easily be – and were being – exploited ‘for 
free’ (especially by those with strong technical capacities). 
Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
In light of the harmful effects of the CBD on the agricultural sector, the 
Conference of the Parties of the CBD invited the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to develop an alternative system for plant 
genetic resources related to food and agriculture. This resulted in the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGR). Originally, the FAO had declared that “plant genetic resources 
are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without 
restriction” (FAO, 1983), a position that could no longer be maintained 
Plants, Genes and Justice Eight 
 
185 
 
after the introduction of the CBD. Instead, the ITPGR installed a 
Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing (FAO, 2001, Part IV) 
which included a list of major crops and forages freely accessible under a 
standard material transfer agreement, thus avoiding the need for bilateral 
negotiations. Through this system, the international transfer of the 
included resources has increased again, now amounting to over 440,000 
accessions in one year (IISD, 2009a). 
 
The recovery of resource transfers might be regarded a sign of the treaty’s 
success, but not everybody agrees. Many developing countries are 
concerned about the benefit-sharing component of the ITPGR, which has 
received rather less attention to date. Most developed countries, mainly 
supported by the seed industry, emphasize that access to the resources 
“constitutes itself a major benefit of the Multilateral System” (FAO, 2001, 
Article 13). In Chapter 5 mention was made of the acknowledgement by 
Mrs. Rosell of the Peruvian ABS agency (CONAM) that everybody has 
benefited from the former tradition of free exchange of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture. Tellingly, however, she also concluded 
that “some have benefited more” and now “we want some compensation 
for the contributions of Peru” (personal communication, 2007). This 
indicates that the treaty may well be unsustainable without an operational 
benefit-sharing mechanism, as many developing countries will pull out if 
access is not fairly balanced with benefit-sharing.113 
 
It was only after my field studies in Peru and Kenya that I fully realised 
how essential this demand for compensation in the current ABS debates 
actually is. Whereas in the first article (Chapter 2), which is based on 
policy documents and literature studies alone, no distinction is made 
between the focus on compensation and the bilateral exchange model of 
ABS in the CBD, in my later work, I have come to the conclusion that 
what is really problematic about the current framework of ABS in the 
CBD is not the underlying idea of compensation per se, but the way in 
                                                 
113
 This was a central point of discussion during the Third session of the Governing Body 
of the ITPGR. Ultimately, it was decided that US$116 million should be put into the 
ITPGR benefit-sharing fund for the period July 2009 to December 2014 (IISD, 2009b). 
Eight Plants, Genes and Justice 
186 
 
which it is organized – i.e. the bilateral exchange model. Several reasons 
for this are discussed in the course of this thesis, which brings us to the 
second research question, that of the major (practical and ethical) 
difficulties which complicate the current negotiations on and 
implementations of benefit-sharing policies. 
Difficulties complicating ABS 
negotiations and 
implementations 
One major problem is the difficulty, or impossibility, for (developing) 
countries to secure a fair exchange of their plant genetic resources. Firstly 
there are the aforementioned characteristics of these resources, which 
prevent countries from monitoring and controlling all their movements. 
Furthermore, the CBD conditions relate only to the cross-border 
movement of resources after the treaty came into force. This means that 
countries may have no legal basis on which to demand compensation for 
the use of their resources by foreign companies and institutes, as much of 
their plant wealth has long since left its native territory and is now to be 
found dispersed in botanical gardens and gene banks around the world. 
This, together with the lack of user-measures in almost all countries, has 
resulted in the current state of affairs where users who do not know or do 
not disclose the source or origin of the resources they utilize, do not have 
to comply with any benefit-sharing provision. 
 
Other difficulties relate to the likely case that a particular genetic resource 
is shared among multiple countries. The questions then are how to decide 
who gets what share of the benefits – i.e. which is the country of origin, 
or, how to prevent a race to the bottom as the party interested in the 
resource tries to negotiate the cheapest ABS agreement possible. In 
addition, there has never existed a substantial market for these resources, 
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which compounds the difficulties inherent in determining values for 
resources and measuring relative contributions. Yet another, and related, 
problem is that many developing countries lack the informational, legal 
and financial negotiation capacities enjoyed by their counterparts in the 
developed world (national governments in the international negotiations 
and (multinational) companies in individual ABS agreements). 
Traditional knowledge 
And this is only half of the story. Thus far, we have merely looked at the 
main ABS issues at the level of countries and with respect to plant genetic 
resources. In both the CBD and ITPGR, benefit-sharing is also directed to 
farming and indigenous communities, and traditional knowledge. With 
respect to traditional knowledge, the CBD states that each country, subject 
to its national legislation, shall “promote their wider application with the 
approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations 
and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices” 
(UNEP, 1992, Article 8j). The ITPGR recognizes the “enormous 
contribution that the local and indigenous communities and farmers of all 
regions of the world” have made for conservation and food security, which 
forms the basis for Farmers’ Rights (FAO, 2001, Article 9). National 
governments are encouraged to promote these rights, which include the 
“protection of traditional knowledge” and the “right to equitably 
participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture” (idem).114 
 
Many of the difficulties experienced by (developing) countries in their 
desires and attempts to protect and secure benefit-sharing for their plant 
genetic resources are experienced also by traditional communities in 
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 The other components are the “right to participate in making decisions, at the national 
level, on matters related to the conservation and sustainable use” of plant genetic 
resources”, and the “rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved 
seed/propagating material, subject to national law and as appropriate” (Article 9). 
Eight Plants, Genes and Justice 
188 
 
relation to their traditional knowledge. In contrast to the knowledge that is 
developed by companies, universities and research centers, traditional 
knowledge often does not fit the requirements for intellectual property (IP) 
protection, which means both that it cannot be protected in the 
marketplace and compensation for its use cannot be demanded. The main 
reason for this is that traditional knowledge is often openly and 
collectively developed in a communal environment, a socio-economic 
setting and cultural milieu which is very different from the competitive 
and industrial context of ‘formal’ knowledge development and the 
corresponding IP protection standards. In addition, most other problems 
described above apply equally to traditional knowledge and communities. 
For example, the difficulty of deciding and quantifying who gets what 
share of the benefits if the knowledge is shared among different 
communities, and the lack of the legal and financial capacities necessary 
in order to negotiate a fair ABS agreement or challenge in court a foreign 
patent that free-rides upon their knowledge. 
Different interests 
The parallels between developing countries and traditional communities 
do not mean, however, that they are fighting the same fight. On the 
contrary, Chapters 3 to 5 discussed the positions of traditional 
communities and showed that some of them consider their national 
government as much a foreign party against whom they have to protect 
their resources as any other. For that reason, and because of the material 
realities also of their often marginalized social and political position, the 
ABS demands of such communities are often critical of those of their 
national governments. This becomes evident, for example, in the repeated 
statements of indigenous peoples’ organizations that protest against the 
strict division in the CBD between traditional knowledge (which belongs 
to the communities), and plant genetic resources (which fall under 
patrimony of the State).115 One such statement, for example, proclaims 
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 And traditional knowledge, it should be noted, is even then still “subject to national 
legislation” (Article 8j). 
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that “our rights include rights over genetic resources, both those that are 
associated with our Indigenous knowledge, and more broadly to all 
genetic resources that originate in our territories, lands and waters whether 
or not associated directly with Indigenous knowledge” (UN PFII, 2007, p. 
8). 
 
Obviously, ABS is just another forum where many indigenous people 
have to fight for their rights.116 This brings not only socio-political issues 
to the ABS negotiation table, but also many cultural aspects that need to 
be taken into account. Many traditional communities have a completely 
different understanding of such basic notions as ‘sharing’ and ‘protecting’, 
and of the plants and knowledge that are its subject matter. For this reason, 
it is feared that while aiming to support traditional communities, the 
national and international ABS regulations tend in reality to lure them into 
adopting foreign standards and beliefs, or just simply impose these upon 
them. What is at stake for many indigenous peoples’ organizations is the 
cultural identity of their communities and their traditional ways of life. 
This is what they want to be protected. In the context of ABS, this means 
that these communities and organizations want to at least contribute to 
setting the agenda, to be able to make their own demands for national and 
international ABS policies according to their own worldviews and 
customary laws. 
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 See in this respect the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html [Accessed 15 July, 2009]). The 
international ABS negotiations are also considered by some indigenous peoples’ 
organizations as a positive opportunity to bring these matters to the attention of the 
international community and open national debates. 
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A diversity of normative 
positions and objectives of 
benefit-sharing  
Clearly there are many different understandings of what benefit-sharing is 
or should be about. This refers to the third question that we formulated in 
the beginning of this research project, regarding the normative positions 
and objectives that are to be incorporated in international legislation on 
benefit-sharing, the benefit-sharing policies of international, national and 
local organizations, and stakeholders perceptions of benefit-sharing. This 
issue has primarily been considered in Chapter 3, in which seven different 
approaches to benefit-sharing that can be extracted from the current 
debates on this issue are distinguished (including, indeed, international 
legislation, organizational policies and stakeholder perspectives), 
presented here as Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary of the different approaches to benefit-sharing 
 
Basic Motivation Mechanism Intended Outcome 
1 
The South-North 
imbalance in 
resource allocation 
and exploitation 
National 
sovereignty over 
plant genetic 
resources 
Equity in 
international 
economic relations 
2 
The need to 
conserve 
biodiversity 
Benefits to support 
conservation efforts 
Conservation and 
sustainable use of 
PGR 
3 
Biopiracy and the 
imbalance in 
intellectual property 
rights 
Countervailing 
rights systems and 
user measures 
Equity in legal 
rights over PGR and 
related knowledge 
4 
A shared interest in 
food security 
Facilitated access 
and exchange of 
PGRFA 
Food security and 
sustainable 
agriculture 
5 
Imbalance between 
IP protection and 
the public interest 
Stimulating 
technology transfer 
and knowledge 
sharing 
Equity in 
distributing the 
benefits of research 
and development 
6 
Protecting the 
cultural identity of 
traditional 
communities 
Recognition for 
customary laws in 
ABS regimes 
Preserving and 
restoring traditional 
communities and 
their cultures 
7 
Protecting the 
interests of the 
biotechnology 
industry 
Liberal access, 
strong IP, and 
simple benefit-
sharing regulations 
Healthy industry for 
the benefit of all 
 
Five of these approaches to benefit-sharing (number 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6) have 
already been discussed, and the differences between them comprise an 
essential part of the difficulties frustrating the current negotiations on and 
implementation of ABS. One important reason for this is, as discussed in 
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Chapter 3, that the various approaches lead to widely different and easily 
conflicting outcomes or expectations. An extra complicating factor is that 
the different approaches are pursued by different stakeholders in many 
different combinations, often without any clear and explicit differentiation. 
The two approaches not yet considered (number 5 and 7) might best be 
described in connection with the fourth question posed in the introduction, 
regarding whether the relation between benefit-sharing and intellectual 
property rights is complementary or oppositional.  This issue was a focus 
of debate especially in Chapters 5 to 7. 
The relation between benefit-
sharing and intellectual 
property rights 
The complex relationship between benefit-sharing and intellectual 
property rights has been a central sticking point in most ABS debates. For 
several stakeholders involved, the link between benefit-sharing and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) is obvious and intrinsic even. Especially 
the industrial sector has claimed that without strong IPRs, no benefits in 
the biotechnology sector can be secured, and thus no benefit-sharing can 
take place. Some have even maintained that extra benefit-sharing 
regulations as set by the CBD are unnecessary or even undesirable 
because industry fares best – and thus produces more benefits for society – 
with liberal regulations that concentrate on facilitating access to resources 
rather than imposing bureaucratic benefit-sharing conditions. In fact, one 
might go further and argue that the IPR system be considered itself a 
benefit-sharing mechanism, insofar as it aims to stimulate the development 
and distribution of inventions, and demands the disclosure of patents, by 
securing for the inventor temporary intellectual and commercial rights. 
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This argument, however, is seriously questioned in this thesis, the main 
objection being that IPRs cannot secure the dissemination of benefits to all 
sections of society, and especially not to those that do not constitute a 
profitable market. Quite the contrary, IPRs may well drive up transaction 
costs or even block technology transfer, especially for people, 
communities, institutions and States even unable to call on the resources 
and legal expertise with which to negotiate access to the protected 
materials. To some, it is exactly this situation that justifies and necessitates 
the demand for benefit-sharing, which should stimulate and move us 
toward a more equitable distribution of the benefits of modern research 
and development. 
IP and local communities 
Another contradiction with respect to the link between benefit-sharing and 
IPRs relates to the protection of the traditional knowledge (and genetic 
resources) of indigenous and farming communities. On the one hand, 
several initiatives and proposals have emerged that aim to strengthen the 
legal rights of these communities over their knowledge and resources, as a 
balancing mechanism designed to offset the strong IPRs enjoyed by 
inventors in the scientific and industrial communities. In this way, it is 
hoped that the communities will be able to protect their resources against 
misappropriation (biopiracy) and demand a fair share of the benefits from 
those wanting to use them. On the other hand, however, many indigenous 
peoples’ councils and organizations have emphasized how the very 
conception of ‘property’ in relation to living organisms or the (sacred) 
knowledge about them does not sit well in their worldviews, or is just 
plain incomprehensible. These groups do not want to apply IPRs for the 
protection of their resources and warn, furthermore, that those “who agree 
to benefit sharing must accept that patent laws will govern the ownership 
of the products derived from their genetic resources” (GRAIN, 2007). 
 
It follows from this that even those who oppose patents seem to accept the 
inextricable link between benefit-sharing and IPRs. Hopefully, we have 
made clear in this thesis that this should not be the case. It cannot be 
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denied that patents play a major role in the biotechnology sector these 
days, and that IPRs and benefit-sharing influence and impact another in 
many different ways, and on various levels – something that has to be 
reflected upon when applying either of them.117 Nevertheless, and 
crucially, this does not and should not imply that benefit-sharing need 
necessarily be dependent on, or even linked to patents or other forms of 
IPRs. If a fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreement is to be arranged 
with a party that strongly opposes the application of IPRs, this must be 
respected. And industry itself, the main player in the world of IPRs, has 
already proven that there are several alternatives to standard IP protection 
in research and development – which involve trade secrets, first-to-market 
strategies, and different forms of licensing, including the open source 
initiatives discussed in Chapters 3 and 6. 
 
Here, it is important to note that if, for example, a traditional community is 
against the application of IPRs, it should not be inferred from this that they 
do not desire their resources to be protected, in order to prevent 
misappropriation or to reap their benefits. Similarly, there is no reason 
why parties that strongly invest in their IP portfolio cannot still fulfill their 
benefit-sharing obligations and enable a fair(er) distribution of their 
products around the world. Just as benefit-sharing and IPRs are not 
inextricably linked, the protection and the sharing of one’s resources do 
not have to be mutually exclusive. 
                                                 
117
 Or even when applying none of them. Here, one may think of a researcher who 
publishes his or her findings on the traditional uses of certain plant genetic resources 
without prior consent of the knowledge holders and governmental officials of the 
community/country in question – because this knowledge will now be openly 
disseminated, the possibilities for IP protection and benefit-sharing can be seriously 
undermined. 
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Fair and equitable benefit-
sharing 
But what does all this say about fair and equitable benefit-sharing, about 
what it is and how it could best be realized, the fifth and final question that 
we set in the introduction? This was specifically dealt with in Chapter 4, 
although all other chapters have to some extent reflected on this question 
as well. Obviously, the different approaches to benefit-sharing entail 
different perspectives on what fair and equitable benefit-sharing is and/or 
how it should be realized. Clarity and insight on these differences, 
provided by Chapters 3 to 5, is an important prerequisite for its realization, 
as they contribute to a better informed and more balanced debate in which 
the different parties have an increased awareness of the various interests in 
play and benefits at stake. Analysis of such differences has to continue, 
especially to ensure that the perspectives and interests of minority and/or 
underprivileged groups (e.g. women) are properly recognized. 
 
Beyond recognition of these different perspectives, some general 
conclusions have been drawn on the central issue of definition and the way 
ahead. Manifestly, the current exchange model of ABS in the CBD is in 
need of fundamental change. One of the main reasons is that because 
(developing) countries and communities cannot control or track the 
movement of their resources, a mechanism that links benefit-sharing 
obligations to the exchange of these resources can never be fair and 
equitable. As an alternative, the utilization model was proposed, in which 
benefit-sharing is triggered by the utilization of resources. In Chapter 4 it 
was shown that such a model has the potential to set a clear entry point for 
benefit-sharing obligations and ensure that benefit-sharing does indeed 
take place. This is, obviously, a crucial first step towards fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. 
 
A second step would be the development of a set of well-defined, 
minimum standards of benefit-sharing in tandem with a broad and creative 
Eight Plants, Genes and Justice 
196 
 
menu of benefit-sharing options. The former are needed to create clarity 
and a concrete basis for the whole system. Although they are likely to be 
formulated in monetary terms, they should not only reflect market-based 
criteria but also take into account the broader objectives of benefit-sharing 
(supporting nature conservation, food security, equity, etc.). These 
minimum standards are also needed to regulate the collection of benefits 
into an international fund in cases where the provider of the utilized 
resources is unknown or undisclosed (or in dispute). The establishment 
and enforcement of such minimum standards of benefit-sharing may in 
turn promote the development and implementation of other, more 
advanced benefit-sharing models. For example, when companies have to 
obey certain monetary standards of benefit-sharing it may become more 
attractive for them to invest in the sharing of information and technologies 
that they already possess. Such forms of benefit-sharing in kind should be 
encouraged and facilitated by the benefit-sharing menu since they have the 
potential to be very valuable and efficient in terms of the broader 
objectives of benefit-sharing. 
Upstream benefit-sharing 
Whether in-kind forms of benefit-sharing can indeed become valuable and 
efficient depends primarily on the context and perspectives of the party 
receiving them. This issue was particularly discussed in relation to the 
concept of upstream benefit-sharing, in Chapter 2, according to which 
parties to a particular ABS agreement try to balance their interests with 
respect to the research in the first place, taking into account the benefits 
that are anticipated to be shared later on. This in contrast to the usual 
‘downstream models’ of benefit-sharing, which merely focus on the 
conditions for access to specific resources in exchange for a share in the 
benefits of their utilization, whatever that utilization may be. The concept 
of upstream benefit-sharing, that is, emphasizes the need for shared 
decision-making on the research priorities and during the research process, 
with the aim of improving the use and benefit of the resulting knowledge 
and technologies for all parties involved. 
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The need for upstream deliberations in benefit-sharing agreements is 
particularly pressing given the current state of affairs in which developing 
countries and communities hardly share in the benefits of the new 
biotechnologies. Despite the often-heard promise that biotechnology can 
contribute much to the poor in terms of improved crops and medicines, 
new products have, in fact, mainly focused on commercial markets and 
not on the major crops and diseases in developing countries (FAO, 2004; 
Global Forum for Health Research, 2004). More research is needed on 
how this new biotechnology-divide can be counteracted,118 but a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing system should aim to contribute to that objective. 
Procedural justice 
The idea of upstream benefit-sharing is strongly related to the principles of 
procedural and cognitive justice as described in Chapter 4. A fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing system can only be realized if all parties 
concerned have equal opportunities to participate in transparent 
negotiation processes, at all levels local, national and international. This 
implies, among other things, that serious efforts have to be undertaken to 
facilitate access to the international ABS negotiations (and individual ABS 
agreements) for representatives of farming and indigenous communities, 
and to support their ability to participate actively. The principle of 
cognitive justice holds, furthermore, that the alternative worldviews and 
perspectives of such communities are respected and treated as equal 
positions in dialogue. The fact that many traditional communities find 
themselves in a marginalized socio-political position only heightens the 
attention and extends the support that needs to be afforded to them in this 
respect. 
 
The principles of procedural and cognitive justice are important 
prerequisites for fair and equitable benefit-sharing, but they do not say 
anything about the distribution of benefits itself. In line with the different 
approaches to benefit-sharing, a combination of allocation criteria would 
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 See e.g. (Vroom, 2009). 
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appear to offer the best prospects. Pursuing this avenue, benefits could be 
distributed with the aim of compensating those groups, countries or 
regions that have made considerable contributions to the conservation of 
biodiversity and promotion of food security – thinking particularly of 
centers of origin/diversity, and with extra attention for those with special 
needs in this respect – thinking particularly of marginalized and 
impoverished peoples. Such general criteria are especially relevant for the 
distribution of benefits that have been collected by an international fund. 
In case of individual ABS agreements, the parties involved may want to 
make their own decisions in this respect. But again, these decisions (and 
the preceding negotiation process) should carefully observe the procedural 
principles and minimum standards of benefit-sharing discussed above. 
The need for continued deliberation and cooperation 
Obviously, there are many practical and ethical difficulties and questions 
that have gone unremarked here, or have been mentioned only in passing, 
and which will need further research and reflection. More than that, 
however, what is needed is continued and extensive deliberation and 
cooperation between the various parties involved. At an international 
level, officials from the different countries, together with representatives 
from the indigenous, farming, industrial and scientific communities (and 
others), will have to decide on the basic standards and organization of a 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing system. Benefit-sharing is first and 
foremost a policy concept created by the international community and 
which, consequently, must be further developed and decided upon by that 
community. It will then be the wide range of interested parties and 
organizations worldwide – actors and stakeholders varying from 
multinational corporations and national governments to local communities 
and individual scientists – who will jointly have to implement subsequent 
regulations and make fair and equitable benefit-sharing operational. And 
not just when involved in specific ABS agreements, but also with respect 
to framing the institutional policies and arrangements for their companies, 
universities and community leadership structures that direct day-to-day 
work, attitudes and interaction.  
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This latter issue was discussed particularly with respect to the public 
research sector in Chapters 5 to 7, where the way and extent to which 
public research organizations are confronted with strong and widely 
diverging views and interests was illustrated. Even within the research 
institutes themselves, there are different and easily conflicting views and 
objectives regarding the sharing and protection of the plant genetic 
resources, knowledge and technologies they work with. Given the present 
context, in which many groups, from industry to governments and 
indigenous communities, are primarily concerned about the protection of 
their resources, research institutes, it is argued, need to develop new ways 
of sharing and protecting and, ultimately, dare to share. This implies that 
they develop clear and effective ABS and IP policies that are carefully 
attuned to the interests of the different parties they are working with while 
at the same time also leaving the institute enough room to share and 
disseminate its knowledge and capacities for the common good. 
 
In this respect, substantial investments in consultations among the 
different stakeholders are clearly necessary. The International Potato 
Centre in Peru, for example, needs to continuously invest in its public 
image and trust building in order to allay concerns of biopiracy and 
improve its freedom to operate when it comes to new collection activities. 
The Wageningen University and Research Centre in the Netherlands, for 
its part, has to discuss and negotiate its IP policies with the research 
partners and the funding agencies that co-own or set the targets for its 
research outputs. The international conference organized in Wageningen 
on IP policies in public research indicated that such consultation and 
deliberation activities are far from easy. 
 
For this conference, discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, we invited a broad 
range of stakeholders with the aim of discussing, or at least initiating 
discussion about how public research institutes can prevent their IP 
policies from hampering innovation in poor countries. Instead of mapping 
the problem and then start a search for possible solutions as we had 
envisaged, however, the discussion largely failed to get beyond defining 
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the problem. Because of the divergence of interests of the various 
stakeholders involved, it was difficult to agree on the problem itself, let 
alone how to fix it. What is a problem for one party can be business as 
usual or even a major objective for another, even within the same institute. 
Fair and equitable burden-sharing 
This situation may not be so surprising, as it points to a common and well-
known dynamic: those who experience or are subject to a particular 
problem are often not those who cause (intentionally or otherwise) or who 
can prevent the problem. But this logic is absolutely crucial with respect to 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing, because those who claim and/or need it 
the most tend to be dependent for its operation on those who claim/need it 
the least. For many researchers, organizations and countries in the 
developed world, the realization of fair and equitable benefit-sharing is 
simply not perceived as something that is in their direct self-interest. On 
the contrary, due to the complex and unclear status of much of the current 
(inter)national body of ABS regulations, fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
is regarded by many as a cost, to be reduced and kept to the minimum. 
This is reflected in the troublesome international negotiations so far, and 
also, moreover, in the disinterest and aversion even shown to ABS and the 
current socio-political environment it entails on the part of many parties in 
the public and private research sector (Chapter 5). 
 
At this moment, we can conclude that the levels of interest shown and 
commitment made by many developed countries and interested parties are 
in stark contrast to the substantial investments necessary in order to realize 
a fair and equitable system of benefit-sharing as discussed in this thesis. 
They stand similarly far removed from the position developed in Chapter 
4, that it is the developed countries and their associated parties which have 
the biggest responsibility to make the system work. Of course, also 
developing countries and communities must invest the necessary means to 
come to fair and equitable benefit-sharing, but, as Shue has stated, “among 
a number of parties, all of whom are bound to contribute to some common 
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endeavour, the parties who have the most resources normally should 
contribute the most to the endeavour” (Shue, 1999, p. 537). 
 
This statement is based on the principle of equity, fundamental to the 
concept of benefit-sharing, which holds that equals should be treated 
equally and unequals unequally. This means that as long as there are large 
inequalities between the different parties involved, an unequal distribution 
of benefits awarded to the weakest parties (and burdens falling to the 
strongest) should be promoted. This would imply, for example, that 
developed countries bear most of the costs of the negotiation process and 
development of international mechanisms (without receiving a stronger 
say during negotiations in return); that the current international IP system 
be modified in order to protect and support traditional knowledge holders, 
who currently have least opportunities to secure and defend their rights; 
and that public and private research institutes agree with significantly 
higher benefit-sharing standards and percentages than has been the case 
thus far. 
 
It must be clear that benefit-sharing entails burden-sharing, so if fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing is to be realized then the burdens also have to be 
shared, fairly and equitably. This research project has aimed to show some 
of the major steps that need to be made and issues that have to be taken 
into account in order to work towards this objective. If countries really 
want to commit themselves to fair and equitable benefit-sharing, then this 
is what it will involve. The same goes for the public and private research 
sector. Where the former can be held accountable to their public mission 
and responsibilities in this regard, the latter will often wait for the 
regulations to be set by their governments. But also the private sector has 
its social responsibilities here and must understand that the current 
regulatory uncertainties and social controversies will not improve without 
their willingness to develop and comply with fair and equitable benefit-
sharing policies. 
 
The world becomes smaller as countries, organizations and individuals 
from around the world are increasingly confronted with the results of 
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others’ actions and interests. Whether it is the use of plant genetic 
resources, the level of carbon emissions, or the way we fight a global 
disease or financial crisis, international reciprocal agreements and 
solutions are increasingly being sought. This is a relatively recent 
development, and an enormous socio-political and ethical challenge. In the 
face of these challenges in the field of benefit-sharing and plant genetic 
resources, the current lack of philosophical reflection certainly needs to be 
rectified. This thesis has aimed to stimulate debate and reflection on some 
of the main ethical challenges involved, and to provide insights and 
directions that bring us closer to a fair and equitable outcome. Altogether, 
it seems that the current attempts to implement benefit-sharing constitute a 
new step of the world community towards global justice, and it should be 
nourished and supported as such. 
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Introduction 
Since the advent of biotechnology, plant genetic resources have become 
more valuable as possible sources for new products and inventions. With 
knowledge about the genetic make-up and functioning of a plant, 
biotechnologists can identify and isolate genes with interesting traits 
which, after long research trajectories, may result in new medicines, 
improved crops or other products. The initial leads towards such new 
products are sometimes provided by the traditional knowledge that local 
and indigenous communities have acquired about their natural 
environment over centuries. At the other site of the spectrum, Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) play an important role in stimulating the research 
and development process of new biotechnologies and products, by 
providing innovators with time-limited exclusive rights to exploit their 
inventions. Altogether, the biotechnology industry has grown rapidly over 
the last decades. The question, however, is whether also we have all 
benefited from it. 
 
Unfortunately, we have to conclude that, as with most other new industries 
and technologies, biotechnology has not provided many benefits to the 
poor up to now. Notwithstanding the repeated promises that biotechnology 
can – and will – improve global health and food security, almost all 
research to date has focused on the development of medicinal and food 
products for commercial markets, mostly in the developed world, with 
very few serious investments having been made in order to tackle the 
major diseases and improve crops in the poorer parts of the world. This is 
despite the fact that many of the genetic traits that are used in new 
products and biotechnologies find their origin in the enormous 
biodiversity of developing countries, and/or the rich knowledge of this 
diversity of local communities in these countries. For this reason, 
developing countries and indigenous communities have become 
increasingly vocal in demanding compensation for the use of their plant 
resources in the new biotechnology industry. 
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This demand became backed by international law in 1992, as the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) declared that access to genetic 
resources is subject to “sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of 
research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial 
and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party 
providing such resources.” (Article 15.7). With respect to the knowledge, 
innovations and practices of traditional communities, the CBD also 
proclaims that each country, subject to its national legislation, shall 
“encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices” (Article 8j). 
Since then, a total of 191 countries have become signatories to the 
Convention and committed themselves to these objectives. Few of these, 
however, have implemented this legislation effectively in such a way as to 
actually enable and facilitate the sharing of substantial benefits. 
Furthermore, the negotiations on an International Regime on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing, which was called for by the Parties to the CBD in 2002, 
are progressing very slowly. 
 
What are the reasons for this lack of progress in the national 
implementation and international negotiations on Access and Benefit-
Sharing (ABS)? This question has been subject of discussion in a growing 
number of studies that aim to analyze the legal, practical, or socio-political 
difficulties involved in current ABS regulations and agreements. Very few 
studies, however, have focused on the ethical problems and challenges. 
Even though questions about who decides which benefits are to be shared 
with whom and in what way are obviously ethical concerns, the current 
problems with ABS have rarely been approached from an ethical 
perspective. This research project aims to improve this situation by 
investigating and initiating debate on some of the ethical dimensions of 
benefit-sharing in the field of plant genetic resources, related knowledge 
and IPRs, with special attention given to the agricultural and public 
research sector. 
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Taking a pragmatist ethics point of view, this research project focuses 
primarily on analyzing the normative positions and argumentations within 
the current debates on benefit-sharing, and reflecting on the meaning of, 
and possibilities for, fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Direction and 
guidance for the project are facilitated through research questions focusing 
attention on: the origination of the concept and purpose of benefit-sharing; 
the major difficulties complicating the present situation in respect of 
benefit-sharing policies; the normative positions and objectives 
incorporated in international legislation, organizational policies and 
stakeholders’ perceptions of benefit-sharing; the relationship between 
benefit-sharing and intellectual property rights; and the question of fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing itself. 
  
The research is based on extensive literature studies, complemented with 
over 75 semi-structured interviews in Kenya, Peru and the Netherlands, 
and visits to meetings of the CBD, the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), and international workshops on ABS in Germany 
and India. Furthermore, an international conference was organized in the 
Netherlands to examine and discuss with relevant stakeholders the impact 
of IPRs on the possibilities for public research institutes sited in developed 
countries to share their knowledge and technologies with partners in 
poorer countries. Altogether, this has resulted in five articles that have 
been either published in or submitted to peer-reviewed journals, and two 
conference documents, which together with an introductory and 
concluding chapter are presented in this thesis.119 
                                                 
119
 Other related material – an article in the journal New Genetics and Society (Korthals & 
De Jonge, 2009), one book chapter (De Jonge & Louwaars, 2009), and several 
publications in popular media and specialist magazines – has not been included. 
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Vicissitudes of benefit-sharing 
of crop genetic resources: 
Downstream and upstream 
Following an introductory first chapter, Chapter 2 sets out with a historic 
overview of the origin and development of the concept of benefit-sharing 
in international law. We see that benefit-sharing was initially included in 
international treaties on the moon (1979) and the sea (1982), in which it 
was linked to the notion of a common heritage of humankind and referred 
to equitable distribution – i.e. distributive justice. Because the resources of 
the moon and deep seabed were considered not to be the property of any 
State or individual, it was decided that the benefits that are derived from 
those resources should be shared with humankind as a whole. With its 
introduction in the CBD, however, benefit-sharing has mainly become an 
instrument of compensation and refers to the idea of commutative justice – 
i.e. justice in exchange. Based on the principle that countries have 
sovereign rights over their own biological resources, States can regulate 
access to their resources and negotiate the accompanying benefit-sharing 
conditions. It is shown, however, that this model does not suit most plant 
genetic resources – and certainly not crop genetic resources. On the 
contrary, it has had harmful effects on the agricultural sector insofar as it 
has functioned to obstruct the international transfer of genetic resources on 
which the agricultural sector historically depends. 
 
In order to better meet the needs of the agricultural sector, the FAO 
developed a Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing, which 
was introduced in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) in 2001. In line with the general objectives 
of the ITPGR, but also of the CBD, we argue that benefit-sharing should 
not be based merely on the idea of justice in exchange, but rather on a 
broader model, one that is grounded also in the concept of distributive 
justice. This has repercussions for the application of benefit-sharing. By 
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distinguishing between ‘downstream’ models of benefit-sharing, in which 
benefits are shared at the end of the research and development pipeline, 
and models where ‘upstream’ in the research process stakeholders try to 
balance their interests with respect to the benefits that will be shared later 
on, we show that benefit-sharing may well be a tool to contribute to world 
food security and global justice. 
A diversity of approaches to 
benefit-sharing 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of, in total, seven fundamentally different 
approaches to the issue of benefit-sharing in the field of plant genetic 
resources. The approaches portray the different ideas that exist about 
benefit-sharing, about its underlying principles, its goals and the preferred 
mechanisms to reach these goals. These different approaches are based on 
the following perceptions, or motivations: 
- The South-North imbalance in resource allocation and exploitation 
- The need to conserve biodiversity  
- Biopiracy and the imbalance in intellectual property rights  
- A shared interest in food security 
- An imbalance between IP protection and the public interest 
- Protecting the cultural identity of traditional communities 
- Protecting the interests of the biotechnology industry in ABS 
negotiations. 
By comparing the different approaches in the second part of this chapter, 
the major stumbling blocks in the current ABS negotiations (at both 
national and international levels) become apparent. This comparative 
analysis shows that the variety of motivations leads to widely differing 
mechanisms for benefit-sharing and significantly different expectations of 
the nature and value of the benefits to be shared. A further complicating 
factor in this is that the different approaches cannot be simply translated 
one-to-one into stakeholder positions. Stakeholders often assume to 
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employ a combination of two or more different approaches. However, by 
explicating the different approaches, the article aims to increase insight 
into the different viewpoints that people and institutions adopt, in order to 
contribute to a better informed and more balanced debate in which policy-
makers and other stakeholders have a raised awareness of the various 
interests involved and issues at stake. 
What is fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing? 
Chapter 4 builds upon these different approaches insofar as it aims to 
investigate what exactly is understood by “fair” and “equitable” benefit-
sharing, and how a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism might 
best be realized. The different approaches to benefit-sharing outlined form 
the basis of a philosophical reflection and are discussed in parallel with the 
main principles of justice involved. These include the principle of 
commutative justice and, under the domain of distributive justice, the 
principles of entitlement, desert, need and equity. In addition to these 
criteria that may guide the allocation of benefits, the principles of 
procedural and cognitive justice also are discussed, as essential to the 
promotion of fair and equitable benefit-sharing. 
 
An important conclusion resulting from this reflection is that the bilateral 
exchange model of ABS in the CBD is in need of fundamental change. At 
present, it is practically impossible for countries and communities to 
secure a fair exchange for the plant genetic resources found within their 
territories, or for the traditional knowledge present in their culture. As an 
alternative, a model is proposed in which benefit-sharing obligations are 
not based on the specific exchange of these resources, but on their 
utilization. An advantage of such model is that it emphasizes the 
responsibilities for benefit-sharing at the user side. This is further 
supported by the principle of equity, elemental to benefit-sharing, which 
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holds that the strongest parties have the biggest responsibilities to make a 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism work. 
Between sharing and 
protecting: Public research on 
genetic resources in the year of 
the potato 
Chapter 5 analyses the policies and environment of two public research 
institutes working with potato genetic resources, the International Potato 
Centre (CIP) in Peru and Wageningen University and Research Centre 
(Wageningen UR) in the Netherlands. The two institutes are situated in 
totally different environments, but both are increasingly confronted with 
an array of (inter)national regulations, interests and perspectives that 
surround the genetic material, (traditional) knowledge and technologies 
with which they work. While CIP, as member of the Consultative Group 
for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), aims to promote the 
sharing of potato genetic resources throughout the world for the sake of 
food security, it is situated in a country that is deeply ambivalent about the 
sharing goal and where concerns about biopiracy proliferate. Wageningen 
UR, on the other hand, is concerned with supporting the Dutch potato 
sector but it has to make sure that its IP and valorization strategies do not 
impede its research for development goals. 
 
Both institutes are continuously weighing up their own interests and those 
of the various stakeholders they work with in order to strike a balance 
between policies geared towards sharing and those aimed at protection. 
However, in the present context where poor but gene-rich countries and 
communities, as well as industrialized countries and biotechnology 
companies are all mainly concerned with protecting their resources in 
Plants, Genes and Justice Summary 
 
231 
 
order to reap the benefits and preclude misappropriation, it is incumbent 
on public research institutes to dare to share. For that purpose, they have 
to develop new ways of sharing and protecting in order to adhere to their 
mission and best serve the public interest. 
Reconsidering intellectual 
property policies in public 
research: A symposium 
Chapter 6 contains the start document and report of the international 
conference on “Reconsidering Intellectual Property Policies in Public 
Research: Sharing the benefits of biotechnology with developing 
countries” organized at Wageningen UR in April 2008. The start 
document describes the increasing role of IPRs in biotechnology research 
and the difficult process that public research institutes face in seeking to 
obtain access to IP protected materials while working on biotechnologies 
destined for the poor. The problems involved range from analyzing 
complex IPR landscapes to negotiating free or affordable access licenses 
with parties that have little to gain from such deals. At the same time, 
however, public researchers are also increasingly stimulated to protect 
their own knowledge and inventions – so an important question for public 
research institutes is how they can (and should) go about preventing their 
IP policy from hampering innovation in poor countries. 
 
These issues were discussed at the international conference, which brought 
stakeholders together from fields as diverse as plant sciences, social and 
development studies, intellectual property offices, research funding 
organizations, the private seed industry, and civil society. The report 
describes the various discussions, presentations and main findings of the 
conference, which also focused on possible strategies to help public 
research institutes to secure their freedom to operate in the field of 
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research for development, such as patent pools, humanitarian licenses and 
open-source biotechnology. 
Valorizing science: Whose 
values? 
Chapter 7 is a viewpoint article that reflects further upon the current trend 
towards valorization, i.e. the creation of economic value, in public 
research. It asks, more specifically, whether the focus on economic 
indicators is the optimal policy for science to contribute to society, or for 
the advancement of science itself. Hereby, it looks back on the 
Wageningen conference and its central subject matter, but now with 
special attention given to the organization process and the difficulties of 
bringing different stakeholders together to discuss complex problems and 
their possible solutions. 
 
The issue of valorization in public research involves a wide variety of 
easily conflicting views and interests, which requires continued input and 
dialogue between the different stakeholders in order to come to workable 
solutions. It is shown that this is not always easy to accomplish, for 
example because stakeholders may already disagree about the problem 
definition itself: a problem for one group may be a triviality or even 
benefit for another, and this even within the same institute. But as the 
current valorization trend influences and impresses upon the role of public 
research itself, the research institutes as well as individual researchers will 
have to invest the necessary time and effort to reflect on their impact and 
(long term) implications. 
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Towards Justice in Benefit-
Sharing 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter that brings the major findings of this 
research project together. Without repeating all the conclusions of the 
separate chapters, it aims to give an overview by reflecting on the research 
questions set out at the beginning in Chapter 1 and the general conclusions 
that have come out of this. Given the many practical (and ethical) 
complexities involved, and the easily diverging interests and perspectives 
when it comes to the sharing and/or protection of plant genetic resources, 
(traditional) knowledge and intellectual property rights, we can predict 
that benefit-sharing will continue to arouse much discussion and debate in 
the years to come. In this thesis, some fundamental changes to the current 
exchange model in the CBD are proposed in order to move away from the 
current deadlock in the international ABS negotiations, and to work 
towards a fair and equitable outcome. It must be clear that benefit-sharing 
entails burden-sharing, and that a successful implementation of fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing requires the continued commitment of all 
stakeholders involved on the international, national and local levels. But 
with such commitment, benefit-sharing can set a new standard of justice in 
how countries, companies, public research institutes and indigenous 
communities interact with each other. 
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Samenvatting 
Planten, Genen en 
Rechtvaardigheid 
Eerlijk zullen we alles delen? 
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Introductie 
Sinds de opkomst van de biotechnologie zijn planten nog waardevoller 
geworden als bron van genetisch materiaal waaruit nieuwe uitvindingen en 
producten ontwikkeld kunnen worden. Met kennis van de genetische 
samenstelling en functionering van een plant kunnen biotechnologen 
genen identificeren en isoleren met interessante eigenschappen, wat na 
langdurig onderzoek kan resulteren in de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
medicijnen, verbeterde gewassen of andere eindproducten. De eerste 
leidraad voor dergelijk onderzoek is soms afkomstig van de ‘traditionele 
kennis’ die inheemse gemeenschappen en traditionele boeren hebben 
vergaard van hun natuurlijke leefomgeving door de eeuwen heen. 
‘Intellectueel eigendomsrechten’ spelen een grote rol in het stimuleren van 
onderzoek en het ontwikkelen van nieuwe biotechnologieën en producten 
doordat zij de uitvinder de exclusieve rechten verschaffen voor de 
exploitatie van een uitvinding gedurende een bepaalde tijdsperiode. Al met 
al is de biotechnologie industrie enorm gegroeid gedurende de laatste 
decennia. De vraag is echter of we er ook allemaal van profiteren. 
 
Helaas moeten we concluderen dat, zoals met veel nieuwe technologieën 
het geval is, biotechnologie nog niet veel voordelen heeft opgeleverd voor 
arme mensen. Niettegenstaande de herhaalde beloftes dat biotechnologie 
de wereld gezondheid en voedselzekerheid kan – en zal – bieden, heeft 
bijna al het onderzoek zich tot op heden gericht op de ontwikkeling van 
medicijnen en landbouwproducten voor commerciële markten, met name 
in het Westen. Er is relatief zeer weinig geïnvesteerd in de belangrijkste 
ziektes en gewassen in de arme delen van de wereld. Dit ondanks het feit 
dat veel van het genetisch materiaal dat gebruikt wordt in de nieuwe 
producten en biotechnologieën zijn oorsprong heeft in de enorme 
biodiversiteit van ontwikkelingslanden, en/of de rijke kennis van die 
diversiteit van lokale gemeenschappen. Om die reden zijn 
ontwikkelingslanden en inheemse groepen steeds mondiger geworden in 
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het eisen van compensatie voor het gebruik van hun plant genetische 
bronnen in de nieuwe biotechnologie industrie. 
 
Deze eis werd kracht bij gezet door internationale regelgeving in 1992, 
toen de VN biodiversiteitsconventie (Convention on Biological Diversity, 
verder CBD genoemd) verklaarde dat toegang tot genetisch materiaal 
onderworpen moet zijn aan een eerlijke en gelijke verdeling van de 
resultaten van onderzoek en ontwikkeling, en van de baten voortvloeiend 
uit het commerciële en ander gebruik van het genetisch materiaal, met het 
land dat het materiaal geleverd heeft (Artikel 15.7). Met betrekking tot 
kennis en innovaties van traditionele gemeenschappen verklaart de CBD 
dat ieder land, afhankelijk van de eigen wetgeving, de gelijke verdeling 
van voordelen (benefit-sharing) die voortvloeien uit het gebruik van die 
kennis en innovaties moet stimuleren (Artikel 8j). Sindsdien hebben 191 
landen de CBD ondertekend en zich gecommitteerd tot bovenstaande 
doelstellingen. Weinig landen hebben deze regelgeving echter 
geïmplementeerd op zo’n manier dat substantiële voordelen gedeeld 
(kunnen) worden. De onderhandelingen over een internationale regime 
van toegang en batenverdeling, oftewel ‘access and benefit-sharing’ 
(verder ABS genoemd), die zijn begonnen in 2002, maken bovendien 
weinig vooruitgang. 
 
Welke redenen zijn er voor deze trage vooruitgang op het gebied van de 
nationale implementatie en internationale onderhandelingen over ABS? 
Deze vraag is het onderwerp van een groeiend aantal studies die de 
juridische, praktische, of socio-politieke knelpunten beoogt te analyseren 
met betrekking tot bestaande regelgeving en ABS overeenkomsten. 
Weinig studies richten zich echter op de ethische problemen en 
uitdagingen. Ondanks het feit dat vragen zoals ‘wie bepaalt welke baten 
worden gedeeld met wie en op welke manier’ bol staan van ethische 
kwesties, zijn de huidige problemen rond ABS nog nauwelijks benaderd 
vanuit een ethisch perspectief. Dit onderzoeksproject tracht deze situatie te 
verbeteren door onderzoek te doen naar, en het initiëren van debat over, 
enkele ethische aspecten van benefit-sharing met betrekking tot plant 
genetisch materiaal, gerelateerde kennis en intellectueel 
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eigendomsrechten. Daarbij wordt speciaal aandacht gegeven aan de 
landbouwsector en publieke onderzoeksinstellingen. 
 
Vanuit het standpunt van de pragmatische ethiek richt dit onderzoek zich 
met name op het analyseren van de normatieve posities en argumentaties 
binnen het huidige debat rond benefit-sharing, en het reflecteren op de 
betekenis van, en mogelijkheden voor, ‘fair and equitable benefit-
sharing’. De onderzoeksvragen richten zich op de oorsprong van het 
concept benefit-sharing; de voornaamste praktische en ethische 
knelpunten met betrekking tot de huidige onderhandelingen en 
implementatie van ABS beleid; de normatieve posities en doelstellingen 
die geïncorporeerd zijn in internationale regelgeving, institutioneel beleid, 
en opvattingen van belangengroepen over benefit-sharing; de relatie 
tussen benefit-sharing en intellectueel eigendomsrechten; en hoe fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing het best gerealiseerd kan worden. 
 
Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op uitgebreide literatuurstudies, aangevuld 
met meer dan 75 semi-gestructureerde interviews in Kenia, Peru en 
Nederland. Daarnaast zijn enkele CBD bijeenkomsten, de VN 
Landbouworganisatie, en internationale workshops over ABS in Duitsland 
en India bezocht. Ook is er in Nederland een internationale conferentie 
georganiseerd om te onderzoeken wat de impact van intellectueel 
eigendomsrechten is op de mogelijkheden van publieke 
onderzoeksinstellingen om hun kennis en technologieën met partners in 
ontwikkelingslanden te delen. Dit alles heeft geresulteerd in vijf artikels 
die gepubliceerd dan wel ingediend zijn bij wetenschappelijke tijdschriften 
(peer-reviewed journals), plus een startdocument en verslag van de 
conferentie. Samen met de introductie en conclusie vormen zij het 
proefschrift dat voor u ligt. 
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De opkomst en ontwikkeling 
van benefit-sharing en de 
internationale landbouwsector 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een historisch overzicht van de oorsprong en 
ontwikkeling van het concept benefit-sharing in internationale 
regelgeving. Het blijkt dat benefit-sharing oorspronkelijk geïntroduceerd 
is in international verdragen over de maan (1979) en de zee (1982), waarin 
het was gekoppeld aan de notie van het gemeenschappelijk erfgoed van de 
mensheid (common heritage of humankind) en verwees naar gelijke 
distributie, oftewel verdelende rechtvaardigheid. Er van uitgaande dat de 
grondstoffen in de bodem van de maan of de diepzee van geen enkel land 
of individu zijn, zouden de baten die daar uit voortvloeien met de gehele 
mensheid gedeeld moeten worden. Echter, met diens introductie in de 
CBD is benefit-sharing voornamelijk een instrument van compensatie 
geworden en verwijst het naar het idee van commutatieve 
rechtvaardigheid, oftewel ruilrechtvaardigheid. Uitgaande van het principe 
dat landen soevereine rechten hebben over hun eigen plant genetische 
bronnen, kunnen overheden de toegang tot die bronnen reguleren en 
onderhandelen over de bijbehorende benefit-sharing condities. In dit 
artikel komt naar voren dat dit model niet geschikt is voor de meeste 
plantensoorten, en zeker niet voor landbouwgewassen. Het model heeft 
zelfs schadelijke gevolgen gehad voor de landbouwsector in zoverre dat 
het de internationale uitwisseling van genetisch materiaal, waar die sector 
altijd van afhankelijk is geweest, heeft geblokkeerd. 
 
Om beter aan te sluiten bij de noden van de landbouwsector heeft de VN 
Landbouworganisatie in 2001 een ‘multilateraal systeem van access en 
benefit-sharing’ geïntroduceerd in de International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (verder ITPGR genoemd). In 
lijn met de algemene doelstellingen van de ITPGR, maar ook van de CBD, 
pleiten wij ervoor dat benefit-sharing niet alleen gerelateerd wordt aan het 
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principe van ruilrechtvaardigheid, maar aan een breder model dat ook 
gebaseerd is op het idee van verdelende rechtvaardigheid. Dit heeft 
gevolgen voor de toepassing van benefit-sharing. Door een onderscheid te 
maken tussen modellen die slechts gericht zijn op een verdeling van de 
uitkomsten van een onderzoekstraject (downstream benefit-sharing) en 
modellen waar al in een eerder stadium (bijv. aan de hand van de 
onderzoeksdoelen) overleg wordt gepleegd over de uitkomsten die 
uiteindelijk verdeeld zullen gaan worden (upstream benefit-sharing), laten 
wij zien dat benefit-sharing een instrument kan zijn dat bijdraagt aan 
voedselzekerheid en globale rechtvaardigheid. 
Een diversiteit aan 
benaderingen tot benefit-
sharing 
Hoofdstuk 3 verschaft een overzicht van in totaal zeven fundamenteel 
verschillende benaderingen tot benefit-sharing met betrekking tot plant 
genetisch materiaal. De benaderingen beschrijven de verschillende 
opvattingen die bestaan over benefit-sharing, over de onderliggende 
principes, doelstellingen en de gewenste mechanismen om die 
doelstellingen te bereiken. De verschillende benaderingen zijn gebaseerd 
op de volgende percepties en motivaties: 
- De Noord-Zuid ongelijkheid op het gebied van exploitatie van 
biodiversiteit. 
- De noodzaak voor natuurbescherming en behoud van biodiversiteit. 
- Biopiraterij en de disbalans in intellectueel eigendomsrechten. 
- Een gedeeld belang in voedselzekerheid. 
- Onevenwichtigheid tussen de bescherming van intellectueel 
eigendom en publieke belangen. 
- Behoud van de culturele identiteit en cultuur van inheemse 
gemeenschappen. 
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- De bescherming van de belangen van de biotechnologie industrie. 
Door de verschillende benaderingen in het tweede deel van dit artikel te 
vergelijken, worden de voornaamste struikelblokken in de huidige 
nationale en internationale onderhandelingen over ABS zichtbaar. De 
vergelijkende analyse laat zien dat de diversiteit aan motivaties leidt tot 
grote verschillen in de mechanismen van benefit-sharing, en de daarbij 
horende verwachtingen over het soort en de waarde van de baten die 
gedeeld moeten worden. Een bijkomend probleem is dat de verschillende 
benaderingen niet één op één overeenkomen met de standpunten van 
verschillende belangengroepen. Verschillende groepen steunen vaak een 
combinatie van twee of meer benaderingen. Doel van het artikel is, door 
de verschillende benaderingen te onderscheiden, het inzicht te vergroten in 
de verschillende opvattingen en doelstelling rond benefit-sharing en zo 
een bijdrage te leveren aan een beter geïnformeerd en gebalanceerd debat 
waarin beleidsmakers en andere partijen zich meer bewust zijn van de 
verschillende belangen die op het spel staan. 
Wat is fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing?  
Hoofdstuk 4 bouwt voort op de verschillende benaderingen tot benefit-
sharing om te onderzoeken wat nu precies verstaan wordt onder ‘eerlijke’ 
en ‘gelijke’ verdeling van baten, en hoe een fair and equitable benefit-
sharing mechanisme het best kan worden gerealiseerd. De verschillende 
benaderingen vormen de basis voor een filosofische reflectie en worden 
besproken in samenhang met de voornaamste rechtvaardigheidsprincipes 
in kwestie. Deze zijn het principe van commutatieve rechtvaardigheid en, 
onder het domein van distributieve rechtvaardigheid, de principes van 
recht, verdienste, behoefte en gelijkheid. Bovenop deze principes, die als 
leidraad kunnen dienen voor de verdeling van baten, worden ook de 
principes van procedurele en cognitieve rechtvaardigheid besproken 
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aangezien zij een belangrijke voorwaarde zijn voor het realiseren van fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing. 
 
Een belangrijke conclusie die voortkomt uit deze reflectie is dat het 
bilaterale uitwisselingsmodel van ABS in de CBD aan een fundamentele 
verandering toe is. Momenteel is het praktisch onmogelijk voor landen en 
gemeenschappen om de bewegingen en uitwisselingen te controleren van 
het plant genetisch materiaal op hun grondgebied of de traditionele kennis 
aanwezig in hun cultuur, en dus om zich te verzekeren van een eerlijke ruil 
van dat materiaal met externe partijen. Als alternatief wordt een model 
voorgesteld waarin de benefit-sharing verplichtingen niet gekoppeld zijn 
aan de uitwisseling van materiaal, maar aan het gebruik daarvan. Een 
voordeel van dergelijk model is dat de verantwoordelijkheid voor benefit-
sharing nadrukkelijk komt te liggen bij de partijen die het genetisch 
materiaal en/of traditionele kennis willen gebruiken. Zo’n model wordt 
ook ondersteund door het principe van gelijkheid, dat fundamenteel blijkt 
te zijn voor het hele idee van benefit-sharing, en wat inhoudt dat de 
sterkste schouders de zwaarste lasten moeten dragen en dus de grootste 
verantwoordelijkheid hebben om fair and equitable benefit-sharing te 
realiseren. 
Beschermen of delen? Publiek 
onderzoek naar genetisch 
materiaal in het jaar van de 
aardappel 
Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert het beleid en de omgeving van twee publieke 
onderzoeksinstellingen die werken met genetisch materiaal van de 
aardappel; het Internationale Aardappelcentrum (CIP) in Peru, en 
Wageningen Universiteit en Onderzoekscentrum (Wageningen UR) in 
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Nederland. De twee instellingen zijn gesitueerd in een totaal verschillende 
omgeving, maar beide worden meer en meer geconfronteerd met een web 
aan (inter)nationale regulaties, belangen en opvattingen die invloed 
hebben op het genetisch materiaal en de (traditionele) kennis waarmee ze 
werken. Terwijl het CIP, als lid van de Raadgevende Groep voor 
Internationaal Landbouwonderzoek (CGIAR), het doel heeft de 
verspreiding van aardappel genetisch materiaal te promoten ten behoeve 
van de voedselzekerheid, is het gesitueerd in een land dat zeer ambivalent 
is ten opzichte van het delen van dergelijk materiaal en waar de 
bezorgdheid voor biopiraterij wijd verspreid is. Wageningen UR, op haar 
beurt, heeft vooral ten doel de Nederlandse aardappelsector te 
ondersteunen, maar het dient er voor te zorgen dat de hierbij horende 
intellectueel eigendomsrechten en zogenaamde valorisatiestrategieën het 
onderzoek voor ontwikkelingslanden niet in de weg staan. 
 
Beide instanties zijn continue bezig hun eigen belangen en die van de 
verschillende partijen waarmee ze werken af te wegen met het doel een 
balans te vinden tussen het delen en beschermen van hun kennis, 
technologie en genetisch materiaal. Echter, in de huidige context waar 
arme maar biodiversiteits-rijke landen en gemeenschappen, zowel als 
geïndustrialiseerde landen en biotechnologie bedrijven, vooral gefocust 
zijn op de bescherming van hun materiaal om daar de vruchten van te 
plukken en diefstal te voorkomen, zijn publieke onderzoeksinstellingen 
het aan hun stand verplicht om te durven delen. Daarvoor moeten ze 
nieuwe manieren van delen en beschermen ontwikkelen die aansluiten bij 
hun missie en het best de publieke belangen dient. 
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Intellectueel eigendomsrechten 
in publiek onderzoek 
herbeschouwt: Een symposium 
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat het startdocument en verslag van de internationale 
conferentie “Intellectueel eigendomsrechten in publiek onderzoek 
herbeschouwt: Het delen van biotechnologie met ontwikkelingslanden”, 
georganiseerd aan de Wageningen UR in April 2008. Het startdocument 
beschrijft de toenemende rol van intellectueel eigendomsrechten in 
biotechnologie onderzoek en het moeizame proces dat publieke 
onderzoeksinstellingen ondervinden wanneer zij toegang tot beschermde 
technologieën proberen te krijgen ten behoeve van onderzoek voor 
ontwikkelingsdoeleinden. De problemen variëren van het analyseren van 
complexe patentdatasystemen tot het onderhandelen om betaalbare of 
kosteloze licenties te krijgen met partijen die daar zelf weinig baat bij 
hebben. Tegelijkertijd echter, worden publieke onderzoekers zelf ook 
steeds meer gestimuleerd om hun kennis en uitvindingen te beschermen. 
Een belangrijke vraag is daarom hoe publieke onderzoeksinstellingen 
ervoor kunnen (en moeten) zorgen dat hun intellectueel eigendomsbeleid 
innovatie in ontwikkelingslanden niet blokkeert. 
 
Over deze kwesties is  gediscussieerd tijdens de internationale conferentie 
die partijen van verschillende disciplines en achtergronden bijeenbracht, 
waaronder plantkunde, sociale wetenschappen, ontwikkelingsstudies, 
intellectueel eigendom organisaties, onderzoeksfinancieringsorganisaties, 
de zaadindustrie en publieke groepen. Het verslag beschrijft de 
verschillende discussies, presentaties en belangrijkste uitkomsten van de 
conferentie. Daarbij is ook gesproken over mogelijke strategieën die 
publieke onderzoeksinstellingen kunnen helpen hun bewegingsvrijheid 
met betrekking tot onderzoek voor ontwikkelingsdoeleinden te vergroten, 
zoals de zogenaamde patent-pools, humanitaire licenties en open-source 
biotechnologie. 
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Wetenschapsvalorisatie met 
welke waarden? 
Hoofdstuk 7 omvat een artikel dat reflecteert op de huidige trend van 
valorisatie – het creëren van economische waarde – binnen de publieke 
onderzoekssector. Meer specifiek richt het zich op de vraag of de nadruk 
op economische indicatoren de optimale manier is voor de wetenschap om 
een bijdrage te leveren aan de maatschappij, of aan de 
wetenschapsontwikkeling zelf. Daarbij wordt teruggekeken op de 
Wageningse conferentie over dit onderwerp, maar nu met speciale 
aandacht voor het organisatorische proces en de moeilijkheden om 
verschillende partijen bijeen te brengen om complexe problemen en de 
daarbij mogelijke oplossingen te bespreken. 
 
Bij de kwestie van valorisatie in het publieke onderzoek zijn veel 
verschillende opvattingen en tegenstrijdige belangen betrokken. Om tot 
werkbare oplossingen te komen op dit gebied is daarom een continue input 
van, en dialoog tussen, de verschillende belanghebbenden vereist. Dit 
blijkt niet altijd makkelijk realiseerbaar, bijvoorbeeld omdat 
belanghebbenden het al oneens kunnen zijn over de probleemdefinitie op 
zich: Wat een probleem is voor de ene groep kan iets triviaals of zelfs een 
voordeel zijn voor de ander, ook binnen één en dezelfde organisatie. Maar 
aangezien de huidige valorisatietrend de rol van het publieke onderzoek 
zelf beïnvloedt, zullen onderzoeksinstellingen en individuele onderzoekers 
de nodige tijd en moeite moeten investeren om te reflecteren op diens 
impact en (lange termijn) gevolgen. 
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Op weg naar rechtvaardigheid 
in benefit-sharing 
Hoofdstuk 8 brengt de voornaamste uitkomsten van dit onderzoeksproject 
samen. Zonder alle conclusies van de voorgaande hoofdstukken in detail 
te herhalen, geeft het een overzicht door te reflecteren op de 
onderzoeksvragen uit Hoofdstuk 1 en de algemene conclusies die daaruit 
voortgekomen zijn. Gegeven de vele praktische (en ethische) knelpunten 
rond benefit-sharing, en de sterk uiteenlopende belangen en opvattingen 
over het delen en/of beschermen van plant genetisch materiaal, 
(traditionele) kennis en intellectueel eigendomsrechten, kunnen we 
voorspellen dat het debat rond benefit-sharing vooralsnog niet voorbij zal 
zijn. In dit proefschrift worden enkele fundamentele veranderingen in het 
huidige uitwisselingsmodel van de CBD voorgesteld om zo de huidige 
impasse in de internationale ABS onderhandelingen te doorbreken, en om 
te werken naar een eerlijke en gelijke uitkomst daarvan. Het moet 
duidelijk zijn dat benefit-sharing ook lasten (burden-sharing) met zich 
meebrengt, en dat voor een succesvolle implementatie van fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing een voortdurende betrokkenheid vereist is van 
alle partijen op internationaal, nationaal en lokaal niveau. Met deze 
betrokkenheid kan benefit-sharing een nieuwe ‘standaard van 
rechtvaardigheid’ worden voor hoe landen, bedrijven, publieke 
onderzoeksinstellingen, en inheemse gemeenschappen met elkaar omgaan. 
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